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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
MOVING IMITATION: PERFORMING PIETY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLISH LITERATURE 
 
Author: Sara Hong 
Advisor: Mary Thomas Crane 
 
Using the rich concept of imitatio as an organizing theme, this study explores the 
tangibility of faith and a privileging of an affective, embodied religious subjectivity in 
post-Reformation England.  Moving Imitation asserts that literary and devotional 
concepts of imitatio—as the Humanist activity of translation and as imitatio Christi—
were intensely interested in semiotics.  Indeed, if the Renaissance was a period in which 
literary imitatio flourished, advancements in translation theory were not unaccompanied 
by anxieties—in this case, anxieties about the stability of language itself.  Likewise, as 
iconophilia turned into iconophobia, a similar anxiety about the reliability of signs also 
characterized the turmoil of the English Reformation.  Moving Imitation examines the 
overlapping qualities of both types of imitatio in order to point out how an important 
devotional aesthetic in the period involves a type of embodied imitation.  The human 
body’s resonance with the humanity of Christ and the pre-Cartesian worldview that saw 
the human body as fully engaged with what we consider to be more cognitive functions 
contributed to a privileging of the body as an acceptable sign of true devotion.      
Beginning with Sir Thomas Wyatt’s paraphrase of the traditional penitential psalms, 
Moving Imitation explores the translation of penitence in Wyatt’s work, and argues that a 
focus on David’s outward gestures and body lends a firmness to a work that is otherwise 
anxious about the mutable nature of human words.  Chapter two examines the suffering 
bodies in John Foxe’s Acts and Monuments and their enactment of a visible imitatio 
Christi.  Terms such as “members” function in its corporeal and communal senses in Acts 
and Monuments, for the marks of one’s membership in the “true church” are born, 
literally, on one’s members.  Although much of Foxe’s argumentation includes polemical 
disputes that seek to shut out a copia of meanings to the words, “This is my body,” Foxe 
as an editor exploits the polysemous nature of the body in its corporeal and communal 
sensibilities.  The performative aspects of martyrdom pave the way to a discussion of 
what I call transformative imitatio in William Shakespeare’s Hamlet and The Winter’s 
Tale.  Although the theater’s ability to “body forth” its fiction is a source of anxiety for 
antitheatricalists, proponents of the stage saw it as a way to defend the theater.  Moving 
Imitation notes that the characterization of the stage’s dangers—the ability to move 
people’s affections—articulates an important Reformist desire: that the individual subject 
should not only be affected, but also be galvanized into devotional imitation.  Such 
interest in action becomes important in Hamlet; if the central dilemma of the play 
(Hamlet’s inability to take action) is considered against a common religious dilemma 
(how one stirs oneself towards genuine worship) the solutions as well as the problems 
overlap. Through the statue scene of The Winter’s Tale, Shakespeare defuses the danger 
attributed to the stage by animating a potentially idolatrous image with life; in ways that 
were only hinted at in Hamlet, The Winter’s Tale makes use of the lively bodies onstage 
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to suggest that the presumed connection between idolatry and the imitative stage is an 
unwarranted one, and “to see… life as lively mocked” can help to perform redemption.  
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  1 
INTRODUCTION 
VERSIONS OF IMITATIO  
This dissertation examines how the semantically rich concept of imitatio helped 
shape the responses triggered by the religious anxieties of the English Reformation.  
While the theory of literary imitation in the Renaissance differed from source to source, 
its wide influence in the period is undeniable and has generated much fruitful 
scholarship.
1
  Aside from its ubiquity in early modern culture, one of the most intriguing 
aspects of early modern imitatio is the fact that the translator is conceived to be both the 
subject and object of translation—that is, as one imitates and produces a new work of 
one’s own, the activity of translation begets a kind of transformation within the writer 
himself.  Since Humanists viewed education as an ethical as well as an intellectual 
endeavor, imitatio was an important pedagogical tool in instilling not just proper writing 
techniques, but cognitive and ethical patterns of behavior as well.  Indeed, the multiple 
metaphors used to describe good and bad works of imitation are indicative of how 
imitatio was viewed as an organic process; in its apian, digestive, filial, and simian 
images, imitation operates, at a fundamental level, as a conversion process.  To quote 
Petrarch’s advice: “Take care that what you have gathered does not long remain in its 
original form inside of you: the bees would not be glorious if they did not convert what 
they found into something different and something better. 
Although the literary and devotional definitions of the term imitatio are not 
conventionally paired, I see articulated in the converting effects of the good imitator an 
important desire in early modern religion: imitation that results in comprehensive change.  
Just as the metaphor of a bee’s activity reflects the ideal translation of language and 
  2 
ideas, the bee’s ability to extract and convert manifests the essence of the devout soul.  In 
his popular guide to private devotion, Francois de Sales borrows from the familiar literary 
metaphor in order to illustrate his point about personal piety: “Watch a bee hovering over 
the mountain thyme; the juices it gathers are bitter, but the bee turns them all to honey—
and so tells the worldling that though the devout soul finds bitter herbs along its path of 
devotion, they are all turned to sweetness and pleasantness as it treads.”
2
 The life of 
Christ illuminates the “path of devotion,” and the concept of imitatio Christi was seen as 
an important touchstone for personal piety in early modern England. 
Just as the literary understanding of imitatio did not have a fixed definition, 
imitatio Christi also operated as a loosely-defined term in early modern England.  
Functioning as an important religious ideal, imitatio Christi emphasized Christ as the 
perfect example for believers to follow, and was further popularized through Thomas a 
Kempis’ fifteenth-century work.  Although Kempis’ Latin work operated originally 
within the context of Catholic piety, popular Protestant translations such as Thomas 
Rogers’ 1580 version points to how the idea of imitatio Christi remained a vibrant notion 
in Elizabethan England.
3
  Passages such as Ephesians 5:1-2 provided scriptural impetus 
for imitation as worship: “Bee yee therefore followers of God, as deare children, and 
walke in loue, euen as Christ hath loued vs, and hath giuen himselfe for vs” (Geneva 
version).  Indeed, the logic of correlation and imitation is found everywhere in Scripture, 
and is a particularly important idea in the Pauline epistles.  In emphasizing the 
correspondence between Christ (referent) and the believer (sign), the theme of imitatio 
Christi pointed to the unbridgeable gap between oneself and one’s model (doctrine of 
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depravity), and yet operated as an viable mode of Christian self-fashioning (doctrine of 
sanctification).   
It is here in the realm of signs that imitatio (as Renaissance Humanist literary 
activity) and imitatio Christi (as a devotional ideal) meet.  As Thomas M. Greene has 
pointed out, if the Renaissance was a period in which imitatio flourished, the innovations 
were not unaccompanied by anxieties—in this case, anxieties about the stability of 
language itself.  Indeed, advancements in translation theory also made Humanist scholars 
aware of the unstable nature of language—how the present language “supplies only a 
treacherous gloss” upon the lost past— and the work of imitatio pointed to the 
impossibility of “true” replication (8).  In his work on language and meaning in the 
Renaissance, Richard Waswo takes a similar view and asserts that new interpretative 
techniques employed by Renaissance scholars ultimately led to the questioning of the 
very nature of what constitutes reality.
4
  Waswo contends that since traditional Platonic 
dualism was undermined by the difficulties of translation, meaning was unwittingly 
becoming divorced from its reference in ways that anticipate postmodern formulations of 
the sign.   
While the critics mentioned above do not engage directly with religious texts of 
the period, a similar anxiety about the slipperiness of signs characterizes the turmoil of 
the English Reformation.  As iconophilia turned into iconophobia, the religious rift of the 
Reformation questioned (and literally tore down) traditional signs of faith.  In the 
Eucharistic debates—what Thomas Cranmer called “the pith of the matter” of the English 
Reformation—we see such interrogation of signs take center stage.
5
  As the focal point of 
Reformation controversy, the Eucharistic debate makes clear the critical connection 
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between translation and religion.  According to the Reformers, priests had misconstrued 
the words “Hoc est corpus meum” by understanding the figurative words as literal ones 
and, in their transformation of a trope into flesh, subsequently polluted the gospel with 
base materialist theology.  It is perhaps not surprising, then, that in important Protestant 
texts such as John Foxe’s Acts and Monuments, the papists’ carnality is linked to their 
mistranslation of scripture: their sins are portrayed as philological as well as religious 
violations of the truth. 
Using the Humanist literary activity (and anxieties) of imitatio as a starting point, 
this dissertation explores imitatio’s role as an important technique not just in literature, 
but also in the arena of religious devotion.  Specifically, it argues that the profound 
epistemological crises brought on by the Reformation made the concept of imitatio all 
the more relevant, especially as a way to negotiate the devotional landmines of 
hypocrisy and idolatry.  It is here that the human body becomes a surprisingly reliable 
sign of right imitation.  Despite the body/soul dualism attributed to traditional Christian 
doctrine, Christ’s incarnational certitude and the privileging of immanence authorized 
the human body as an appropriate sign of devotion. At first glance, this is perhaps most 
surprising in light of the iconoclastic theme found in Protestant devotional aesthetic.  
Critics have summarized the differing paradigms for Catholic and Protestant aesthetics 
as a competition between images and words, which value certain methods of cognition 
over others.
6
  However, though Reformist claims of a transcendent mode of 
knowledge—exercising the mind’s eye versus the “idolatrous” physical eye, for 
example—would seem to reject the human body as a viable form of knowing the divine 
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Other, Protestant anti-materialism treated the human body more ambivalently and, at 
times, with surprising affirmation.
 7
   
The fact that Christ’s identity was understood as incarnate complicates the sola 
scriptura thrust of the Reformation, and this study examines the desire for a tangibility 
of faith in Reformation England.  In this way, matters that stand beyond the bounds of 
ocular proof help organize my dissertation chapters: Sir Thomas Wyatt’s translation of 
repentance in The Penitential Psalms; issues of true martyrdom in John Foxe’s Acts and 
Monuments; and the performance of verity in William Shakespeare’s Hamlet and The 
Winter’s Tale.  Although these texts vary in genre, they all point to an embodiment of 
proof that privilege the human body as a trustworthy sign.  As I discuss later, the body’s 
resonance with the humanity of Christ, and the pre-Cartesian worldview that saw the 
human body as fully engaged with what we consider to be more cognitive functions, 
contributed to a privileging of the body as an acceptable sign of true devotion in a 
religiously fraught age.  More than the fallen language of man, the language of the body 
was deemed to be more reliable, and the body was perceived to be a stable vehicle that 
could enact, and even trigger, right imitatio.  
IMAGE AND WORD 
Although my project functions microscopically as an examination of the 
conceptual overlaps between various forms of imitatio, it also participates in a larger 
critical discussion surrounding early modern iconoclasm.  Described by Michael 
O’Connell as a phenomenon that begins in the 1520s and, when it begins, “it is with such 
suddenness and intensity that there is no question of checking abuses and reforming 
excesses.  [Iconoclasm] is directed against the entire system of worship and devotion and 
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aims to replace it with a radically different system based on verbal structures” (50).  
Although Protestant iconoclasm is an undisputed phenomenon in England and captures 
the spirit of the Reformist movement, the human body operates as a safe imago Dei, and 
offers an alternative to the conflict paradigm traditionally ascribed to the Catholic-image 
and Protestant-word relationship.  Focusing on how the human body was viewed as 
directly in alignment with emotions helps to fill in some of the gaps in sectarian 
aesthetics; that is, even as the corporeal “real presence” became relegated to the realm of 
language and metaphor, the nature of true faith still took on an embodied, material quality 
in the period.   
It is helpful here to make the distinction that St. Paul makes between the flesh and 
the body in the New Testament.  Although the flesh (sarx) and the body (soma) became 
virtually indistinguishable in the aftermath of Augustinian thought, the body was seen as 
a more neutral vehicle.
 8
  In Pauline thought, the human body functions as an important 
metaphor (the body of Christ and individuals as members of that body) and also as a 
way to enact one’s connection to the divine.  This is the logic behind harsh Pauline 
rebukes such as the one found in the first letter to the Corinthians: “Know ye not that 
your bodies are the members of Christ? Shall I then take the members of Christ, and 
make them the members of an harlot? God forbid” (1 Corinthians 6:15 KJV).  The 
slippage between figurative and physical domains becomes apparent through the use of 
the term members; what one chooses to do with one’s physical members in effect can 
disqualify one from being a spiritual member of the body of Christ.   
While the scope of my project does not allow me to trace the history of the 
devotional body, I am indebted to medieval scholarship that shows the importance of the 
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body in religious practices, and finds the blurred boundaries between sensation/reason to 
be helpful in formulating my own thoughts about how the body was seen as a legitimate 
sign of devotion.
9
  Early modern critics’ works such as Katherine E. Maus’s study on 
inwardness and early modern theater also usefully demonstrate the centrality of religion 
in understanding subjectivity in the period.  In particular, Maus focuses upon the 
epistemological anxieties posed by hypocrisy.  She states: 
On the one hand, the theistic context in which the problem of human inwardness 
is posed provides a standard of what would constitute certainty.  On the other 
hand, faith itself encourages a kind of mistrust: for what is most true about human 
beings in such a system is simultaneously least verifiable.
10
    
Like Maus, I also focus on the notion that faith is beyond ocular proof in this work; 
however, I propose that rather than actions, it is words that are frequently viewed as 
inadequate signs of “true” faith and are seen as agents of hypocrisy.  Scriptural passages 
such as Matthew 7:21 had always made the need for distinguishing between true and 
false believers relevant—“Not euery one that sayeth vnto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter 
into the kingdome of heauen”—yet the religious turbulence of the Reformation made the 
work of distinction-making even more urgent, and language itself seemed to pose the 
greatest threat to religious integrity.  The logocentric aesthetic of Reformist doctrine 
rejected empty rhetoric that claimed faith but did not practice it; yet the practical piety 
that characterized Protestant devotional works required an embodied dimension in 
imitation and devotion.   
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EMBODIED DEVOTION  
While the importance of holistic worship is not a novel idea in Scripture, I suggest 
that the reason for how the body could be seen as a conduit and as a stable sign of 
devotion by Protestant divines was strengthened by the uniquely embodied way in which 
interiority was understood in the period.  In her work on dominant habits of thought in 
the Renaissance, Debora Shuger has noted how “religion… supplies the primary 
language of analysis” for this culture;
11
 this study extends this observation in order to 
focus specifically on the affective, embodied language with which believers were 
exhorted to see themselves.  The tactility of faith embedded in Scripture becomes more 
significant in a culture that understood terms such as “affections” and “passions” as being 
anchored in the body.  
The primacy of the body in Renaissance literature has long been noted; however, 
greater attention needs to be paid to the permeability of the body and its role in shaping 
subjectivity.
12
  This study’s approach to subjectivity and its embodied aspects draws upon 
a non-Cartesian understanding of the self, whose impact upon early modern literature has 
been studied by critics such as Gail Kern Paster, Michael Schoenfeldt, and Mary Floyd-
Wilson.
13
  The productive, liminal status of the body in early modern imagination results 
partly from a pre-Cartesian paradigm that did not separate the physiological from the 
psychological, a blurring of boundaries that did not draw a division between what we 
now consider to be interior (the mind) and the exterior (the body).  The permeability of 
selfhood challenges traditional thoughts about noncorporeal inwardness, which see the 
body as the mind’s instrument and product.
14
  It is significant, then, that true knowledge 
of the divine is frequently described in terms of affections and passions in many 
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devotional works.  In a period in which the psychological was not yet removed from the 
physiological, the affective terminology with which the believer was encouraged to view 
his relationship with God required him to be moved not just rationally, but emotionally 
and bodily as well.  It is precisely the kind of unintentional transformation that happens in 
good imitatio.  
Two works by the Cambridge divine William Perkins serve to illustrate the above 
point regarding embodied imitatio.  In A Case of Conscience (1592) and A Declaration of 
the True Manner of Knowing Christ Crucified (1596), Perkins addresses the 
contemporary religious anxieties surrounding election and true knowledge.  Indeed, the 
full title of Perkins’ A Case of Conscience is instructive, since it includes the phrase, 
“How a man may know, whether he be the son of God or no”—a succinct formulation 
that captures the religious concerns of the day. The method by which Perkins takes up 
this question is dialogical in nature; after the preface in which he addresses the “godly 
reader,” the rest of the work is made up of a dialogue between the Church (expressing 
anxieties of the general Christian) and John (taking voice from the first epistle of John).  
The dialogue provides a fascinating glimpse into how religious anxiety fuels the desire 
for assurance.  The voice of the Church constantly undermines the confidence with which 
the Apostle John speaks; following the declaration that Christ is the propitiation for the 
whole world, for example, the voice of the Church asks, “Be it that I knowe him to be my 
aduocate: may I not be deceaued? Howe may I knowe, that this my knowledge is 
effectuall to saluation?”  Here lies the crux of the matter in the diverse array of devotional 
works in Tudor England—the distinction between true and false knowledge of God.  
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While the answer seems frustratingly circuitous in A Case of Conscience, Perkins 
is more forthright in his later tract, A Declaration of the True Manner of Knowing Christ 
Crucified (1596).  If Perkins’ tone in his earlier work is one that attempts to be 
reassuring, it is decidedly more resolute in this later tract.  Addressing a “common sinne 
of men at this day” in which men only have a shallow understanding of Christ crucified, 
Perkins expounds on the nature of truly knowing Christ, and employs the language of 
embodiment in order to do so.  The reliance upon the human body seems to be catalyzed 
by how false knowledge is construed: for Perkins, the way towards true knowledge is 
pitted against the fallacious pathway of partial knowledge—an inadequacy signaled by 
the poverty of mere mental knowledge, which, as Perkins points out, even the devils 
have.  Referring to such inadequate knowledge as knowledge consisting of a “swimming 
in the braine, which doth not alter and dispose the affection of the whole man,” his 
preface makes clear that it is not mere rhetoric that counts as true knowledge, and lays 
out the following steps: “to be touched with an inward and a lively feeling of our sinnes” 
and “secondly in the Passion, as in a myrrour, to behold and in beholding to labour to 
comprehend the length, the breadth, the height, the depth of the love of the father.”
15
   
Two elements are striking here: the value placed upon emotive knowledge 
(“lively feeling”) and the construction of devotion as “labour.”  They point to a 
significant assumption about devotion—that man is inherently resistant to worship—and 
to the body as a productive site for inciting true devotion.  Human depravity necessitates 
that admonishments towards active and feeling devotion become uttered, and Perkins 
notes how one moves toward such authentic devotion through “labour.”  Of course, the 
Reformist emphasis on sola scriptura meant that much of that labor involved the activity 
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of reading and understanding the vernacular Bible; yet, as Perkins (along with other 
Reformist writers) asserts, mere mental knowledge is not enough.  He states in A 
Declaration that worthwhile knowledge “must not be onely speculative, that is, barely 
conceiued in the braine, but it must be experimental: because we ought to haue 
experience of it in our hearts and liues, and we should labour by all meanes possible to 
feele the power of Christs death.”  Perkins’ works point to a theme apparent in many 
Reformist devotional texts—the rejection of a compartmentalized knowledge of God—
and indicate the importance of the human body in authentic imitatio Christi.   
This notion is graphically demonstrated in Perkins’ reference to the Old 
Testament story of Elijah and the widow.  Citing the prophet as a model of someone who 
truly knows God, Perkins urges the reader to know Christ crucified in the same way that 
Elijah revived the child of the Shunamite widow: that is, by lying on top of the dead 
boy’s body and resurrecting him through a kind of body-to-body resuscitation.  Perkins’ 
vivid description is worth citing here at length, as he exhorts the reader toward an 
imitation of the prophet’s ways:  
Even so, if thou wouldst be revived to everlasting life, thou must by faith as it 
were set thy self upon the cross of Christ, and applie thy hands to his hands, thy 
feete to his feete, and thy sinful heart to his bleeding heart, and content not thy 
self with Thomas to put thy finger into his side, but even dive and plunge thy self 
wholly both bodie and soul into the woundes and bloode of Christ. 
Although Perkins’ language is figurative here, his encouragement for believers to “dive 
and plunge thy self wholly both bodie and soul” attests to the importance of 
understanding true devotion in embodied terms.  Perkins instructs the reader to set 
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himself upon the cross “by faith,” since one must know Christ experientially and with a 
kind of visceral vigor.  Only then will proper emotions and faith be stirred in the 
believing individual, so that there will be an assurance of true knowledge.  
Perkins’ directions for “true knowledge” are striking but not uncommon in 
Reformist rhetoric.  As Richard Strier notes, although western tradition typically vilifies 
strong passions, they are a necessary component in Christian doctrine since they drive the 
naturally stony, cold self to desire the divine other.
16
  Consequently, various devotion 
manuals portray devotion as a process, within which the body is a positive prerequisite to 
positioning and driving oneself towards sincere devotion.  George Downame’s treatise on 
“practical prayer,” for example, defines prayer in this way: “True prayer is not a bare 
reading or recitall of any form of prayer without understanding, without affection, 
without devotion, without faith; but a religious service devoutly offered unto God out of 
an upright and pure heart.”
17
  The gap between sign and thing becomes most vulnerable 
to attack within the context of prayer; the right feelings must be stirred in order to breach 
any gap between reciting and understanding. Perhaps appropriately, then, Downame 
places affection as the second step in an implied process involving understanding, 
affection, devotion, and faith.   
As Cynthia Garret notes regarding English prayer manuals, they “do not advise 
the reader to feign an emotion he does not feel” (339).  Yet devotion manuals also 
acknowledge that the believer needs incitement—a stirring up of one’s affections in order 
to pray, since the doctrine of utter depravity dictates that the believer is not inclined 
towards prayer.  Thus, the instruction manuals on devotion implicitly contain the idea 
that sincere devotion requires work that incorporates the external and internal orderings 
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of the body.  George Downame, for example, includes a section on “holy gestures” in The 
Doctrine of Practical Prayer and labels them as honorem signi.  He states: “Now our 
bodies and members thereof, as they are the instruments so also the indices and 
manifesters of our souls: and therefore the signes of those graces which we contein in our 
souls must (when they may conveniently) be expressed in the body.”  Citing how 
“gesture and voice do greatly serve to help both the attention of the mind and intention of 
the affections,” Downame later concludes that “in publick prayers they are also good 
means to excited and stirre up one another.” 
ERASMUS AND ETHICAL IMITATIO 
Erasmian notions of true eloquence crystallize the notion of being stirred first in 
order to enact good imitatio, and offer another bridge between secular and devotional 
concepts of the word.  Widely circulated in the early sixteenth century and the subject of 
much controversy in Erasmus’ lifetime, Ciceronianus (1528) attacks the rigidity of 
“Ciceronian” eloquence made popular in certain schools of rhetoric.  Through the voice 
of Bulephorus, Erasmus formulates his ideas about what constitutes good imitatio: 
mainly, that in order to be a true imitator of Cicero, the spirit of Cicero must be imitated 
rather than following him to the letter.  The dialogue touches upon common conceptions 
of imitatio: good imitation is like bees gathering honey, not the activity of apes and 
crows; good imitation enlivens one’s natural talents, whereas bad imitation kills and 
deadens.  While the list of reasons for abandoning a literal following of Cicero is long, 
the ones of central interest to this study involve an affective principle at work—that is, 
unless one’s eloquence moves the listener, one’s attempts are futile.  It is a concept that 
  14
defines the difference between good and bad imitatio for Erasmus, and an idea that lies at 
the heart of English devotional aesthetic. 
Like other Humanist thinkers, Erasmus displays a growing awareness of linguistic 
mutability as he points to historic appropriateness as a central element for what 
constitutes good imitation.  According to him, the greatest linguistic faux pas involves the 
use of pagan terminology when speaking about Christian subjects; because we no longer 
live in the times of Cicero but in an age of Christianity, one must accommodate one’s 
language appropriately.  He states through Bulephorus: 
 Wherever I turn I see things changed, I stand on another stage, I see another 
theater, yes another world.  What shall I do?  I, a Christian, must speak to 
Christians about the Christian religion.  In order that I may speak fittingly, shall I 
imagine that I am living in the age of Cicero and speaking in a crowded senate in 
the presence of the senators on the Tarpeian Rock?  (62) 
Bulephorus then goes on to cite an uninspiring example of a speaker who spoke in 
Roman terms about the death and resurrection of Christ.  Although this speaker spoke 
elegantly, “in so Roman a fashion spoke that Roman that I heard nothing about the death 
of Christ… he said almost nothing on the subject which he seemed neither to know nor to 
care for, nothing to the point, and moved no one’s feelings” (65).  Rather than adding 
elegance to his speech, the speaker’s anachronistic approach resulted in failure.   
In light of the emphasis placed on affections in a devotional context, the 
description of the speaker’s failings is significant, for success is construed in terms of 
knowledge and emotions.  The dialogue makes clear that in order to possess the true spirit 
of Cicero, one must first possess a thorough knowledge of the subject and be deeply 
  15
moved first in order to move others.  In this way, pleasurable eloquence is not enough, 
since it does not effect true change.  Bulephorus advises the following to those who 
desire to make an impact on the audience:  
It is not enough to arouse in the reader little temporary feelings of delight; 
emotions worthy of the Lord must be aroused.  And you cannot do this unless you 
have the subject you are handling thoroughly mastered: for you will not inflame if 
you yourself are cold; you will not set the reader’s mind on fire with the love of 
celestial things, if you yourself are but lukewarm. (119) 
The steps toward good imitatio involve a transformation that is judged to happen within 
oneself first: “You will not inflame if you yourself are cold; you not set the reader’s mind 
on fire with the love of celestial things, if you yourself are but lukewarm.”  It is an 
injunction that is echoed and, perhaps more importantly, idealized in devotional tracts.  
The flourishes of eloquence are not to be preferred over substance; consequently, “That 
which merely furnishes amusement cannot continue to please, especially if those who are 
reading have the end in view not only to speak with greater polish, but to live better” 
(116).  Here, it becomes apparent that Erasmus reached for a type of imitatio that resided 
not just in speech, but would be embodied in a lifestyle. 
OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
Although I work specifically with the Humanist literary technique, imitatio, in 
chapter one of this study, the way I use the term imitatio is closely aligned to the general 
term imitate as well.  As even a cursory look at the Oxford English Dictionary shows, the 
term imitate possesses a wide spectrum of meanings.  Understood in its classical context, 
imitation as mimesis highlighted the gap between the real and the counterfeit—reason 
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enough for poets to be exiled in Plato’s Republic—and this image of art as a counterfeit, 
illegitimate imitation is an idea that haunts the period’s most ambitious works.  While it 
is not my intention to excavate the full range of meanings held within the term imitate, I 
want to establish the relevance and complexity of the term imitate as it functions in 
literary and religious contexts.  Interestingly, the first recorded use of the word is found 
in Thomas More’s On the Passion (1534) in which he applies the verb to how believers 
ought to relate to Christ’s sacrifice: “He that so receiueth the bloude of hys redeemer, that 
he will not yet imitate and follow his passion” (OED).  From the start, the believer’s 
action of imitation is directly connected to his devotional sincerity, if the object of 
imitation is Christ.  
 In this way, the motif of imitatio—in its literary, emulative, transformative, and 
antitheatrical aspects—guides the organization of my chapters.  Though placed in 
chronological sequence, I do not mean to ascribe teleological meaning to the list; the 
genre-crossing from Wyatt to Shakespeare is meant to highlight the overlaps in embodied 
imitatio rather than reify these texts.  The first chapter examines the relationship between 
secular and religious imitatio in Sir Thomas Wyatt’s literary works.  Building upon 
Thomas M. Greene’s work on Renaissance imitatio, I argue that Wyatt was enabled 
towards productive imitation through a focus on the body—a technique that results in a 
diachronic reproduction of the original work.  While the bulk of the chapter focuses on 
Wyatt’s religious translation, The Penitential Psalms, the beginning pages examine his 
Petrarchan imitative works.  They argue that the presentness attributed to Wyatt’s 
successful Petrarchan imitations is achieved through an emphasis on the speaker’s 
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body—a strategy that carries over to the expression of penitence in his arrangement of the 
seven traditional penitentiary psalms.   
Whereas chapter one focuses solely on textual imitation, chapter two looks at a 
more religious form of emulative imitatio through John Foxe’s Acts and Monuments.  
The concept of imitatio Christi is highly relevant to the genre of martyrology.  Keeping 
Foxe’s Protestant agenda in mind, this chapter examines the editorial strategy that Foxe 
employs in his massive and hugely influential work.  Analyzing select accounts of 
Henrician and Marian martyrs, I argue that Foxe creates a community of the true church 
by deploying double levels of meanings to words such as members—that is, in order to 
count as a member of the true church, one must be willing to subject one’s members to 
pain and martyrdom.  While both sides of the Eucharistic debate would reject the 
slipperiness of the sacred host operating on literal and figurative levels, the martyrs use a 
kind of semiotics that insists upon the relevancy of both in Foxe’s work.  After examining 
how the body in pain is made to serve as an undeniable real presence of faith in Foxe’s 
work, I study the didactic strategy of emulative imitatio and, specifically, its impact upon 
the kind of “audience” that gathered to witness these martyrdoms.  Fleshing out the 
Greek meaning of martyr (witness), the spectators are given an important place in both 
the visual and narrative descriptions of martyrdom, and point to the dramatic components 
evident in Acts and Monuments. 
Such dramatic elements in Acts and Monuments pave the way to a discussion of 
the stage, and the last chapters on Hamlet and The Winter’s Tale explore how a 
transformative notion of imitatio permeates the antitheatrical and devotional writings of 
late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.  Building upon scholarship that identifies 
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the proximity between the pulpit and the popular stage, the chapters examine the 
ambivalent values placed upon “lively” portraiture in antitheatrical and devotional 
discourses. The public stage’s infectious and stirring effects were seen as chief reasons 
for denouncing the playhouse as the “devil’s pulpit.”  The dangers of theater—that of 
stirring the members of the audience—are viewed more favorably, however, by 
contemporary religious discourses that worry over a listless and ardor-less spirit.  After 
establishing the connecting element of “lively portraiture” in antitheatrical and devotional 
discourses, I explore how the transformative powers of the stage play out in central 
moments of Hamlet.  In the stifling confines of Elsinore, Prince Hamlet identifies the 
play as the thing to “catch the conscience of the king.” As a means toward representing 
an invisible interiority, the body is at once anathema and a site for truth for Hamlet, and 
ultimately plays an instrumental role in the prince becoming “Hamlet the Dane.” 
The “lively portraits” in Hamlet give way to the lively statue of Hermione in the 
spectacular ending to The Winter’s Tale.  The work of remembering from the previous 
chapter becomes an embodied re-membering in the celebrated ending to the play. 
Building upon the previous chapter’s notion of positive performance—one that can enact 
action and not merely counterfeit it—this last chapter examines the imitation of reality 
and the central role that Hermione’s body plays in the work of redemption in the play.  
Arguing that Leontes’ jealousy can be understood in terms of contemporary notions of 
idolatry, I point out how the wintry world of the first three acts requires the warmth of 
Hermione’s breathing body in the final scene.  Specifically, because Leontes insists on 
seeing her as merely flesh—“no barricado for a belly”—in his self-referential, idolatrous 
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gaze, the redemption that the king needs to undergo is a re-recognition of her status as a 
fully human being.   
The relevance of the body in early modern culture is undisputed; indeed, the 
seemingly endless proliferation of figurative and analogical imageries that converge upon 
the body during the Renaissance has led to the characterization of the period as a culture 
of anatomization and blazoning.  Only recently, however, have our readings of the body 
in early modern culture begun to move away from an anachronistic imposition of a post-
Cartesian split between mind and body.  While an exploration of the corporeality of 
inwardness has begun, further work needs to be done linking the culture of embodiment 
with religion in the early modern period.  Using the rich lens offered via imitatio, this 
study examines the implications of holistic imitation in all of its diverse manifestations.
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CHAPTER ONE: SIR THOMAS WYATT AND THE TRANSLATION OF 
DEVOTION 
EARLY MODERN TRANSLATION CULTURE 
Ranging from the halting efforts of schoolboys to polished productions of great 
poets, the term imitatio encompassed a wide range of literary activities in Tudor England.  
Although this chapter focuses on the imitative practices of a single “great poet,” Sir 
Thomas Wyatt, it is important to note from the outset that early modern literary culture 
was a culture of translation.  Belying the Romantic notion of an author having “original” 
creativity, early modern authors engaged in and thrived upon imitation—a technique that 
was part pedagogical, part rhetorical, and all pervasive.  In the religious domain, the term 
imitatio held greatest resonance with the traditional devotional paradigm of imitatio 
Christi.  While the religious definition of imitatio was not always conflated with its 
literary counterpart, it is significant that the literary and devotional activities of imitation 
were often placed within the same network of associations.  In his translation of Thomas 
a Kempis’s Imitation of Christ into English, for example, Thomas Rogers writes of the 
natural human inclination to imitate, which he attributes partly to nature and “partlie 
because we are Englishmen who of al other people are most famous, and infamous too 
for imitation.”
1
  This comment on national character is followed by the statement:  
A shame were it therefore for us to imitate so painfulie as manie do in eloquence 
Cicero; in philosophie Aristotle; in lawe Iustinian; in Physick Galen for worldlie 
wisedome; yea to imitate, as most do, the French in vanitie, the Dutch in luxurie, 
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in brauerie the Spanish, the Papists in idolatrie, in impietie and al impuritie of life 
the Atheists, and not to folowe our Sauior Christ in heauenlie wisedome. 
Rogers argues that the ubiquitous presence of imitation in English culture makes the 
English particularly able to engage in Christ-like imitation, and his belief in such 
“natural” English capacity provides added fuel to his prefatory fervor.  That Rogers is so 
easily able to list the diverse types of imitation—cognitive, external, ethical—attests to 
the seamlessness with which the term imitation encompassed multiple sites of knowledge 
that make up selfhood in early modern England.   
Although the importance of the dual influence (and confluence) of classical and 
Christian traditions is one of the first tenets of Renaissance culture taught in the 
undergraduate classroom, it is important to note that the term imitation takes on a 
peculiarly vibrant and tactile quality for Wyatt through such a culture of secular and 
biblical imitations.  Indeed, it seems appropriate that the metaphor of digestion is used to 
describe both the process of translation and scriptural learning, for each venture is 
frequently imagined as a kind of anabolic, bodily process.  The activity of imitation was 
not compartmentalized into one specific category, but was one that involved the whole 
person.  It is significant, too, that imitation was viewed not simply as a mental exercise, 
but as an important activity towards self-framing and self-development.
2
  Not only did 
the religious use of the word “imitation” possess a sliding relationship with subjectivity—
one that encompassed inward and outward conformity—but Renaissance humanist 
endeavors also viewed the activity of imitation as one that helped to shape selfhood. 
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WYATT, PETRARCH, AND PRODUCTIVE IMITATIO 
In light of the ways in which imitation was understood in such far-reaching and 
embodied ways, what becomes notable through the case of Wyatt’s works are the ways in 
which these notions shape the nature of subjectivity in his imitations of Petrarch and 
Scripture.  Wyatt’s place in English poetry has fluctuated in critical approval over the 
years, a kind of “continuall chaunge” that the self-ironizing poet himself would 
appreciate.  From being known as the father of the “drab age” to the current status of 
someone exemplifying “modern” subjectivity in early modern lyric poetry, Wyatt has 
been the subject of much critical attention in Renaissance studies.
3
  While it is not my 
intention to rehash the various interpretations of Wyatt’s poetry, I seek to reconsider his 
works in light of two concerns: first, the connections between the “secular” and 
“religious” imitative works by Wyatt; second (and in relation to the first), the embodied 
method of constructing subjectivity in Wyatt’s Penitential Psalms.  Whereas previous 
critical efforts to examine Wyatt’s secular and religious works of imitation have tended 
toward reification of one “type” against the other, I explore the ways in which a 
dialectical relationship can exist between them.  Indeed, though much work has been 
done on the topic of Renaissance imitatio, it has been primarily limited to translations of 
secular materials.
4
  Conversely, due to a tendency to be preoccupied with sectarian 
poetics and politics, scholarship on Wyatt’s psalm translation has not fully treated the 
epistemological complexities involved in translating devotion.  Since both types of 
translation possess greater similarities than disparities, it is useful to examine early 
modern psalm translations within the existent theories of dilemmas facing Renaissance 
imitatio.   
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Thomas Greene’s work on Renaissance imitation explores the combination of 
anxiety and creativity involved in Renaissance imitation, and it is worth touching upon 
Greene’s salient points on this topic before moving on to consider the methodology of 
imitation in Wyatt’s Penitential Psalms. Building his argument on the Derridean 
“iterability” of drifting inherent in all languages, Greene describes the “tragic sense of 
loss” that Renaissance writers experienced.  As they realized the unstable nature of 
language, the irretrievable nature of the classical past also became painfully clear to 
them.  This irretrievability was imagined as a historical as well as a cultural gap, a breach 
in time that ultimately led Renaissance writers to acknowledge the linguistic distance 
between sign and thing.  Such developments toward a diachronic perspective of the word 
impacted the humanists’ endeavors toward imitation deeply.  As Greene puts it: 
If a remote text is composed in a language for which the present supplies only a 
treacherous glossary and if it is grounded in a lost concrete specificity never fully 
recoverable, then the tasks of reading, editing, commenting, translating, and 
imitating become intricately problematized—and these were the tasks that 
preoccupied the humanists. (8)   
Yet, as Renaissance writers faced the etiological problem of “constructing retrospectively 
a past from which a literary work could visibly emerge without damaging anachronism,” 
the recognition of the historicity of the signifier was one which ultimately led to positive 
and productive imitation—what Greene terms heuristic or dialectical imitation in his 
categorization of humanist imitation (33).  Acknowledging its dependence and yet not 
crippled by its predecessors, heuristic imitation “becomes a kind of rite de passage 
between a specified past and an emergent present…  It points to a dependence which it 
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then overcomes by a declaration of conditional independence” (41).  This kind of 
imitation is a far cry from the modern-day Bloomsian anxiety of influence, and again 
points to the importance of understanding how authorship and imitation complemented 
one another during the early modern period.   
For Greene, Wyatt’s translations of Petrarch’s sonnets epitomized this model of 
heuristic imitation for Renaissance England.  As one of the earliest respondents to the 
Italian literary Renaissance, Wyatt began to translate from Petrarch’s works after his visit 
to Italy in 1527, and he (together with Surrey) is often cited as the forerunner for creating 
the English sonnet.  George Puttenham in The Arte of English Poesie (1589) would 
acknowledge the national literary implications of Wyatt’s imitative efforts as one in 
which he “greatly polished our rude & homely maner of vulgar Poesie” and through 
which he became one of the “reformers of our English meetre and stile.”  Greene’s praise 
of Wyatt’s Petrarchan imitations is perhaps just as enthusiastic: 
The shadings in Wyatt’s play with subtexts, like the shadings of self-presentation, 
are curiously, hauntingly modern.  Standing at the opening of the mature 
humanist endeavor in England, Wyatt at his ablest demonstrated the potential 
force of diachronic poetry with a subtle power only a few of his successors would 
surpass. (263) 
Greene largely attributes Wyatt’s successful imitation to his ability to tauten the dramatic 
intensity of a poem, an ability that is only possible through recognizing the diachronic 
nature of language.  In many of Wyatt’s imitations such as “The longe love,” the 
circularity of Petrarch’s works is transformed into “a unique, unrepeatable plot” (251).  
The generic ‘I’ of the Petrarchan lover becomes the specific ‘I’ of Wyatt’s speaker—a 
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specificity and uniqueness that are formed through recognizing the inevitable and 
productive iterability of language. 
 While there is no need to review Greene’s analysis of Wyatt’s Petrarchan 
imitations at length here, it is nonetheless important to consider how the creation of 
diachronic poetry intersects with embodied subjectivity in Wyatt’s works.  What I am 
aiming for here is not a semantic analysis that compares Wyatt’s faithful (or faithless) 
translation of Petrarch’s lyric poems, but an investigation into the particular tangibility 
and firmness in Wyatt’s imitative efforts—that is, the element of tangere that is largely 
absent from the original Petrarchan works.  In comparison to the original sonnets, 
Wyatt’s Petrarchan imitations are notable for their personal specificity.  The public, 
universal aspects of Petrarch’s poems become erased by the solipsistic tendencies of 
Wyatt’s speaker—tendencies which are essential for creating subjectivity in Wyatt’s 
imitative works.  Although there is general critical agreement on the historical specificity 
of Wyatt’s lyricism, little work has been done to connect the ways in which an awareness 
of and an emphasis on the body helps to create such diachronic subjectivity.  Wyatt’s 
imitations are works that manifest historical specificity and create lyric subjectivity 
through their preoccupation with the body.  The diachronic method of imitation in these 
poems involves a heightened awareness of the physical presence of the speaker, a 
physicality that signaled specificity and locality.  
 The insistent historicity of the body is one that interrupts the teleological impulse 
of a universalized, public reading, an interruption that resembles the “unrepeatability” of 
Wyatt’s imitations. A Petrarchan imitation that displays such moments of embodied and 
unrepeatable subjectivity is the sonnet, “The longe love.”  
  26
The longe love that in my thought doeth harbar 
And in myn hert doeth kepe his residence 
Into my face preseth with bold pretence 
And therein campeth, spreding his baner. 
She that me lerneth to love and suffre 
And will that my trust and lustes negligence 
Be rayned by reason, shame, and reverence, 
With his hardines taketh displeasure. 
Wherewithall, vnto the hertes forrest he fleith, 
Leving his entreprise with payne and cry, 
And there him hideth and not appereth. 
What may I do when my maister fereth, 
But in the felde with him to lyve and dye? 
For goode is the liff ending faithfully. 
Greene comments regarding this translation that the omission of “sometimes” (talor) in 
Wyatt’s version has the effect of breaking out of a familiar ritual and leading to “tauter 
dramatic intensity” in the poem (252).  While this is true, it is also worthwhile to note 
that the speaker’s physical body also “adds” to the dramatic intensity and contributes to 
the sense of “real” risk in the poem.  Moreover, the tactile details suggest that the 
mistress arouses external as well as internal responses from the speaker, forming an 
external readability that ultimately displeases the mistress.   
 Such physical responses of the speaker to love can be noted in the changes 
between the original Petrarchan and Wyatt’s translated version.  The “forehead” (fronte) 
  27
in Petrarch is translated into “my face” by Wyatt, a difference in anatomical location that 
displaces love from the traditionally rational place of the forehead to the greater 
expressive site of the face.  The figurative language of the description of love as someone 
who “sometimes come forth all in armor into my forehead, there camps, and there sets up 
his banner” takes on greater concreteness in Wyatt’s translation, which states that love 
“into my face preseth with bolde pretence, / And therein campeth, spreding his baner.”
5
  
The added attribution of “bolde pretence” to love disarms the potential for agency from 
the speaker and emphasizes his helpless state before the boldness of love.  Moreover, the 
use of the verb “spreding” evokes the image of a physiological response that takes place 
on the lover’s face, an allusion perhaps to a spreading blush that alerts the lady to the 
speaker’s desire for her.  Likewise, Wyatt’s translation of the place to where love flees in 
reaction to Laura’s anger, “hertes forrest” instead of al core, establishes a firmer image 
than the abstract image of the heart.  The “hertes forrest” touches several levels of 
connotations—the tangled growth of a forest, the place of the hunt for “hertes”—and 
stresses the material element present in the entire endeavor.    
 Another Petrarchan imitation that illustrates such instances of embodied 
subjectivity is Wyatt’s rendering of Petrarch’s sonnet 190.  Here, the looseness of 
Wyatt’s translation makes its relationship to the original an almost unrecognizable one.  
The una candida cerva and the pristine symbolism associated with the sacred symbol of 
Laura all but disappear in Wyatt’s version, “Whoso list to hunt,” in which the 
unknowable evanescence of the white doe becomes the known wiles (and wildness) of 
“the doe”.  Although the wearied worldliness of Wyatt’s speaker in “Whoso list to hunt” 
has been much commented upon, I would like to focus on the physical imagery in this 
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poem as a network of images that generate lyrical subjectivity.  While critics note that 
Wyatt typically ignored the physical aspect of the lady in his Petrarchan imitations, I 
argue that physical awareness is a pertinent factor in Wyatt’s translations.  It becomes 
transferred and transformed, however, into an awareness of the speaker’s own body 
rather than that of the lady.  Even as the speaker admits that it is his “mynde” that is 
principally wearied from partaking in the “vayne travaill,” there is an insistent physical 
presence in Wyatt’s imitation of Petrarch that is wholly devoid in Petrach’s “Una 
Candida Cerva.”  The enjambed line, “But as she fleeth afore, / Faynting I folowe” enacts 
the physical difficulty of the hunt, and the alliteration sounds out the laborious act of 
someone fainting and following.  Moreover, while there is no possibility of holding the 
sacred doe in Petrarch, the voice of the speaker who advises those “who so list to hunt” is 
one that possesses the implied prerequisite of prior experience.  The ‘I’ is the voice of an 
experienced, albeit unsuccessful, hunter, who can personally attest to the weariness of the 
“vayne travail.”   
  Despite their differences, each of the speakers in Petrarch’s and Wyatt’s sonnets 
experiences a similar loss of control in their relationship to the doe.  The ethereal 
imperiousness of the white doe in Petrarch’s sonnet becomes a worldly disdainfulness on 
the part of Wyatt’s hind, and the doe’s inaccessibility is created through the engraved 
words born on the collars on their necks.  For Petrarch, the dignity of the words graven 
around the sacred doe/Laura is a testament of her freedom: “Nessun mi tocchi… Libera 
farmi al mio Cesare parve” (“Let no one touch me… It has pleased my Caesar to make 
me free”).  Wyatt’s hind also bears similar words of inaccessibility, since his sonnet ends 
with the couplet, “Noli me tangere, for Caesar’s I am, / And wild for to hold though I 
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seem tame.”  The mandatory aspect of both “Nessun mi tocchi” and “Noli me tangere” at 
first makes these phrases interchangeable, yet a closer inspection shows their relationship 
to be otherwise.  The multi-valenced aspect of this Latin phrase—“Noli me tangere”— 
opens a fascinating moment of intertextuality in Wyatt’s poem, a heteroglossia of voices 
that seem to slyly undermine the permanence of these graven and inscribed words and 
illustrate the difference of tangere between the original and the imitation.  On one hand, 
Wyatt invokes the well-known Latin motto: “Noli me tangere quia Caesaris sum,” which 
Caesar’s hinds bore around their necks as they were set free.  On the other hand, the 
words Noli me tangere echo the similarly well-known first words that the resurrected 
Christ speaks in the Gospels to Mary Magdalen (John 20:17).  The ramifications of these 
competing and/or complementary echoes are fascinating: the evocation of Christ’s sacred 
body mingles with the conventional “wildness” of female sexuality, and the former 
infuses the latter with sacred otherworldliness.   
 In both readings of Wyatt’s translations of Petrarch’s sonnets, then, it is evident 
that Wyatt is drawn towards establishing a tactility of images.  The heuristic imitation 
that Greene saw reflected in Wyatt’s works—the recognition of diachronic language and 
the reworking around the “tragic loss” of linguistic rupture—becomes, for Wyatt, a felt 
immanence of the lover, which in turns shapes the nature of subjectivity in these works.  
Although it is presumptuous to conclude that all of Wyatt’s Petrarchan imitations involve 
such tactics of tactility, it seems significant that the most effective of Wyatt’s imitations 
make use of a tactile subject.  Such a tendency becomes significant when examining the 
portrayal of the beloved.  It is a commonplace observation that much of the sensual 
imagery of the lady disappears in Wyatt’s Petrarchan imitations, since the physical 
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presence of the lover is emphasized through an effacement of the beloved.  Indeed, the 
operations of Petrarchan economy are such that the creation of the poet’s identity is 
established through a necessary absence of the lady, an absence that opens up a space for 
the speaker to fill.   
 One Wyatt poem in which the description of the lady is readily available is “They 
flee from me.”  While “They flee from me” is not an imitation proper, I focus on it 
because it poetically enacts the imitative process that I have been tracing thus far, and 
because the tactile qualities of the poem take on heightened importance in the poem:   
They flee from me that sometime did me seek 
With naked foot stalking in my chamber 
I have seen them gentle tame and meek 
That now are wild and do not remember 
That sometime they put themselves in danger 
To take bread at my hand; and now they range 
Busily seeking with a continual change 
Thanked be fortune, it hath been otherwise 
Twenty times better; but once in special, 
In thin array after a pleasant guise, 
When her loose gown from her shoulders did fall, 
And she caught in her arms long and small; 
And therewithal sweetly did me kiss, 
And softly said, Dear heart, how like you this? 
It was no dream, I lay broad waking 
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But all is turned thorough my gentleness  
Into a strange fashion of forsaking 
And I have leave to go of her goodness 
And she also to use newfangleness 
But since that I so kindely am served 
I would fain know what she hath deserved. (1-21) 
The omitted talor from “The Long Love” is explicitly present in the beginning of this 
poem, as the speaker begins by recollecting the actions of the deer-women that 
“sometime” did him seek and “sometime” put themselves “in danger” to take bread from 
his hand.  The repeated use of “sometime” establishes a continual pattern in which the 
present speaker no longer participates (or is able to participate).  The imperfect tense of 
the first lines becomes perfective with the words “but ons in speciall” in line nine, as the 
general pattern of the past is broken to accommodate a particular event, and the retelling 
attains specificity and locality.  The creation of real experience in the poem is, again, one 
that employs tactile imagery.  Yet the dream-like element of tangere noticeable in the 
Petrarchan imitations is absent in this poem; here, in the wilderness of a Tudor courtier’s 
bedroom chamber, everything happens in the harsh reality of “brode waking.”   
 While the speaker in “They fle from me” strikes a familiar pose of recounting his 
experience, the confidence with which the speaker in “Whoso list to hunt” offered his 
advice is absent.  Instead, the validity of his personal experience hangs in doubt, and it is 
this anxiety to express the truth of his memories which provides the necessary pressure 
for identify formation in the poem.  The lines “I have sene theim gentill tame and meke / 
That nowe are wyld and do not remember” present a contrast between the “have sene” 
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and the “nowe.”  The dissonance between the two time periods makes the subjective 
memory of the speaker suspect—a misgiving confirmed through the later, unprovoked 
protest, “It was no dreme.”  Although like many of the other poems, the mode that the ‘I’ 
of the poem takes is one of complaint, the words “do not remember” seem to pinpoint the 
reason for such a complaint: the only person who remembers the way things used to be is 
the speaker, for “nowe they raunge / Besely seeking with a continuell chaunge.”   Indeed, 
the “wildness” of the women is paired with their amnesia over how they once used to be 
in the line, “That nowe are wyld and do not remembre.”  The subjectivity of the speaker 
is created by recognizing the disparity that exists between how things were (which only 
he remembers), and how things are now. 
 Because the speaker’s memory in “They fle from me” must, in effect, compete 
with the present for its reality, the method of remembering is of particular importance.  
Significantly, the method Wyatt chooses is one of embodied memory—the concreteness 
of bodies, which lends locality and credibility to his recollection.  For this reason, the 
generally absent details of the lady’s presence are emphasized in this poem, since the 
lady’s presence as a tactile subject is a necessary element of subject formation for the 
speaker.  While the speaker’s presence seems subordinate to the woman’s, the 
subjectivity of the speaker attains greater validity through the material solidity of the 
woman’s interaction with him.  The tactile present-ness of the “ons in speciall” memory 
serves to refute the possibility of untruth in the speaker’s construction of himself, as the 
speaker recalls: 
… but ons in speciall, 
In thyn arraye after a pleasaunt gyse, 
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When her lose gowne from her shoulders did fall, 
And she me caught in her armes long and small; 
Therewithall sweetly did me kysse, 
And softely said, dere hert, howe like you this? 
Besides the passivity of the speaker and the switching of traditional amorous roles in this 
moment, what become noticeable here are the tactile qualities of the woman.  She 
emerges from the unnamed, numerous “they” in this “ons in speciall” memory with 
physical boldness that matches her breathy question to the speaker.   
 While the concreteness of her “armes long and small” lends firmness to the 
memory, it is interesting to note the ways in which the speaker himself is aware of the 
physicality of his memory.  That is, the artfulness of these lines is matched by the artful 
arrangement of the woman’s actions in the speaker’s memory, which becomes lyrically 
evident through the regular meter and smoothness of these lines.  The underlying anxiety 
of the speaker and the amnesia of the deer-women are solved through this retelling of the 
past.  Yet, the resemblance between his memories and fantasy/dream is one that even the 
speaker himself must acknowledge, since the poem comes to an abrupt caesura and an 
end-stopped line, “It was no dreme: I lay brode waking.”  The passivity of the speaker is 
apparent through the verb “lay,” and the paralyzing effects of living in memory become 
conveyed through the contrast between the speaker’s inactivity and the women-deer’s 
busy activity. 
 The complexity of the last line of the poem—“I would fain know what she hath 
deserved”—and how to decipher its layers of irony are pointed reminders of the central 
problem of uncertainty in Wyatt’s poem, an uncertainty that is built on an unstable 
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system of semiotics.  Like the speaker in the Petrarchan imitations, the speaker in this 
original lyric is petulantly passive; he is a product of women’s “new fangilness,” which 
leaves him stewing in his own “gentilnes.”  The term “gentilnes” itself is an unstable 
marker of selfhood for the speaker, however, since the “continuell chaunge” of his world 
involves linguistic change as well.  As Greene puts it, “[Wyatt] has to deal with linguistic 
as well as political and sexual ‘new fangilnes’; words as well as men slide from their 
slipper top” (258).  Because the relationship between signifier and signified was 
becoming increasingly complex in Tudor England, one way for the speaker to combat 
such erosion of meanings is to establish the physical immanence of the woman and of the 
event.  In Wyatt’s poem of a disillusioned courtier who cannot keep up with the “straunge 
fashion of forsaking,” the distance between past and present is marked by words such as 
“gentilnes” and “goodness,” whose terms he thought he knew and had played well by, but 
whose meanings escape him “nowe”. 
 
SHARED ANXIETIES BETWEEN SECULAR AND DEVOTIONAL IMITATIO 
What this brief foray into Wyatt’s Petrarchan imitations and lyric poetry is meant 
to establish is the way in which a focus on the body interacts with linguistic mutability in 
order to form subjectivity in Wyatt’s works.  The recognition of unstable words and their 
“continuell change” is an inevitable and ultimately productive apprehension; through its 
historicity, the body becomes a countering anchor against the tide of linguistic 
changeability. A similar fusion between semiotics and the body occurs in Wyatt’s 
religious imitations, which have tended towards critical reification.  Yet, reflecting his 
culture and world, Wyatt ranged freely between “secular” and “religious” modes of 
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writing; indeed, not only was he one of the first English writers to experiment with the 
Italian sonnet form, Wyatt was also one of the first poets to set the psalms to English 
meter.   
While Greene’s notion of a “tragic sense of loss” may not be so pertinent in 
biblical translation, the challenges (and innovations) in both types of Wyatt’s imitatio are 
shaped around a belief in the inherent instability of language.  Since the agon of 
penitence is built upon the acknowledgment of one’s propensity towards falsehood, in 
which the utterance of prayer itself holds potential for hypocrisy, the status of language 
was of key importance in the psalms.  Indeed, in Wyatt’s The Penitential Psalms, King 
David’s subjectivity is partly created through a rejection of human logos, since the 
recognition of his sins also involves the recognition of the fallen and unstable nature of 
his words.  Wyatt’s David seems to share the Augustinian notion that truth is ultimately 
not conveyed by words and that words are subordinate to revelation—an idea that 
becomes apparent in his distrustful attitude towards the stability of human words.  As a 
result of anxieties surrounding verbal instability, the communication involved in prayer 
becomes embodied in key moments of Wyatt’s work.  In the same way that tactility 
creates subjectivity in his Petrarchan imitations, then, a preoccupation with the body in 
worship creates subjectivity in Wyatt’s work of religious imitation.  It is true that an 
invisible interiority is privileged in Wyatt’s work when, for example, David states that 
repentance itself is a rejection of “owtward dede, as men dreme and davyse,” since “the 
sacrifice that the lord lykyth most / Is sprite contrite” (409-501).
6
  Yet even as an “inward 
Syon” must be built through such hidden measures, the prologues’ emphasis on David’s 
body and the performative aspect of prayer point to how repentance can also be 
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experienced outwardly (504).  Scriptural belief in the insufficiency of “words alone” 
becomes amplified in this work, in which the act of penitence forms the center and 
creates space for subjectivity. 
 
THE PLACE OF THE PSALMS IN EARLY MODERN CULTURE 
 
Most Wyatt critics attribute Wyatt’s translation of the penitential psalms to the 
year 1541 and to his imprisonment in the Tower.  Although these psalms have received 
less critical attention than Wyatt’s “secular” lyrics, The Penitential Psalms has become 
increasingly important in examining Wyatt’s poetic technique.
7
  In his own time, Wyatt 
was praised for his work on the psalms.  Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey, praises the 
courtier poet for painting “the lyvely faythe and pure, / The stedfast hope, the swete 
returne to grace / Of just Davyd by parfyte penytence.”  Wyatt’s Psalms is also a work 
that has invited general critical agreement on the fundamentally Reformist nature of its 
poetics.  In “Thomas Wyatt’s Paraphrase of the Penitential Psalms of David,” for 
example, Robert Twombly interprets Wyatt’s psalms as “a shrewd, germinally Protestant-
Evangelical psychological drama of the outcast” (345); Elizabeth Heale asserts in Wyatt, 
Surrey and Early Tudor Poetry that Wyatt’s psalms are “distinctly Reformist [and] their 
program emerges subtly from Wyatt’s careful versions of his unimpeachably Catholic 
sources” (159).  Even Stephen Greenblatt, whose Foucauldian interpretation of Wyatt’s 
work renders the idea of authenticity problematic, states regarding Wyatt’s psalms: 
“Wyatt captures the authentic voice of early English Protestantism, its mingled humility 
and militancy, its desire to submit without intermediary directly to God’s will, and above 
all its inwardness” (115).  Yet examining David’s “parfyte penytence” in light of 
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sectarian poetics seems to predetermine what one can expect to discover in this 
fascinating work of translation.  Although there are certainly Reformist qualities to the 
representation of inwardness in Wyatt’s psalms, the tendency to make a sharp distinction 
between Catholic and Protestant poetics limits the ways in which Wyatt’s rich work can 
be discussed.  What seems more relevant during this time is the complex representation 
of devotional inwardness—indeed, the translation of it—in these psalms.   
The first English translation of the Psalms was made by George Joye in 1530 and 
more than seventy different versions were published between 1530 and the end of the 
century.
8
  Like most humanist scholars who did not know Hebrew, Wyatt translated from 
a non-Hebraic version.  While Wyatt’s other sources include the Latin Vulgate, the Great 
Bible, Tyndale, and Campensis, his main source was Pietro Aretino’s prose paraphrase of 
the seven traditional psalms.
9
  Aretino’s influence is the most noticeable because of 
Wyatt’s adoption of his dramatic narrative structure.
10
  Although the traditional medieval 
grouping of the seven penitential psalms—psalms 6, 32, 38, 51, 102, 130, and 143—had 
already bound these psalms together, the use of a prologue before each psalm solidifies 
the narrative elements between the psalms and dramatizes the story of David as a 
teleological story of penitence.  In his bricolage use of different sources, Wyatt seems to 
heed Petrarch’s view of translation: “I quote the authors with credit, or I transform them 
honorably, as bees imitate by making a single honey from many various nectars.”
11
  
While the “various nectars” are acknowledged, the choices Wyatt makes in his 
representation of David’s penitence are the “honey” that is of primary interest in this 
study.  In general, I agree with H. M. Mason’s evaluation of what the variety of sources 
reveal about Wyatt—that he was not a sectarian and that what Wyatt was interested in 
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was “getting at the truth of the psalms by all the avenues open to him.”
12
  And the “truth 
of the psalms” is, for Wyatt, the representation of prayer—the mechanics of which 
involve the external signs of the body. 
The characteristic of the psalms as having a powerfully instructive value for the 
individual Christian has long been observed in the history of the psalms, and Calvin 
famously characterized the psalms as a “glass” in which one may view “the anatomy of 
all the partes of the Soule”.
13
  Barbara Lewalski points out that the psalms served as a 
“compendium of all theological, doctrinal, and moral knowledge in lyric form” and that 
they were widely accepted as a model and chronicle of spiritual experiences (41).  
Indeed, what becomes apparent over and over again is the psalms’ unique example as a 
source and model for Christian subjectivity.  As Luther wrote in A Manual of the Book of 
Psalms: 
You have therin, not only the works and acts of the saints, but their very words 
and expressions, nay, their sighs and groans to God, and the utterance in which 
they conversed with him during their temptations; and all these are recorded in 
such a lively and descriptive manner, that those saints, though now dead, seem 
still to live and speak in the Psalms. (6) 
Wyatt’s work seems intensely interested in tracing such “inmost sensations and motions” 
of the soul, yet as Luther’s description of the psalms indicates, the primary characteristic 
of the psalms is the transmission of “the very hidden treasure of their hearts’ feelings.”  
The effort to provide access to such hidden things involves the acknowledgment of how 
difficult the process is, for the act of recording the song which “from his hert owt 
brynges” is to admit that the recording itself is an imperfect artifact (425).  Perhaps 
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appropriately, then, the narrator mentions before Psalm 51 that David’s song is one “that 
I not wither he crys or singes,” as the song/cry of prayer becomes indistinguishable (426).   
Wyatt’s Penitential Psalms attempts to translate the knotty issue of genuine 
penitence and, as a result, the work provides an early sixteenth century glimpse into a 
lyrical representation of devotional subjectivity.  More than just a metrical precursor to 
the Sidney-Herbert Psalter, Wyatt’s psalms provide an example of prayer that negotiates 
the contemporary religious landscape through its alternation between a third-person 
prologue and a first-person psalm proper.  By employing an alternating structure between 
the prologues and the psalms proper, Wyatt’s translation of the psalms stages a dialogue 
between the visible and invisible expressions of devotional inwardness.  And, as this 
oscillation between the representation and articulation of inwardness makes clear, it is 
one that must be ultimately anchored by King David’s embodied devotion, since the 
inherent instability of human words necessitates an exteriorization of inwardness.  Like 
the Petrarchan imitations in which the body provides the diachronic lightening rod 
through which subjectivity could be channeled, a similar combination between 
immanence and imitation occurs in these psalms.   
Before entering into a reading of Wyatt’s Psalms, I want to pause here to clarify 
what I mean by the words “inward” and “inwardness”.  I consciously use the word 
“inward” over “inner” to refer to the quality of intimacy in these penitential prayers; the 
latter term connotes a sealed-off inaccessibility, whereas the former term has a 
directionality that addresses some type of an audience within the speaker.  The belief in 
an unseen other opens up inner speech to accommodate more than the solipsistic self, 
unlocking inward discourse to the divine Other as well as to others engaged in the same 
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work of prayer, and this sense of audience plays an important role in how Wyatt saw the 
psalms as a potential model for prayer.  Indeed, the didactic function of the psalms is 
explicitly expressed in Psalm 51, the centerpiece of the penitential psalms: “Then shall I 
teach thy wayes unto the wicked, and sinners shall be converted unto the.”
14
  Moreover, 
the notion that the psalms held an endless repository of experiences—both personal and 
communal—for the Christian individual was a commonplace belief in the sixteenth 
century, since the psalms were perceived as a guide to the various experiences of one’s 
spiritual journey, serving an instructional purpose as well as an associative one.
15
 
THE PENITENTIAL PSALMS 
In accordance with the principle of hiddenness and inwardness in the period, the 
poem constructs David’s devotional subjectivity through an inaccessible interiority.  This 
becomes apparent in the first of Wyatt’s Penitential Psalms.  Although many try to ease 
the king’s despair, David states in Psalm 6 that God alone knows what he is undergoing 
and “That to my hert thes foes have non acces” (168).  At a general structural level, this 
distance from the “hert” seems to be created through the alternation between prologue 
and psalm in Wyatt’s work.  Told in the third-person voice of the narrator who describes 
King David’s state before each psalm, the prologue offers us a view of King David’s 
preparations for penance before we are plunged into the uncomfortable closeness of the 
first person voice of the psalms themselves.  Perhaps appropriately, the prologues are the 
sites in which David’s prayer most resembles performance, with the narrator describing 
the posture and arrangement of David’s body.  Each prologue, in effect, sets the stage for 
the subsequent psalm and allows the reader to visualize David between each psalm 
through the perspective of the third-person narrator.  In this way, though Wyatt’s work is 
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generically a far cry from Shakespeare’s staging of the body in devotion, I see the gap 
between the lyric and the dramatic being bridged through the performative body in 
devotion.  
The pairing of prologue and psalm display a contrast not only in the voices 
utilized, but also in the meter and cadence of these voices.  After the hearing the Davidic 
‘I’ voice psalm 6 in terza rima, for example, the ensuing prologue states in a different 
voice and meter: 
Who so hathe sene the sikk in his fevour, 
After treux taken with the hote or cold 
And that the fitt is past off his faruour, 
Draw fainting syghes, let hym, I say, behold 
Sorwofull David after his languour, 
That with the treys that from his iyes down rold, 
Pausid his plaint, and lad adown his harp, 
Faythfull record of all his sorrows sharp. (184-192) 
In contrast to the first person voice of the psalms proper, the narrator’s voice in the 
prologues is mostly that of a didactic observer whose chief function is to serve as the 
reader’s eyes; just as the harp is the “faithful record” for David, the narrator in the 
prologues serves as a recorder who provides access to David’s inward penitence.  Yet 
even as the prologues provide narrative continuity and access to David’s intense solitude, 
they also foreground the mediated aspect of these psalms by reminding the reader that 
his/her accessibility to David is at best a limited one.  In the prologue before Psalm 51, 
for example, the narrator comments regarding the hidden quality of David’s prayer, “But 
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that so close the Cave was and unkowth / That none but god was record off his payne” 
(415-16).  Although King David is offered up before the gaze of the reader, what is 
emphasized again and again is that “none but god” is fully knowledgeable of his 
experience.   
Critics have interpreted the significance of the prologues and their relationship to 
the psalms proper in various ways: Robert Twombly, for example, saw the prologues as 
being “dramatically superfluous” and concluded that Wyatt’s work was thus too 
idiosyncratic to be didactic in nature; others have located the dramatic element in the 
psalms rather than in the prologues.
 16
  Recently, Rivkah Zim has read the prologues as 
enacting a kind of a sermon glossing the spiritual confusion within the psalms 
themselves: “The role of this narrator who addresses only the reader, not David, is to act 
as a guide to the reader, ‘speaking alongside’, or paraphrasing and expounding the 
psalmist’s self-expression” (47).  Although Zim’s reading rightly notes the didactic 
function of the prologues, she does not sufficiently consider how the prologues point to 
David as an example of true penitence.  The prologues’ function of displaying the setting 
and preparing the reader to encounter the Scriptural Word resembles the longstanding 
tradition of a “composition of place, seeing the spot” prevalent in Catholic meditations.
17
  
Based on such meditational practices espoused by Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises, the 
“composition of place” involves placing oneself in the dramatic situation of the scriptural 
scene.   
Louis Martz points out in The Poetry of Meditation that “the practice of 
dramatizing theological points, after the manner of Gospel parables, has become almost 
second nature to the meditator,” and asserts that such Catholic traditions of meditation 
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gained popularity in Protestant England because they satisfied “a deep inner need” in 
their rich and imaginative meditative practices (29).  Whether or not Wyatt was 
responding to an overtly Catholic method, Wyatt’s use of a Catholic source in Aretino 
shows his attraction to the imaginative framework that the prologue-psalm structure 
offered.
18
  What seems important in the prologues’ ability to set up a dramatic 
“composition of place” is their ability to offer a sense of immediacy to the reader, a kind 
of visualization of the scene that the medieval writers such as St. Bonaventure wrote 
about in his Meditations on the Life of Christ:  
Be present… endeavour to reconstruct the scene… For if you wish to gather fruit 
from these things, imagine that you are actually present when the Lord Jesus says 
or does them; as if you heard with your own ears, and saw with your own eyes, 
and attend with your whole mind and heart. (359-60) 
In dramatizing David’s penitential prayers before God, the prologues in Wyatt’s psalms 
allow the insistent “I” of the ensuing psalms to attain greater poignancy, since the reader 
must “endeavour to reconstruct the scene”—that is, the setting and posture of 
penitence—before taking on the voice of penitence in David’s prayers.  The composition 
of place allows the compendium nature of the psalms—its first person, third person, and 
communal voices—to merge into the idiosyncratic voice of the psalms proper.   
This traditional meditative practice is also one that foregrounds the body of the 
believer through its encouragement toward rich imaginative practices.  Indeed, as works 
on medieval devotional practices show, the incarnational aspect of Christ is one that 
invites visceral imaginings of the place and personhood of the passion and resurrection.
19
  
The resurrected Christ himself points towards the important physicality of his body, as he 
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asks his startled disciples, “Why are ye troubled?  And why do thoughts arise in your 
hearts?  Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself: handle me, and see; for a spirit 
hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me here” (Luke 24:39).  The proven godhead of Christ 
is directly connected to the touchable reality of his body, and his historical embodied 
presence.  The kind of impersonation that the composition of place requires, then, is the 
type of embodied imitatio that enables what would otherwise be an unreachable 
subjectivity on the part of the believer.  
The incarnational, concrete aspect of Christ’s personhood has had a long tradition 
of sparking devotional subjectivity.  As Sara Beckwith writes in her work on the role of 
Christ’s body in medieval devotional imitation, “The irreducible origin and 
accompaniment of imitation is the human body itself, which ambivalently codes the body 
as representative (body as vehicle) and experiential (body as agent)” (61).  As noted 
throughout this study, such notions of imitation form an important part of the devotional 
aesthetic in Tudor England and allow the body to be a stable sign and even a catalyst for 
right imitation.  In Wyatt’s translation of the psalms, the references to the posture of 
penitence and the gestures of repentance underscore the embodied aspect of imitatio that 
forms an important counterpart to the instability of fallen language.  Even as the lyrical 
nature of the psalms is apparent through the careful arrangement of rhythm and meter, the 
body of David provides an experiential and embodied outlet of emotions that serves an 
important didactic function.  Through these preparatory prologues in which repentance 
gains visibility and embodiment, the inherently resistant state of the reprobate can be 
properly stirred toward devotional imitation.
20
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The “composition of place” also seems relevant to Wyatt’s work because the 
tradition acts to safeguard the lyric ‘I’ of the psalms proper from being misleadingly 
confusing.   Since the movement toward genuine repentance is enacted through the 
dramatized setting and visualizations within the prologues rather than solely through the 
psalmist’s language in the psalms proper, such dramatic components allow the lyric ‘I’ 
from becoming too self-referential.  This is in contrast to the Petrarchan paradigm in 
which the speaker’s stable words are set in contrast to the fickleness of the mistress.   
With an ending couplet such as, “My wordes nor I shall not be variable, / But always oon, 
your owne boeth ferme and stable,” for example, the Petrarchan speaker can assert the 
immutability of his words (and his accompanying steadfastness).  In contrast to such 
confidence, the position of penitent David is to acknowledge the instability of his human 
words, since fallen logos is part and parcel of the postlapsarian condition.  Perhaps 
appropriately, then, one of the primary methods of characterizing God is to portray 
divinity in direct contrast to man’s mutability.  David states in the beginning of Psalm 38, 
for example:  
O Lord as I the have both prayd and pray, 
(Altho in the be no alteration 
But that we men like as our sellffes we say, 
Mesuryng thy Justice by our mutation) 
Chastice me not, O lord, in thi furour, 
Nor me correct in wrathfull castigation.   
The subordinate thought in parentheses—“Altho in the be no alteration”—forms the 
backdrop against which the psalmist asks for forgiveness, the a priori given that helps to 
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form the speaker’s paradigm.  Moreover, with the use of the collective “we,” David 
includes not just himself to this preset understanding, but all of mankind as well.  Man’s 
collective “mutation” provides the necessary foil against which God’s justice can be 
measured. 
Visualization and who has access to sight are important themes throughout 
Wyatt’s work, and the power of sight is established from the beginning lines of the first 
prologue.  Setting up the story of David and Bathsheba from 2 Samuel 11, the narrator 
states: “Love to gyve law unto his subject hertes / Stode in the Iyes off Barsabe the 
bryght; / And in a look anone hymsellff convertes, / Cruelly plesant before kyng David 
syght” (1-4).  As in “The long love,” love is portrayed as a separate agent who animates a 
passive subject into action in his psalms.  This time, however, Love is an almost satanic 
figure who influences his subjects through “venemd breth,” “creping fyre,” and “moyst 
poison,” which is only possible after having “first dasd his Iyes” (6, 8, 10, 5).  The 
resulting state of being “launcyd” by Love’s poison is David’s love for Bathsheba, as we 
find out through the narrator: “The forme that love had printyd in his brest / He honorth it 
as thing off thinges best” (15-6).  It is a type of idolatry that would have been instantly 
recognizable.  Although Cupid’s tyranny is couched in familiar Petrarchan terms that 
focus on the lover’s sight, the strong emphasis on vision also draws on traditional biblical 
motifs involving sight and conversion.
21
  This loss of sight seems to prepare David’s eyes 
to eventually turn inward, so that he can later say, “And in my syght my synn is fixid fast, 
/ Theroff to have more perfett penitence” (443-4).  The conversion of his sight first 
requires blindness, however, as David’s obsession with Bathsheba and his murder of her 
husband Uriah are formulated in terms of a moral loss of sight: “He blyndyd thinkes this 
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trayne so blynd and closse / To blynd all thing that nowght may it disclosse” (31-2).  
Here, David’s fundamental failure is his blindness in believing that there is an action 
undisclosed to God, an act that is quickly nullified by Nathan who “spyd out this 
trecherye” (32).  The triple blindness in lines 31-32 is interesting, as if the possibility of 
avoiding God’s gaze—“to blynd all thing that nowght may it disclosse”—needs to be 
encased in multiple layers of blindness in order to even consider that an all-seeing God 
may possibly be in the dark.  Once David realizes that his actions have been disclosed, he 
enters the setting in which he will sing his psalms, a dark cave “wherein he might hym 
hyde, / Fleing the light, as in prison or grave” (62-3).  
Even as David must move into a space of darkness in which he wrestles alone 
with his sin, this typological figure of repentance becomes all the more exposed to the 
reader’s sight.  That is, although David’s gaze ultimately becomes one of inward 
introspection, the narrator’s voice functions to draw the reader’s gaze to behold the 
outward signs of his penitent state.  This is done by providing the necessary details 
which, even as David himself forgets about them, act to emphasize his material body.  In 
preparation for psalm 130, for example, the narrator describes David as being lost in his 
thoughts and yet describes his posture.  Consequently, we are provided with a 
representation of what inward rumination looks like: “And while he ponderd thes thinges 
in his hert, / His knee, his arme, his hand, susteind his chyn, / When he his song agayne 
thus did begynn” (661-3).  Just as the body is mastered by Love in the first prologue, the 
body is mastered through prayer, and it becomes necessary to visualize the posture of 
penitence.   
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The prologue between Psalms 32 and 38 functions in the same way; the narrator 
remarks upon David’s silence after he finished his song: “Ryght so David that semid in 
that place / Marble ymage off singuler reuerence / Carffd in the rokk with Iyes and 
handes on high, / Made as by craft to plaine, to sobbe, to sygh” (306-09).  Even as David 
falls silent, his prayer continues through the correlating image of his body.  His uplifted 
thoughts are literally embodied in his “Iyes and handes on high.”  The comparison of 
David’s body to a “marble ymage… carffd in the rokk” is disturbing, however, for 
though it is an “ymage off singuler reuerence,” it bears a dangerous similarity to graven 
and idolatrous images.  The words “semid” and “made as by craft” also contribute to the 
note of artificiality in this scene, especially as Wyatt translates the original la man de 
l’arte as “craft”.  Indeed, at this moment in the psalms, Wyatt’s David seems to resemble 
the marble images of saints that iconoclastic Reformists blamed Catholics for 
worshipping falsely.  What connections can anything “made as by craft” have with 
genuine worship?  Such was the Reformist cry against the aesthetic accoutrements of the 
Catholic Church.  The representation of David’s penitence seems to safely negotiate 
iconoclastic anxieties because of the stability given to the sign of his body.  It is an 
image, but it serves a didactic function by invoking recognizable gestures of penitence.   
Again, the reasoning behind the composition of place is helpful, since the Catholic view 
of images explained the images’ positive purpose in this way: “That we may call to 
remembraunce the manifolde examples of virtues, which were in the sainctes, whom they 
do represent.”
22
  The artifact of worship becomes acceptable when its purpose facilitates 
spirituality, a tenet that Wyatt’s prologue seems to follow in its concluding lines: 
He then Inflamd with farr more hote affect 
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Of god then he was erst of Bersabe, 
His lifft fote did on the yerth erect, 
And just therby remaynth the tothr kne; 
To his lifft side his wayght he doth direct. 
Sure hope of helth, and harpe agayne takth he; 
His hand, his tune, his mynd sowght his lay, 
Wyche to the Lord with sobre voice did say. (317-24) 
The detailed description of what someone who is “inflamd” for God looks like provides a 
set of directions for how to compose the body, down to where the feet and knees should 
be placed.   
Although such attention to David’s posture of prayer may seem trivial, it plays 
into the didactic program of the prologues.  As mentioned above, such an emphasis on 
the bodily posture of prayer was not counterintuitive to early modern conceptualizations 
of the self.  Indeed, belying our postmodern notions of the directionality of the 
relationship between the mind and body, the body was believed to influence emotions 
and not just to reflect them.  As Zirka Filipczah points out in an essay on Renaissance 
poses, “The position and movements of the body loomed so important because they were 
believed to influence emotions, not just reveal them” (71).  Because of the two-way 
directionality between outward form and inward posture, the body provided a legitimate 
means of verifying and even encouraging inward sincerity.  As George Downame 
remarked regarding prayer, “Where he [the Lord] requireth the inward worship of the 
soul in prayer, as honorem facti, the honour of the deed, there also he requireth the 
outward of the body when it may be conveniently exercised, as honorem signi, the 
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honour of the signe.”  Just as the body played an important part in David’s sin with 
Bathsheba, the body plays a similarly important role in David’s “far more hote affect / Of 
god,” as inwardness and desire acquire a physical dimension and the body becomes an 
acceptable and honorable sign.    
In her work on the history of prayer in early modern England, Ramie Targoff 
writes about the importance of the body in worship precisely for these reasons.
23
  Targoff 
states, “There were no absolute divisions between sincerity and theatricality, inwardness 
and outwardness within the early modern English church” (4).  Citing how Tyndale 
writes of bodily pleasure involved in true prayer in his Exposition of Matthew, Targoff 
argues that Tyndale’s work marks “the initial articulation in English Protestantism of an 
evaluative model that relies upon the external body for determining sincerity and 
hypocrisy at prayer” (9).  The idea that the body acts as a physical barometer for how to 
measure sincerity in prayer seems to be at work in the prologues in Wyatt’s psalms.  
Whereas Targoff is interested in the rise of common prayer for Protestant England 
through a correlating justification of “bodily reverence,” I am interested in how the body 
functions as a measure of faith for individual prayer in Wyatt’s psalms.  Indeed, Targoff 
makes clear that she does not regard Wyatt’s psalms to be a part of public devotion: 
“Wyatt’s taste for enjambment and parenthetical musings create a rhetorically as well as 
psychically complex petition that seems inherently unsuitable for congregational 
reiteration” (79).  What Targoff notes in communal prayer seems to be an equally 
important measure of sincerity in Wyatt’s work, for even though translating the psalms 
mitigates the possibility for wrong worship, Wyatt’s need to foreground the body is a 
testament to how invisible worship needed its material aspect, both in common and 
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individual prayer.  Wyatt’s David occupies the hidden space of the dark cave (or the 
prayer closet), and again and again, the narrator instructs us to “behold” the body in 
penitence—a set of instructions to enter the scene through a composition of body as well 
as through a composition of place.  
A contemporary translation of St. Cyprian’s commentary on the Lord’s Prayer 
(1539) also stresses the importance of the worshipper’s body in prayer, stating that 
“diuine eyes must be pleased bothe with the behauyour of the body, and maner of 
speche.”
24
  Cyprian alludes to the example of the publican and the Pharisee in Luke 18 in 
order to discuss the behavior of the body in prayer:  
It behoueth the to praye to god inwardelye. But yet well beloued brethern, he that 
dothe pray, shuld not forget, after what maner in the temple the publycane prayed 
with the pharisee, his eies not vnsemely lifted vp to heuen, nor his handes 
insolently stratched out, knocking his brest, and acknowlegynge his secrete & 
hydden synnes, lamentably desyred succour of goddis meecy. 
 Though St. Cyprian notes that prayer is primarily an inward operation, he references the 
publican and the signs of penitence exemplified in the passage.  Likewise, Thomas Becon 
writes in his 1542 treatise on Basil’s prayer: “Nowe as concernyng the externall gesture 
in prayenge, as knelyng, knockyng on the brest, lyftynge vp of the handes. &c. in asmuch 
as they be indifferent, & we reade that they were vsed of Christ & many holy men in 
times past, they are not to be despised.”   
The physical preparations in the prologues lead to the paraphrases of the psalms 
proper, and the narrator’s third-person voice gives way to David’s first-person prayers.  
In contrast to the relative stability of signs in the prologues—signs of genuine penitence 
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manifest through the narrator’s description of David’s body—the psalms proper exhibit 
an anxiety over the slipperiness of language.  This becomes particularly evident in the 
penitential prayer par excellence in Scripture, Psalm 51, and it is important to examine 
Wyatt’s translation of this psalm in order to see how David’s words are construed in 
contrast to God’s words.  As Hannibal Hamlin explains in his work on early modern 
psalm culture, Psalm 51 occupied a significant space in both public and private spaces in 
early modern society: the Misere mei deus played a central role in liturgy as well as in 
individual prayers during the sixteenth century and its recitation figured importantly in 
serving as a kind of verbal “proof” for genuine inward penitence.  For example, it was a 
standard part of the execution ritual for prisoners to echo the words of biblical penitence.  
Moreover, the successful recitation of the first verse of Psalm 51 in Latin also served as 
legal evidence that one was a clergyman in court, which allowed the accused to take 
advantage of a legal loophole known as “benefit of clergy”.
25
  Indeed, in all the key 
spaces that make up a person’s life—religious, judicial, and even the threshold space of 
capital punishment—this penitential psalm played an important role in articulating an 
unseen sign of inwardness: piety, penitence, and purity.   
Yet, if knowledge of Psalm 51 played a crucial role in early modern England, its 
stress on inwardness made it equally vulnerable to doubt—that is, the state of “a broken 
and a contrite heart” is one that stands beyond ocular proof.  Wyatt’s translation of this 
highly-charged Davidic psalm shows him translating inwardness in tandem with the 
surrounding prologues, an act that ultimately stabilizes the slippery nature of language 
noted within the psalm itself.  Critics have rightly noted that Wyatt drifts from Aretino’s 
prose version more and more freely with the progression of each psalm.  By the time 
  53
Wyatt arrives at Psalm 51, Wyatt diverges from Aretino’s text in both the prologue to the 
psalm and in the psalm proper.  The prologue to psalm 51 begins with an image of a 
pilgrim that Wyatt creates on his own:  
Lik as the pilgryme that in a long way 
Fayntyng for hete, provokyd by some wind 
In some fresh shade lith downe at mydes off day, 
So doth off David the weryd voice and mynd 
 
Tak breth off syghes. (395-400) 
Through the image of the fainting pilgrim, Wyatt emphasizes David’s weariness in 
“voice and mynd” and invites the reader to imagine the pilgrim’s physical distress.  
David’s state before prayer is conceived in terms of physical exhaustion, as Wyatt 
emphasizes the labor involved in prayer.  In contrast to the outdoor images of “hete,” 
“wind,” and “fresh shaade” associated with the pilgrim, however, David’s dramatic 
situation is to experience their utter absence as he sits in the darkness of the cave. Since it 
provides an isolated space of confession, the cave offers an appropriate stage for the 
enactment of repentance.  The prologue’s emphasis on David’s physical isolation in the 
cave known to “none but god” becomes a spiritual isolation in Psalm 51, as David 
declares to God, “To the alone, to the have I trespast, / Ffor none can mesure my fawte 
but thou alone” (416, 445-6).  The culpability of David’s actions becomes solely 
measurable by God, which is stressed by the repetition of “the” and “thou”.  The private 
voice of prayer, emphasized by the remote setting of the cave, is one that can only be 
heard by God.  This acknowledgment of sin against God “alone” is followed by an 
affirmation of divine character, which is specifically related to the stability of divine 
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speech.  David states, “Pardon thow than, / Wherby thow shalt kepe still thi word stable, / 
Thy justice pure and clene; by cawse that whan / I pardond ame, then forthwith Justly 
able, / Just I ame jugd by justice off thy grace” (451-55).  The repetition of the word 
“justice” and the use of its various forms (justice, justly, jugd) in these lines form a 
linguistic counterpart to God’s “stable” word.  Indeed, the witty play of language 
becomes a sign of human transgression.  In contrast to divine stability is David’s sense of 
his instability as he declares about himself in the following line: “Ffor I my sellff, lo 
thing most unstable” (456).  The use of the word “unstable” is Wyatt’s own addition for 
this verse and seems to point to the nature of sin as mutability.  Moreover, his deliberate 
cross-reference back to God’s “word stable” defines David’s transgressions as a verbal 
offence, an instability in his words that measures the distance between divine and human 
speech and points to the imperfect nature of prayer itself.  Perhaps appropriately, then, 
the “operation” that David exhorts God to perform near the end of the psalm is one that 
must start with his mouth, as he states, “Thow must, o lord, my lypps furst unlose” (494).  
The typical movement from self-reproach to an affirmation of God’s character in the 
psalms takes on a specifically verbal aspect in Wyatt’s psalms, one that highlights the 
difference between the divine, stable word and the penitent’s own unstable words.   
The oscillation between David’s outward motions in the prologues and his inward 
monologues in the psalms converge after Psalm 51.  Although it prefaces psalm 102, the 
prologue following Psalm 51 is an extension of the prior psalm in that it records David’s 
reaction to the prayer he has just made.  This prologue also continues the theme of verbal 
instability from Psalm 51, and provides a fascinating endnote to the dilemma of speech 
and mutability through its representation of David’s body.  After uttering the famous 
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prayer of Psalm 51, David appears amazed at his own capacity to express divine truth.  
Like the prior prologue, this prologue is also largely independent from Aretino’s version, 
and uses direct speech for the first time in the work.  The narrator remarks upon the 
profound nature of the just-uttered prayer, the “grettnes” of which astonishes the psalmist 
himself.  David talks to himself in wonder: “I sinner, I, what have I sayd alas? / That 
goddess goodness wold within my song entrete, / Let me agayne consider and repete” 
(514-6).  The repetition that follows is a silent one, and what follows is a fascinating 
moment in the poem where the “diepe secretes” of God are considered wordlessly by 
David:   
And so he doth, but not exprest by word: 
But in his hert he tornith and paysith 
Ech word that erst his lypps might forth afford. 
He poyntes, he pawsith, he wonders, he praysyth 
The marcy that hydes off justice the swourd, 
The justice that so his promesse complysyth,  
For his wordes sake to worthiless desert, 
That gratis his graces to men doth depert. (517-524) 
There is no access to how David “tornith and paysith / Ech word,” except through the 
unconscious pantomiming that ensues.  The anxiety over his own verbal instability is 
mitigated by this second attempt at considering God’s “diepe secretes,” but this is an act 
that is only recognizable to the reader in terms of David’s outward actions: “He poyntes, 
he pawsith, he wonders, he praysyth.”  This re-enactment of the previous psalm becomes 
embodied prayer and, as his prayer attains complete invisibility, the instability attributed 
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to human language is avoided altogether in his inward repetition of the previous psalm.  
The outward deed as a sign of genuine piety becomes acceptable, as the already-uttered 
prayer converges with David’s bodily signs of prayer.     
CONCLUSION 
As Stephen Greenblatt has noted, all translation is an act of interpretation.
26
  In 
translating the seven penitential psalms, Wyatt interprets the activity of prayer as 
communication whose inwardness must also be an embodied one.  The emphasis he 
places on David’s material surroundings and physical body paints a portrait of prayer 
whose inwardness is not purely a matter of invisible prayer, for the prologues and the 
psalms engage in dialogue with one another to create an acceptable inwardness.  Even 
when the prayer is stationed within the most revered canon of scriptural prayers, the 
“unstable” words of the penitent need to be accompanied by physical signs that signify 
repentance to the outward eye.  The prerequisite for inwardness—the acknowledgment 
that there can be a discrepancy between one’s inner and outer actions—is formulated in 
Judeo-Christianity as a distrust of oneself and, in particular, of one’s spoken words.  For 
this reason, only the divine word is imagined as completely free from the epistemological 
uncertainties surrounding the language of prayer.  The linguistic gap that formed the 
sense of “tragic loss” for humanist imitative endeavors had grappled with the unstable 
nature of words; in religious imitative endeavors, the same awareness of verbal instability 
combines with the foregrounded body to produce subjectivity.  Perhaps appropriately, 
then, Wyatt’s dangerous combination of the words “tourne” and “translate” in Psalm 102 
are attributed to God, as the change implicit in both of these words are safely allowable 
within the stable context of divine translation.  David addresses divine sovereignty by 
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stating near the end of psalm 102, “Tourne, and translate, and thei in worth it tak” (624).  
The turning here is not the fickle turning of fortune or hap or word to which man is so 
susceptible, but the divine and natural turning of earthly things: “But thou thy sellff the 
sellff remaynist well / That thou wast erst, and shalt thi yeres extend” (625-6). 
 The ideas brought forth in this chapter—the stable sign of the body and the 
problems of representing authentic devotion—form important underpinnings for the 
remainder of this study.  The rest of this dissertation continues to explore the 
performative nature of the body hinted in this chapter; namely, the spectacles of bodies in 
pain in John Foxe’s Acts and Monuments and the pleasurable (yet highly decried) 
spectacles of performing bodies on the Elizabethan and Jacobean stage.  If Wyatt’s David 
unwittingly plays a didactic role through the dramatic elements of the work’s prologues, 
the performing bodies in the subsequent chapters are presented with a kind of conscious 
didacticism that draws upon contemporary religious polemics.  The movement from lyric 
to works such as Acts and Monuments, Hamlet, and The Winter’s Tale is also one in 
which I hope to show the relevance of imitatio in its various aspects.  The “private” 
concerns of the lyric psalms make up the matter of concern in the “public” domains of 
Smithfield and the stage.  
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CHAPTER TWO: MEMBERS AND MARTYRS IN JOHN FOXE’S ACTS AND 
MONUMENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Whereas the previous chapter identified an embodied brand of textual imitatio in 
Sir Thomas Wyatt’s secular and religious works, this chapter investigates the devotional 
paradigm of imitatio Christi in John Foxe’s Actes and Monuments of these Latter and 
Perillous Days, touching matters of the Church (1563 and subsequent editions).  Perhaps 
more than any other literary category, the genre of martyrology provides a natural 
connection to the devotional concept of imitatio Christi.  The lives of the martyrs offer 
models for imitation while testifying to the reality of the miracles promised in Scripture.  
In the pages of hagiography and martyrology, the term “imitate” takes on an explicitly 
emulative connotation and, moreover, operates as an implicit function of the genre.  As 
James Truman notes in his work on Reformation martyrology, “The story of the martyrs' 
suffering is designed to testify to the true faith and advocates its adoption; it is thus 
crucial to Foxe’s project that his text itself inspires imitation beyond itself” (56).    
Moving from textual imitatio to the devotional ideal imitatio Christi, this chapter 
examines the strategy of emulative imitation that The Book of Martyrs (as it was 
popularly known) employs.  Although it was commonplace to praise the acts of the 
martyrs, Foxe’s work is unique in that it emphasizes the attainability of martyrdom.  He 
accomplishes this through a series of devices: the gender and class-crossing accounts of 
the martyrs; the inclusion of tactile details; and an emphasis of the body in pain.  While I 
touch upon the first two points, I focus especially on this last strategic element as a way 
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to account for why imitatio Christi takes on such strikingly vibrant aspects in Foxe’s 
work.  When Foxe asks the general reader, “They offered theyr bodies willing…  And is 
it so great a matter then for our part, to mortifie our flesh, with all the members therof?” it 
is clear that he considers the community of believers to be forged through the common 
experience of suffering—a suffering that is not mere abstraction, but embodied in flesh 
and blood (16).  Foxe deploys similar semiotics with important words such as “members” 
in his work; that is, “members” functions equally in its corporeal and communal senses in 
The Book of Martyrs, for the marks of one’s membership in the “true church” are born, 
literally, on one’s members.  Although much of Foxe’s argumentation includes polemical 
disputes that seek to shut out a copia of meanings to the words, “This is my body,” Foxe 
as an editor exploits the polysemous nature of the body in its corporeal and communal 
sensibilities.  
Unlike Elaine Scarry’s theory of the dissolution of the self through the suffering 
body, the description of the body in pain serves to authenticate the martyr’s inclusion in 
the “true” church, and is essential to his/her religious integrity.
1
  Various critics note the 
graphic descriptions of martyrdoms in The Book of Martyrs.  Helen C. White observes, 
for example, that for Foxe, “Literally nothing is too terrible to tell; indeed, it is precisely 
in the handling of the horrible that his extraordinary gifts are most powerfully revealed.”
2
  
John R. Knott notes that Foxe’s “task, as martyrologist, was to persuade his readers that 
his ‘saints’ did indeed die mildly, with spiritual rejoicing, while experiencing horrific 
torments” (722).  I would add to this that Foxe’s task was to also persuade the reader that 
anyone was eligible for martyrdom.  In this way, while critics such as Mark Breitenberg 
have discussed the textualizing process of  “the word made flesh” in Foxe’s Protestant 
  60
martyrology, I am interested in examining the material aspect of faith and the peculiar 
way in which truth is “bodied forth” in this work.
3
  How does Foxe’s work exhibit a 
material faith, since most of the work is devoted to denouncing the gross materiality of 
the Catholic doctrine of presence?  If the vocabulary of idolatrous images and empty 
presence permeate this work, in what capacity does the human body serve the Protestant 
agenda?   
The frontispiece for the second edition of The Book of Martyrs provides a visual 
clue to such questions; divided in half, one side represents the “true” Reformed church, 
and the other the false church of Roman Catholicism. The panel with the lifted host of the 
mass is offset with the opposing panel of the burning bodies of saints—a sacramental 
switch that, as Janel Mueller has pointed out, shifts “transusbstantiation from the domain 
of miracle to that of natural law, where the entire embodied experience of human beings 
unfolds” (171).  Mueller’s essay on the construction of selfhood in Foxe’s Acts and 
Monuments identifies the kind of conflation that occurs between Protestant and Catholic 
ideas about the real presence, and points to the liminality of the body that informs my 
own thoughts about the Eucharistic debate.  Mueller suggests that the Protestant rejection 
of the real presence is, in effect, compensated by the “burnt offerings” of the Marian 
martyrs.  Although the Reformists resisted the doctrine of transubstantiation, the bodies 
of the martyrs, in a sense, “filled” the gap left by the elevated host.   
Building on Mueller’s analysis, I propose that Foxe identifies the suffering 
Protestant body as an inviolate sign of religious truth—a connection that further de-
stabilizes the false sign of the Catholic host, and also blurs the traditional binary between 
Protestant-word and Catholic-image.  While critics have recognized the importance of 
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Foxe’s work to Protestant Reformation history (indeed, Patrick Collinson goes so far as 
to write, “an account of the Protestant Nation without Foxe is indeed Hamlet without the 
Prince”), additional study needs to be done on how Protestant iconoclasm and images 
interact in The Book of Martyrs.  Again, a consideration of semiotics is useful.  In a work 
that scrutinizes the gap between res and verba through the debate over the “real 
presence,” Foxe invests the bodies of the martyrs with surprising stability.  Indeed, even 
though Foxe fulfilled his Protestant agenda by emphasizing the bodies of the martyrs, it is 
clear that this reliance on material, visible signs did not sit uneasily with him.  I propose 
that this strategy is in response to the particularly linguistic texture of the Eucharistic 
debate itself, and that in a world of fallen signs and philological uncertainty, the 
believer’s body, and specifically, his/her performance at the stake, provided an inviolate 
sign of who belonged to the “true” church.  In contrast to the dubious sign of the 
Eucharist, the suffering body—in its perceived connection to the incarnate Christ and its 
New Testament status as a temple of God—was a sign of the new covenant of faith that 
the English Protestant Church was, even then, building up.   
The emphasis on the corporeal dimensions of martyrdom is not only motivated by 
the limits of language, but serves to highlight the futility of language in the hands of 
Catholics.  Indeed, the performance of piety frequently operates as a Protestant strategy 
against the “cavelling” Catholics.  Though impressive, the verbal virtuosity of the martyrs 
pales in comparison to their embodied argument, for the logos of the disputations is 
superseded by the ethos of their martyrdom.  This becomes particularly evident in the 
cases of the martyrs John Hooper and Thomas Cranmer, whose suffering bodies are 
highlighted and whose bodily performances are shown overtaking their voices as the 
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primary vehicle of testifying to the truth.  Their cases make clear the ironic fact that in a 
work that records argument after argument for and against the notion of 
transubstantiation, Protestant proof for truth is found not just in the examination room, 
but at the sites of the burnings.  If, as Breitenberg suggests, The Book of Martyrs provides 
a kind of conduct book for the Protestant community to follow, the bodily behavior of the 
martyrs was also crucial for the formation of that community (401-402). 
Using select accounts of Henrician and Marian martyrdoms, I trace the notion that 
the preacher and martyr John Bradford utters during his examination: namely, that “faith 
is more than man can utter” (7.180).  This definition of faith shapes the performances of 
the martyrs, and mediates the epistemological anxieties wrought by the Eucharisitc 
controversy.  After examining specific accounts, the rest of the chapter considers the 
dramatic aspect of Foxe’s work and how the legacy of the true church is enabled through 
the spectacle of the martyrs.  The focus also turns onto those who witness the burnings of 
the martyrs.  By doing so, the last portion of the chapter offers a way to look ahead to the 
kind of transformative imitatio that will take center stage in the next chapters.  In ways 
that anticipate the kind of competition that antitheatricalists would decry later on in the 
century, the spectacle of the martyrs’ deaths overshadowed the execution sermons of the 
Catholic priests.  
JOHN FOXE’S ACTS AND MONUMENTS 
Perhaps one of the most significant accomplishments of Foxe’s monumental work 
is that it promoted and created the fantasy of English Protestantism as part of a grand, 
teleological narrative of the one true church.  While living away from England during the 
reign of Queen Mary, Foxe collected documents that would eventually end up in Acts and 
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Monuments.  Filled with a cornucopia of “anecdotes, autobiographical memoirs, legal 
examinations, sermons, ballads, beast fables, letters, tales, romanticized adventure 
narratives,” Foxe’s work knit together divergent sources and was dedicated to the new 
queen, in whom he saw the fulfillment of God’s divine plan for England.
4
  As various 
Foxean critics have noted, through its copia of content, Acts and Monuments 
demonstrates notions of authorship that render modern ideas of “textual integrity” 
immaterial.
5
  Although ostensibly addressed to Queen Elizabeth, a paragon of learning in 
his eyes, Foxe’s decision to write in the vernacular also shows whom he had in mind as 
his true audience was: the general populace.  In his 1583 prefatory letter to Elizabeth, 
Foxe describes the ignorant mass in the following way: 
Who, as they haue bene long led in ignoraunce, and wrapt in blindenesse for lacke 
specially of Gods word, and partly also for wanting the light of history, pity I 
thought but that such should be helped, their ignoraunce relieued, and simplicity 
instructed.
6
  
As I discuss in greater detail later, Foxe’s work fulfills the didactic criteria of traditional 
martyrologies by instructing the reader in the true history of the church and by teaching 
the reader to properly respond to scenes of martyrdom.  Through eliciting sympathy and 
admiration from his readers, Foxe hoped to create a community of readers and believers 
that would emulate the lives of the martyrs in his text.  It is through such imitation that 
the Protestant community would be replicated and expanded. 
Foxe’s prose style is heavily influenced by the urgency of living in “these 
dangerous times,” and the belief that the history of the English people enacts the 
providential history of a clash between good and evil.
7
  Consequently, Foxe is able to 
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turn the argument of tradition (if the Catholic church is false, why would God have 
allowed it to exist) against the papists, since the Roman Catholic Church is the predicted 
false church of scripture.  Protestant history implicitly answers the question of authorized 
lineage, which interrogators frequently phrase as, “Where was this Church and religion 
forty years ago, before Luther’s time?”  Instead of a new religion possessing potentially 
heretical roots, Foxe presents the Protestant martyrs within an unbreached continuum of 
martyrs.  Closely related to his eschatological history is Foxe’s agenda to train the reader 
to distinguish between true and false religions.  In his 1583 edition’s preface to the 
general reader, Foxe writes:  
Now for as much as the true Church of God goeth not lightly alone, but is 
accompanyed, wyth some other Church or Chappel of the deuill to deface and 
maligne the same, necessary it is therfore the difference betweene them to be 
sene, and the descent of the right Churche to be described from the Apostles tyme. 
(11) 
Because of the troubling phenomenon of doubles in the history of the Church, Foxe is 
determined to make the “difference betweene them to be sene.”  More than doctrine, it is 
the actions of these martyrs that would mark the “difference” between the true and false 
church. 
 Although Foxe works to present a continuous line of legitimate martyrs, his work 
is nonetheless “modern” in the sense that his accounts do not attempt to merge the 
historical distance (and difference) between the primitive and the present church.  In this 
way, Foxe’s work distinguishes itself from Catholic predecessors such as The Golden 
Legend.  As Knott notes, “He collapsed the distance that medieval hagiography tends to 
  65
open up between the saint and the ordinary human” so that anyone could “play” the role 
of a martyr (729).  I suggest that the humanness becomes signified through the human 
body in Foxe’s work; indeed, the grand teleology underlying the phrase “true religion” is 
mingled with homely details of the martyrs as well as the supernatural accounts of their 
perseverance.  Some involve, for example, the earthy effects of prison hygiene; part of 
Alice Benden’s sufferings is described as having spent nine weeks in the same clothes in 
her jail cell, “whereby she became at the last a most piteous and loathsome creature to 
behold” (8.327).  Other details are slyly humorous, as Foxe reports Rowland Taylor’s 
relief that he should burn rather than hang: “And, there, hanging by the hands… quoth he, 
‘What a notable sway should I give if I were hanged’ meaning for that he was a corpulent 
and big man” (6.700).  The inclusion of these features has the effect of making the 
martyrs seem more real and, ultimately, more imitable.  They are saintly, but their 
saintliness is something that can be found on earth.  While their place in Foxe’s 
compilation of martyrs points to their saintliness, Foxe also grounds his stories of such 
Protestant heroism in the material world. 
 While diverse in class and gender, the martyrs found in Foxe’s accounts bear 
similarities that work to smooth out differences.  Throughout Foxe’s compilation of 
stories, the primary characteristic of a martyr remains the same: fortitude in face of 
extreme pain.  The often grisly details of their suffering are captured through the 
description of what happens to the human body when it is exposed to extreme heat—the 
cracking and popping of sinews, the scorching of hair—and the martyrs’ supernatural 
endurance is underscored through the descriptions of their joy in face of pain.  At the 
same time, because the martyrs themselves are presented as having doubt over their 
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ability to perform piously at the stake, their “supernatural” endurance is depicted as 
human.  In this way, the body in pain serves a pivotal role in Foxe’s didactic agenda of 
evangelism and imitation; that is, the fortitude of the martyrs remind the reader of divine 
sustainment.  At the same time, the details of the body in pain localize the supernatural 
event as something that can be imitated.  Much like the body’s ability to trigger locality 
and presentness in Wyatt’s works, the recent memories of the century’s religious turmoil 
made the martyrs’ bodies more movingly effective.   
THE EUCHARISTIC DEBATE 
 The cases of the Tudor martyrs make clear the central position of the Eucharistic 
debate.  Before diving into individual accounts in Foxe’s work, it is necessary to obtain a 
clearer sense of the language and logic of the debate.  As the primary cause of 
imprisonment and argument, the Eucharistic controversy was a semiotic and religious 
crisis that touched upon the interpretation of the words, “This is my body.”  Stephen 
Greenblatt has pointed out how the Eucharist and the problems of “leftovers” equipped 
Protestants with much ammunition to protest the logic of transubstantiation.  In his essay, 
“The Mousetrap,” Greenblatt notes: “The consecrated bread had been transformed by the 
touch of the transcendent, but its material accidents stubbornly persisted and were 
unnervingly subject to the disgraces to which all matter is vulnerable” (147).  By the 
logic of “real presence,” anyone who consumed the host—whether a person or a mouse—
received the body of Christ.   
Whereas the Catholics blamed the Protestants of draining the host of sacred 
properties through their insistence on figurative presence, the Protestants argued that the 
incarnational certitude of Christ’s human and historical body could not allow his body to 
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be in multiple places at once.  It is interesting that, despite the level of polemical 
vehemency, both sides of the debate seized upon the materiality of Christ’s body as their 
baseline of argument.  Indeed, the historical and human nature of Christ serves as a 
pivotal argumentative tool in the hands of Protestant polemicists; what becomes apparent 
in arguments against the real presence is the centrality of Christ’s physical body in the 
midst of rejecting gross materialist theology.  As John Phillpot, Archdeacon of 
Winchester and one of the martyrs in Foxe’s The Book of Martyrs, states:  
But bodily to be present, and bodily to be absent; to be on earth, and to be in 
heaven, and all at one present time; be things contrary to the nature of a human 
body: ergo, it cannot be said of the human body of Christ, that the selfsame body 
is both in heaven, and also in earth at one instant, either visibly or invisibly. 
(6.408) 
Reformists rejected the gross materiality of the doctrine of real presence, yet they also 
protested against it because it did not allow Christ’s body to be physical enough—that is, 
subject to natural laws being true “to the nature of a human body.”   
John Bradford, one of the notable martyrs in Foxe’s work, offers a similar 
argument against the doctrine of real presence in his Two Notable Sermons (1574).  
Bradford makes a connection between the material reality of Christ (his human nature) 
and the figurative meaning of the Lord’s Supper in the second sermon.  He states that by 
believing in the doctrine of transubstantiation, “the propertye of the humane nature of 
Christ is denyed,” since “it is not of the humane nature, but of the deuine nature to be in 
many places at once.”  That is, the particular “real presence” of Christ is authenticated 
through the denial of general “real presence.”  If believers insist on the verity of the 
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doctrine of real presence, they perform the heresy of denying the human aspect of 
Christ’s identity. 
The importance attached to the incarnational aspect of Christ provides a way to 
understand the insistent corporeality of Foxe’s martyrs, then, since the primary sign of 
the humanity of Christ was physical pain.  As Caroline Walker Bynum has pointed out in 
her “answer” to Leo Steinberg, it is the centrality of suffering rather than sexuality that 
defined what it meant to be human for the late medieval subject.
8
  Although Bynum 
focuses mainly on late medieval thought, the important connection between Christ’s 
humanity and suffering remained vibrant in the sixteenth century.  While it is plain that 
the martyrs are imitating Christ and previous martyrs, their suffering bodies become 
especially suitable for imitating Christ.  The perception of Christ’s life as incarnational 
and historical added to the tangible nature of faith; the martyred bodies and their 
connection to Christ’s humanity offer another way to understand how the human body 
provides a “middle” ground between the traditional binary between Protestant-word and 
Catholic-image. 
I see this desire for materiality and physicality manifesting itself in the way that 
scriptural allusions and metaphors take on literal meanings in Acts and Monuments and 
other Protestant works.  That is, part of the devotional concept of imitatio Christi for 
Protestants seems to require a kind of literalization of figurative concepts found in 
scripture.  For example, Bradford’s Two Notable Sermons includes this idea about what 
will happen to those who repent: “That as with his eyes, toung, handes feete &c he hath 
displeased God, doing his own wyl; euen so now with the same eyes, toung, eares 
handes, feete, &c he may displease his own selfe, and do Gods wyll.”  Bradford imagines 
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the abstract concept of repentance in embodied ways: the many members with which one 
had displeased God become an avenue through which one can now please God.  In the 
cases below (especially Cranmer’s), I continue to consider the materiality of faith that 
insists on literal renderings of images.  
THE CASE OF JOHN HOOPER 
The account of John Hooper, Bishop of Gloucester, serves as a representative 
sample of the embodiment of religious truth in Foxe’s work.  As in the other accounts, 
the “singular virtues” of Master Hooper are related with much reverence.  Like others, 
Hooper is shown displaying remarkable dignity and calm at the stake, and is seen echoing 
the scriptural martyrs as he cries, “Lord Jesus receive my spirit!”  Hooper’s stoicism is 
perhaps all the more amazing due to the gruesome circumstances of his death.  We learn 
through Foxe that multiple fires had to be lit because of the cold and wind, which kept the 
blaze from wholly lighting.  The protracted length of his sufferings (three quarters of an 
hour) is something that Foxe makes certain to emphasize after describing his death, as if 
to remind the reader of Hooper’s legitimacy.  Due to the flames, Hooper soon loses the 
ability to speak.  Foxe describes the scene in the following way:  
But when he was black in the mouth and his tongue swollen, that he could not 
speak, yet his lips went till they were shrunk to the gums: and he knocked his 
breast with his hands, until one of his arms fell off, and then knocked still with the 
other, what time the fat, water, and blood, dropped out at his fingers’ ends, until 
by renewing of the fire his strength was gone, and his hand did cleave fast, in 
knocking, to the iron upon his breast.  So immediately, bowing forwards, he 
yielded up his spirit. (6.658) 
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Foxe’s description is clinically descriptive, even detached, and his own comments do not 
intrude upon the scene.  Much like the narrator in Wyatt’s Penitential Psalms, he is 
content to let Hooper’s body speak for itself, and we are led to witness a similar scene of 
devotional gestures that authenticate the moment. 
Though Hooper’s account may seem unique in the extensive amount of graphic 
details offered to the reader, it is not uncommon in Acts and Monuments to find Foxe 
providing unflinchingly accurate portrayals of what happens to the human body when it 
is exposed to fire: the skin pops and bursts with blood and water; the lips shrink to the 
gums.  What is perhaps most notable about Hooper’s case (a fact which Foxe highlights) 
is the description of his insistence on still “speaking” even after his capacity to speak is 
gone.  Hooper accomplishes this through the activity of knocking at his breast, a 
dominant image in this scene through which Hooper communicates control in the midst 
of immolation and confirms his piety.  Whereas the loss of his voice could be seen as a 
sign of Hooper’s deterioration, his gestures serve to strengthen his status as a martyr and 
points to the kind of embodied imitatio hinted at in the earlier chapter.  Hooper’s 
religious integrity is closely tied to the performance of his body, which, in its suffering, 
bypasses any hint of hypocrisy. 
The knocking of the breast invokes the traditional posture of penitence found in 
Luke 18, a scriptural place in which the outward actions of the sincere publican are 
praised above the showy and smug prayers of the pharisee.  While the locus classicus for 
authentic prayer, Matthew 6, emphasizes elements of hiddenness and secrecy, the story of 
the repentant publican was also widely recognized and one that Hooper could invoke and 
imitate.  Sermons on prayer evoke the story of the publican and Pharisee, and praise the 
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publican for his humble posture that communicate more clearly with God.
9
  The 
evocation of this moment in scripture where the gestures of penitence speak more loudly 
than the self-satisfied words of the Pharisee seem appropriate to the scene of Hooper’s 
execution, especially in light of the fact that Protestant executions were preceded by 
sermons.  Although accused of heresy by the sermonizing priest, Foxe infuses this 
moment of immolation with scriptural authority that allows Hooper’s performance to 
physically deny the charge of heresy and, consequently, to subvert the message of the 
Catholic authorities. 
 It must be acknowledged, of course, that what I allude to as Hooper’s 
“performance” at the stake arose from circumstances that were beyond his control, and is 
not a performance in the playing sense.  However, circumstances necessitated his actions, 
and they involved a desire for communication, since a common tactic deployed against 
the Protestant martyrs took the shape of enforced silence.  Although some of the martyrs 
spoke until their capacity for speech was gone, the enforcement of silence often occurred 
even before they suffered from the flames.  Silence was often implemented, for example, 
by having the martyrs wear close-fitting hoods to their execution sites.  As the account of 
Rowland Taylor’s martyrdom details, this was done “wherefore [the Catholics] feared 
lest, if the people should have heard them speak, or have seen them, they might have 
been much more strengthened by their godly exhortations, to stand steadfast in God’s 
word, and to fly the superstitions and idolatries of the papacy” (6.695).  Many martyrs 
were self-consciously aware of what was at stake during their hour of death, and in this 
way, Hooper’s insistent bodily communication was aimed at evangelizing the earthly 
audience.   
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 In light of this didactic motivation, it is at first surprising to find that the 
spectacular suffering body should be placed in the middle of Hooper’s account rather 
than serving as a culminating end piece.  Rather than ending the narrative with the 
description of Hooper’s death, what closes the account are Hooper’s letters to various 
people.  The odd arrangement of material, however, points to rather than detracts from 
Foxe’s editorial sense.  This becomes apparent when looking at the purpose of the letters 
following the grisly account of Hooper’s death: exhortation.  Coming at the heels of 
Hooper’s martyrdom, these letters gain a kind of posthumous authority, since Hooper’s 
words of advice attain greater authority through his spectacular death.  Foxe seems to 
fully recognize the rich potential of this moment, since he exhorts the readers to read 
them as a remembrance unto Hooper.  They are “most fruitful and worthy to be read, 
especially in these dangerous days, of all true Christians, who, by true mortification, seek 
to serve and follow the Lord” (6.662).   
It seems clear, too, that these letters were written for public viewing, even if 
addressed to private persons such as family members.  As if in agreement with his future 
editor, Hooper’s letters testify to a similar awareness of the importance of embodied 
imitatio as an authorizing technique.  In his letter to “relievers and helpers in the city of 
London,” for example, Hooper thanks various people in London for their provision of 
material relief during his time in prison.  After thanking them, he encourages them to 
willingly suffer and to live for a heavenly reward.  The tenuous reality of Hooper’s 
present situation clearly affects his words of advice to fellow believers, and what stands 
out in his instructions of proper devotion is his emphasis on the outward body.  As if 
imagining his imminent immolation, Hooper writes of using “both your inward spirits 
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and your outward bodies” to behave properly to God, for there cannot be division 
between the two.  He writes: 
Therefore, dear brethren, pray to the heavenly Father, that as he spared not the 
soul nor the body of his dearly beloved Son, but applied both of them with 
extreme pain, to work our salvation both of body and soul; so he will give us all 
grace to apply our bodies and souls to be servants unto him: for doubtless he 
requireth as well the one as the other, and cannot be miscontented with the one, 
and well pleased with the other.  Either he hateth both, or loveth both; he divideth 
not his love to one, and his hatred to the other.  Let not us therefore, good 
brethren, divide ourselves, and say our souls serve him, whatsoever our bodies do 
to the contrary for civil order and policy. (6.671) 
Here, Hooper draws upon the logic of reciprocation: since God “spared not the soul nor 
the body of his dearly beloved Son,” so believers also ought not to be divided in serving 
God with soul and body.  It is, in essence, the logic of imitation and one that Foxe 
himself employs again and again through the discrete narratives of martyrdom.  As 
Hooper denounces the practice of casuistry as a division of selfhood, one can see him 
thinking about his future imitatio Christi, and his anticipation of martyrdom makes the 
visibility of inner and outer conformity of faith all the more important.   
THE CASE OF THOMAS CRANMER 
 Another striking example of embodied devotion can be found in the account of 
Thomas Cranmer, Archbishop of Canterbury, and his martyrdom during the Marian 
regime.  Although the description of his life and death match the typical template found 
in Foxe’s work—a virtuous life, calling to religion, and martyrdom—the account of 
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Cranmer’s martyrdom differs in a crucial way: unlike the others, he succumbed to the 
temptation of recanting his Protestant beliefs.  Foxe describes how after almost three 
years in prison, the papists through “all crafty practices and allurements they might 
devise” tried to persuade Cranmer to recant (8.80).  Although Foxe supplies much 
dramatic energy to the description of the constant urging that Cranmer was under, he 
stops at attributing a fixed reason for the Archbishop’s recantation: “It might be supposed 
that it was done for the hope of life, and better days to come: but, as we may since 
perceive by the letter of his sent to a lawyer, the most cause why… was that he would 
make an end of Marcus Antonius, which he had already begun” (8.81).  Though Foxe 
remains ultimately ambivalent regarding the real reason for Cranmer’s recantation, he is 
certain about its meaning: “But so it pleaseth God, that so great virtues in this archbishop 
should not be had in too much admiration of us without some blemish… that in him 
should appear an example of man’s weak imbecility” (8.81-2).  The archbishop, like all 
of the martyrs in Acts and Monuments, communicated lessons through exemplification. 
While the performative aspects of Hooper knocking at his breast are ambivalent, 
Cranmer’s actions at the stake seem self-consciously coded as a performance.  That is, 
the account of Cranmer’s martyrdom makes clear the fact that he calibrates his 
performance at the stake in direct reaction to his earlier recantations, and he concentrates 
especially upon the “guilty” member of his body: his hand.  As Cranmer announces to the 
people, the hand that signed the false recantations would be the first thing to burn at the 
stake.  While Cranmer’s actions differentiate him from other martyrs, what I want to 
point out in the dramatic nature and logic of Cranmer’s determined deed is a strange 
reversal of the traditional semiotic stance of Protestantism.  Cranmer’s insistence on 
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allowing his “guilty” hand to burn first materializes Christ’s figurative language about 
sin: “Wherefore, if thy hand or thy foote cause thee to offend, cut them off, and cast them 
from thee: it is better for thee to enter into life, halt, or maimed, then hauing two hands, 
or two feete, to be cast into euerlasting fire” (Matthew 18:8).  Cranmer’s confession of 
his cowardice focuses upon the hand that signed the false recantation, and provides a 
material focus for his act of repentance.  It also allows him to put distance between 
himself and his guilty act.  He states, “And forasmuch as my hand offended, writing 
contrary to my heart, my hand shall first be punished therefor; for, may I come to the fire, 
it shall be first burned” (8.88).  By choosing to let his hand burn first and announcing this 
decision to the people around him, Cranmer visibly purges the guilt of his earlier 
recantation before the eyes of witnesses.  
 Although initially grouped with Hugh Latimer and Nicholas Ridley as an ardent 
attacker of the doctrine of transubstantiation, Cranmer would eventually commit the kind 
of casuistry that Hooper denounced by signing a letter of recantation.  It was a recantation 
that the Catholics triumphantly circulated during Queen Mary’s reign, and due to the 
notoriety of Cranmer’s actions, Foxe needed to treat his re-instatement carefully.  I 
suggest that the reason why both Foxe and Cranmer invest heavily in the performance at 
the stake is because the integrity of Cranmer’s words had become suspect.  Consequently, 
his behavior and visage received great attention.  Foxe reports the Archbishop’s behavior 
during the execution sermon in this way: “Cranmer in all this mean time, with what great 
grief of mind he stood hearing this sermon, the outward shews of his body and 
countenance did better express, than any man can declare” (8.86).  Foxe emphasizes the 
truthful sign of Cranmer’s body, and attributes greater eloquence to his bodily expression 
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that what “any man can declare.”  The stable sign of the body is further emphasized when 
Foxe later states that in Cranmer, “A man might have seen the very image and shape of 
perfect sorrow lively in him expressed” (8.86).   
 After the funeral sermon and Cranmer’s surprising disavowal of his former 
recantation, the archbishop is reported to be tied to the stake.  The description of 
Cranmer’s death forms one of the more memorable scenes in The Book of Martyrs: 
And when the wood was kindled, and the fire began to burn near him, 
stretching out his arm, he put his right hand into the flame, which he held so 
steadfast and immovable (saving that once with the same hand he wiped his 
face), that all men might see his hand burned before his body was touched.  
His body did so abide the burning of the flame with such constancy and 
steadfastness, that standing always in one place without moving his body, he 
seemed to move no more than the stake to which he was bound. (8.90) 
The dominant image here is not immolation, but immovability, for Cranmer refuses to be 
moved by pain.  Like the other martyrs in Foxe’s work, Cranmer is “unmoved” by the 
effects of the fire.  Significantly, the language used to describe Cranmer’s literal 
steadfastness here blurs with a figurative immovability of faith, and the body is invested 
with a stability that can no longer be found in his words.  Indeed, the only discernible 
movement in this still scene is the movement of his guilty appendage, which he extends 
into the flame so that it may burn first.  In doing so, Cranmer insured that he visibly kept 
his word.  
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THE SEMIOTICS OF ANNE ASKEW 
 What becomes apparent in accounts like Cranmer’s is the kind of counterintuitive 
semiotics deployed by Protestant martyrs.  Whereas the Marian martyrs insist on the 
figurative reading of the words, “This is my body,” in the examination room, martyrs like 
Cranmer ask for both a figurative and literal interpretation of his body.  In light of the 
way in which words like “members” operate in Foxe’s work, I turn our attention to the 
semiotics employed by another Reformation martyr, Anne Askew.  I argue that unlike 
many of the martyr accounts in Foxe, Askew’s recording of her suffering body does not 
partake in the kind of body-as-proof semiotics.  This becomes especially apparent when 
comparing her account and the comments made by her editor, John Bale.  Although both 
Askew and Bale use the term “weak” to describe her character, for example, it is evident 
through the context in which it is used that Askew uses this strategically as a figurative 
weakness; for her editors, however, Askew’s weakness is primarily physical in nature.  
While she deploys her weakness as a sign, her editors insist on its real presence. 
A Protestant convert from Lincolnshire, Askew was imprisoned twice in March 
1545 and June 1546, and was sentenced to death by fire at the age of 25.  She recorded 
her examinations and smuggled the manuscript out of prison through her maidservant.  In 
the year after her death, the Protestant exile and minister, John Bale, published her work 
alongside his own extensive commentary.  Askew’s narrative would later become a part 
of Foxe’s Acts and Monuments, which helped establish her as a popular figure of 
Protestant martyrdom well beyond the sixteenth century.
10
  Despite the critical prejudice 
against Bale and a general preference for Foxe—the latter having been deemed to present 
a “purer” presentation of Askew’s voice—it is clear that both men actively edited 
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Askew’s manuscript.
11
  Although recent interest in recovering early modern women 
writers has placed a premium on locating Askew’s “voice,” the edited nature of her work 
makes it difficult to locate such a clear-cut version of her selfhood.  While it is true that 
Foxe’s edition is less fragmented than Bale’s edition, I agree with Thomas Freeman and 
Sarah Wall’s opinion that, “precisely speaking, [Askew’s Examinations] does not exist” 
(1168).
 
 That is, the search for an “authentic” narrative voice becomes destabilized within 
the circumstances surrounding the production of Examinations: Askew’s work is 
fundamentally an edited work and, as such, needs to be considered in its entirety.  For 
these reasons, I refer to both Bale and Foxe’s editions in my discussion of Askew’s 
narrative. 
What, then, should we make note of when reading this striking narrative?  The 
editorial strategies involved in the presentation of Askew’s work provide a clue, for both 
Bale and Foxe emphasize similar aspects within Askew’s narrative: her physical 
vulnerability.  Bale introduces Askew as “a gentylwoman verye yonge, dayntye, and 
tender” and places Askew within a recognizable genealogy of female martyrs.
 12
 He 
describes their similarities in this way: “Blandina was yonge and tender.  So was Anne 
Askewe also.  But that which was frayle of nature in them both, Christ made most stronge 
by hys grace” (10). Through such prefatorial comparisons as well as editorial insertions 
throughout the course of Askew’s narrative, Bale continually foregrounds the weakness 
of Askew’s female body, and this strategy allows him to emphasize the intervention of 
divine grace.  While Bale draws parallels between Askew and a prior female martyr, 
however, Askew subscribes to a more general scriptural martyr and compares herself to 
Stephen or Job from Scripture. 
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The distinction between Askew’s editors and her own voice becomes most 
pronounced when referencing the treatment of her suffering body.  Indeed, Bale almost 
gleefully elucidates upon her experience on the rack and points out the barbarity of her 
torturers, Lord Chancellor Wriothesley and Richard Rich, in the latter examination.  In 
his usually scathing prose, Bale states: “Marke here an example most wonderfull, and se 
how madlye in their ragynge furyes, men forget themselves and lose their ryght wittes 
now a days” (128).   Bale interprets their involvement in Askew’s torture as a sure sign of 
their identity as “false christians,” and he validates his conclusions through the material 
evidence provided through Askew’s body in pain.  He builds his case in this way: 
Where could be seane a more clere and open experyment of Christes dere 
membre, than in her myghtye sufferynges?  Lyke a lambe she laye styll without 
noyse of cryenge, and suffered your uttermost vyolence, tyll the synnowes of her 
armes were broken, and the strynges of her eys peryshed in her heade.  Ryght 
farre doth it passe the strength of a yonge, tendre, weake, and sycke woman (as 
she was at that tyme to your more confusyon) to abyde so vyolent handelynge, 
yea, or yet of the strongest man that lyveth. (129) 
Unlike her torturers, Askew is a “dere membre” of Christ’s true church and her 
membership is made most clear through her “myghtye sufferynges”.  Bale alludes to 
Askew’s Christ-like behavior by comparing her to a lamb and, again, references her 
feminine tenderness with the list of adjectives “younge, tendre, weake, and sycke”. 
Foxe’s version shapes Askew’s narrative through less noticeable ways, yet a 
familiar centering of her body is evident in his versions of her work.  While he does not 
attach the kind of elaborate “elucidation” that Bale does to his presentation of Askew’s 
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narrative, Foxe formulates her experiences in similar ways.  This becomes apparent 
through his Latin epitaph on Askew in the Rerum.  Appended to her narrative, this poem 
reveals an interpretation of her sufferings akin to Bale’s in that it focuses on her body in 
pain.  The epitaph reads: 
Lictor incaestis manibus cruente, 
Membra quid frustra eculeis fatigas, 
Vique uirtutem laceras puellae 
Te melioris?
13
 
By using the word puella, Foxe emphasizes the girlish nature of the body on the rack—
another version of Bale’s favored adjectives, “yonge and tender”—and asks the reason 
for the virtuous girl’s sufferings.  The lurid description of her limbs and bones being 
broken and severed in a later stanza culminates in the image of the one thing that is left 
intact—her tongue—as he writes: “Sola enim nullis potuit moueri / Lingua rupturis”
14
 
(21-22).  Perhaps appropriately, the traditional sign of female fault—the too-active 
tongue—is left intact and becomes a sign of Askew’s heroism. 
Although the editors foreground the female suffering body in the Examinations, 
Askew’s narrative is one that challenges the emphasis on her frail body.  Indeed, Askew 
remains largely silent over her experience on the rack.  There is only one reference to her 
physical torture.  In the latter examination, she records her experience on the rack in the 
following way: 
Then they ded put me on the racke, bycause I confessed no ladyes or 
gentyllwomen to be of my opynyon, and thereon they kepte me a longe tyme.  
  81
And bycause I laye still and ded not crye, my lorde Chauncellour and master 
Ryche, toke peynes to racke me their owne handes, tyll I was nygh dead. (127) 
With a chilling brevity of the words, “and thereon they kepte me a long tyme,” Askew 
leaves the experience of being tortured largely undescribed.  Rather than focusing on her 
pain, she provides the details of her figurative weakness.   
While Askew employs a general rhetorical tactic that utilizes the fact of her 
“weaker sex” freely, she makes clear to the reader that it is a conscious choice on her 
part.  In this way, whereas her editors impress upon the reader Askew’s physical 
weakness, Askew’s narrative stresses her argumentative prowess through tapping into 
existent models of femininity.  When accused of having too few words by a frustrated 
examiner, for example, Askew responds: “God hath geven me the gift of knowledge, but 
not of utterance.  And Salomon sayeth that a woman of few wordes is a gift of God.”  
Here, Askew relies on biblical presentations of womanhood to evade her questioner’s 
attempts to convict her of heresy.  Interestingly, as evidenced by her answer, she does not 
equate a woman’s silence with inadequate knowledge; instead, she claims the gift of 
“knowledge, not of utterance.”  When later ordered to answer the hypothetical question, 
“If the host shuld fall, and a beast ded eate it, whether the beast ded receyve God or no?” 
Askew again utilizes a similar plea of female weakness, since she tells her examiner, “I 
was but a woman, and knewe not the course of scoles” (34).  Yet, even as Askew claims 
to be “but a woman,” she insinuated that the masculine “course of scoles” is ultimately 
foolish.  What becomes clear throughout the two examinations is her ability to sidestep 
questions through verbal alacrity.  Her response to the declaration that she would be 
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burned for heresy, Askew answers, “I had searched all the scryptures, yet could I never 
finde, that eyther Christe or his Apostles putte anye creature to death" (181). 
Although Askew is not afraid to foreground her identity as a woman in order to 
maintain a self-protective silence during her interrogations, it is also clear that she does 
not use her gender in the same way that Bale (and, in a more moderate sense, Foxe) does.  
Whereas they focus on the weakness of Askew’s physical body, Askew focuses on her 
verbal and mental “weaknesses” as a woman; however, it is a weakness that claims 
wisdom in ways similar to St. Paul’s declaration about wisdom and foolishness: “For the 
wisdom of the world is foolishness with God. For it is written, He taketh the wise in their 
own craftiness” (1 Corinthians 3:19).  In body, however, she refuses to identify herself as 
a young woman, nor does she ever choose to dwell on her physical pain.  Though she 
would not deny her weakness, it is a weakness that does not operate merely physically—
an interpretation that her future editors fail to grasp.   
DRAMA AND AUDIENCE IN FOXE 
With some exceptions to the rule, I have been arguing so far that the various 
accounts of the martyrs enact a smoothing out of differences—a process that becomes 
manifest in the uniformity of the martyrs’ stoicism and bravery at the execution sites.  
Another reoccurrence that can be seen at the execution sites is the behavior of the 
spectator in Foxe’s work.  In continuing to trace the emulative ideal of imitation in 
Foxe’s The Book of Martyrs, I want to shift my attention to the audience at the execution 
sites and examine the imitative exchange that occurs there.  Fleshing out the exchange 
implicit in the Greek term martyr (or witness), these spectators are an important part of 
Foxe’s editorial strategy and form a significant aspect of the work of transmission that 
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happens in a martyrology.  Indeed, accounts such as Cranmer’s death show how 
effectively his performance at the pyre impacted the people surrounding him.  Foxe 
describes Cranmer’s actions as intentional, so “that all men might see his hand burned 
before his body was touched.”  A similar focus upon the audience becomes apparent in 
the account of John Hooper’s execution.  Foxe draws attention to the people by reporting 
how there is “nothing to be seen” in every corner except “weeping and sorrowful 
people.”  Like Cranmer, Hooper is also self-consciously performative in his death.  
Described as embracing and kissing the very materials that would help to set him aflame, 
Hooper is literally set upon a stage of sorts—“he looked upon all the people, of whom he 
might be well seen (for he was both tall, and stood also on a high stool).”  In both 
Hooper’s and Cranmer’s executions, the interaction between physical gestures and 
spectator participation becomes an integral part of their martyrdoms.  
The rest of this chapter investigates the exchange that occurs between a martyr 
and the watching attendants at the execution, and in doing so, looks ahead to the drama 
chapters.  Huston Diehl’s work on the reformation of the stage provides an insightful 
analysis of the ways in which Foxe utilizes a variety of elements in his martyrology, and I 
rely upon her work in order to examine the dramatic components in Acts and 
Monuments.
15
  As Diehl observes, while Foxe is determined to be iconoclastic in his 
method, he nonetheless “constructs the history of the Reformation as a riveting and 
dynamic drama” (24).  She points out that the martyrology’s dramatic elements are 
visibly apparent, since much of the work is printed in dialogue format.  However, 
whereas the medieval illustrations had only focused upon the figures of the martyrs, the 
illustrations in Foxe offer a wider lens through which the reader is allowed to see the 
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crowd of spectators and, as a result, to also become a participant.
16
  Diehl points to 
moments in which Foxe “reforms” the reader’s gaze by using illustrations that draw 
attention to idolatrous aspects of images, and sees Foxe utilizing the elements of drama to 
further his Protestant agenda.  In this way, she questions the “widely held assumption that 
the reformed religion is essentially antitheatrical and thus necessarily hostile to the 
London theater that flourishes under Elizabeth and James” (25).  
While I do not yet want to dive too deeply into the nature of the hostility that 
antitheatricalists would hold later on in the century, the characterization of the typical 
audience member is important when investigating the spectator in Acts and Monuments.  
I argue that the kind of audience that is constructed in Foxe is notably different from the 
average spectator that antitheatricalists such as Stephen Gosson depict.  Indeed, in 
Gosson’s work, the “common people” bear as much abuse as the players themselves: at 
turns portrayed as naive, misled, or lascivious, the theater attendants who bear the brunt 
of his denunciations are depicted as incapable of discerning good from bad.  The 
spectators in Foxe’s cosmic “drama,” on the other hand, confirm the community of the 
godly through their actions and reactions.  Often captured with expressions of horror and 
sympathy, the spectators who are depicted in narrative and visual form provide, like the 
martyrs themselves, an accessible model for imitation.  In this way, Foxe accomplishes 
his didactic mission of evangelism, which does not stop at just distinguishing between the 
true believer and the heretic, but demonstrates the proper response for the Protestant 
community.   
While critics such as James Truman has described the nature of the exchange 
occurring at the execution sites as essentially violent and that “the theatricality of 
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martyrological narrative mimics the violence exercised by the tormentors themselves… 
[and] the horrifying spectacle of the martyrs' torment ravish the audience,” I propose that 
Foxe also portrays them as more than passive and moldable spectators that are objects of 
“ravishment” (58).  It is true that the spectators are portrayed as exhibiting horror at what 
occurred before their eyes, but Foxe also includes details about their behavior that 
indicate their participation rather than passivity.  It is our modern sensibilities that cringe 
before the visceral descriptions of pain; rather than being “ravished” by these scenes, 
Foxe’s spectators are held ethically responsible for what they witness.  Indeed, the 
spectators not only demonstrate pity and reverence at the execution sites, but also model 
resistance to Catholic authorities through their actions.  They are affected, but it is a 
positive exchange that stirs people to piety rather than paralysis; it is, moreover, an 
exchange that is theatrical in nature.  The people surrounding the Marian martyr John 
Hullier, for example, are admonished by the Catholic authorities not to pray for him, 
since as “being but a damned man, it could profit him nothing” (8.380).  However, as 
Foxe relates, “Nevertheless they continued praying.”  In this way, Foxe not only sets up a 
pattern of piety not just in the martyrs, but also in the spectators who are described and 
depicted in his work. 
The genre of the martyrology and its agenda of transmission made the spectator 
an especially important figure.  What is striking about Foxe’s work is that not only is 
Foxe aware of the audience in addressing the reader from time to time, but the martyrs 
and persecutors themselves seem to be conscious of the spectator’s gaze.  As Hugh 
Latimer is reported to state to his fellow martyr, “Be of good comfort, Master Ridley, and 
play the man.  We shall this day light such a candle, by God’s grade, in England, as I 
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trust shall never be put out.”  This statement, one of the most frequently quoted out of 
The Book of Martyrs, underscores how Latimer understood his death to have future 
consequences and the fact that he was creating history through his martyrdom.  Not 
unaware of the persuasive power of the burning heretics, Catholic officials attempted to 
control the publicity of the burnings, especially when the burnings involved high profile 
Protestant figures.   
The case of John Bradford makes this notion clear.  As a prominent Protestant 
preacher who played an important role in articulating the Protestant position, Bradford 
was a well-known figure to the public.  Foxe reports in the account of Bradford’s life and 
execution that the preacher was scheduled to be executed at the early hour of four in the 
morning, specifically in order to prevent a crowd from gathering.  He goes on to describe 
how a great multitude nevertheless gathered to witness the event.  Foxe reports this 
incident itself as a kind of miracle: “For the next day, at the said hour of four a clock in 
the morning, there was in Smithfield such a multitude of men and women, that many 
being in admiration thereof, thought it was not possible that they could have warning of 
his death, being so great a number in so short a time, unless it were by the singular 
providence of Almighty God” (7.148).  As an occasion to be censored (or celebrated), 
Bradford’s case underscores the importance with which both sides of the Reformation 
viewed the physically present crowd.  One tried to suppress the witnessing of Bradford’s 
death and the other applauded the miraculous gathering of the crowd. 
A fellow martyr and Bradford’s mate in prison, the story of Rowland Taylor 
provides a dramatic account that foregrounds the role of the sympathetic spectators.  In 
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order to analyze the role of the people, I quote extensively from the account of his 
martyrdom: 
When they were now come to Hadley, and came riding over the bridge, at the 
bridge-foot waited a poor man with five small children; who, when he saw Dr. 
Taylor, he and his children fell down upon their knees, and help up their hands, 
and cried with a loud voice, and said, “O dear father and good shepherd, Dr. 
Taylor! God help and succour thee, as thou hast many a time succoured me and 
my poor children.”  Such witness had the servant of God, of his virtuous and 
charitable alms given in his lifetime: for God would now the poor testify of his 
good deeds, to his singular comfort, to the example of others, and confusion of his 
persecutors and tyrannous adversaries.  For the sheriff and others that led him to 
death, were wonderfully astonied at this: and the sheriff sore rebuked the poor 
man for so crying.  The streets of Hadley were beset on both sides with men and 
women of the town and country, who waited to see him; whom when they beheld 
so led to death, with weeping eyes and lamentable voices they cried, saying one to 
another, “Ah good Lord! There goeth our good shepherd from us, and so godly 
hath goverened us. O merciful God! What shall we poor scattered lambs do? 
What shall come of this most wicked world?  Good Lord strengthen him, and 
comfort him:” with such other most lamentable and piteous voices.  Wherefore 
the people were sore rebuked by the sheriff and the catchpoles his men, that led 
him.  And Dr. Taylor evermore said to the people, “I have preached to you God’s 
word and truth, and am come this day to seal it with my blood.” (6.697) 
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As Taylor is led to the place of his execution and passes through the town of Hadley, his 
former parish, various people come out to meet him.  Although rebuffed by the sheriff 
under whose guard Taylor travels, the people nonetheless insist on speaking to him.  
Even before they arrive at the site of the execution, the martyr, his executors, and the 
people form a dramatic ensemble, in which the hero and villain are clearly demarcated.  
The people’s remarks and reactions to the martyr guide the interpretation of the scene at 
hand, such that Foxe needs only to state simply, “Such witness had the servant of God.”    
 Taylor’s account also reveals the conscious overtures the papists take in order to 
silence the martyr, and the importance they attached to the power of the people. Once 
Taylor arrives at the site of his burning, Aldham-common, he is greeted by the sight of “a 
great multitude of people gathered thither” (6.698).  The guards take great care to 
maintain a distance between the would-be-martyr and the people, and Foxe highlights the 
silence enforced upon Taylor, and alludes to a promise of silence he was forced to take: 
“What this promise was, it is unknown: but the common fame was, that after he and 
others were condemned, the council sent for them, and threatened them they would cut 
their tongues out of their heads, except they would promise, that at their deaths they 
would keep silence, and not speak to the people” (6.698).  Foxe depicts the council as 
having the power to condemn, but fearful of the persuasive power of the martyr’s 
tongue—so much so that their tongues were literally threatened.  Foxe relates the reasons 
in this way, “For the papists feared much, lest this mutation of religion, from truth to lies, 
from Christ’s ordinances to the popish traditions, should not so quietly have been 
received as it was,” and cites the authorities’ fear of popular unrest as a result of 
witnessing the preacher’s burning (6.698).   
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 Taylor’s last act before being bound is to kneel and to pray—a familiar gesture of 
devotion, since he could not speak to the people—and Foxe reports how someone from 
the crowd steps forward in order to pray with him: “…and a poor woman that was among 
the people, stepped in and prayed with him: but her they thrust away, and threatened to 
tread her down with horses: notwithstanding she would not remove, but abode and prayed 
with him” (6.699).  Here, we witness the continuity of the persecution narrative that Foxe 
desired to impart to his readers when compiling his martyr narratives: as the martyr 
kneels down to pray, he is literally imitated by the poor woman who, despite the threats 
from authorities, also kneels down to pray next to him.  She enacts active resistance to the 
Catholic authorities, and offers her actions as a gesture of sympathy and solidarity.  It is a 
response that is triggered by witnessing Taylor’s actions, but at the same time, seems to 
impart strength to the would-be-martyr.  The fact that this figure is a “poor woman,” who 
is doubly marginalized through her gender and economic status, allows this unnamed 
woman to be imitable.  Foxe implicitly suggests that anyone can play the role of the 
martyr. 
IDOLATROUS IMAGES 
Critics have had difficulty reconciling Foxe’s Protestantism and his use of visual 
images, and the use of visual representations in The Book of Martyrs has been variously 
interpreted.  Whereas Catherine Coats places Foxe as a compromising figure who “would 
prefer to eliminate imagery, but fears an inability to fully communicate with it,” Huston 
Diehl asserts that Foxe deliberately uses illustrations in order to draw attention to 
idolatrous aspects of images and subvert traditional medieval reaction.
17
  These critics 
attend to the dominant Protestant aesthetic policy of iconoclasm, which rejects the use of 
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images as an idolatrous method of communication.  My own view is that Foxe uses 
images without uneasiness, because the images he points our attention to are the “temples 
of God.”  Although Protestant distrust of images has been a well-documented 
phenomenon, the martyred bodies are deemed “safe” images that possess powers of 
persuasion in Foxe’s work.   
As the martyrologist’s embodied strategy makes clear, lingering over the details 
of the martyr’s suffering body is not, like the images of saints, an occasion for idolatry.  
Indeed, the usual condemnation with which the Protestants react to Catholic worship of 
relics is significantly absent in Foxe’s description of what happened to one martyr’s 
remains: 
His flesh being consumed, his bones stood upright even as if they had been alive. 
Of the people, some took what they could get of him, as pieces of bones. One had 
his heart, the which was distributed so far as it would go; one took the scalp, and 
looked for the tongue, but it was consumed except the very root.  One rounded 
him in the ear, and desired him to be constant to the end; at which he spake 
nothing, but showed a joyful countenance, and so continued both constant and 
joyful to the end. (8.380) 
This account of John Hullier burnt at Cambridge is striking in that the people around him 
literally treat his remains as a relic.  Yet, even when the martyr’s body seems to elicit 
dangerous practices of idolatry from the crowd, Foxe does not step into the narrative in 
order to denounce the crowd’s actions.   
 I suggest that Foxe gives free reign to the spectators because he assumes a 
homogeneous emotional makeup to the people witnessing the martyrdoms.  That is, the 
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power of witnessing martyrdoms is such that it moves the people to an inexorable end, 
and the spectators themselves often provide models for imitation.  In this way, Foxe’s 
portrayal of the spectator seems to be tied to his surprisingly positive stance towards 
images, because they too become part of the stirring imagery that make up the scenes of 
martyrdom.  The reporting of the crowd’s reaction to the burnings of Ridley and Latimer 
makes this idea clear.  After describing the excruciating difficulty that Ridley had in 
dying—alternately crying, “Lord have mercy upon me,” and “Let the fire come unto me, 
I cannot burn”—the people are described in this way: 
However it was, surely it moved hundreds to tears, in beholding the horrible sight; 
for I think there was no one person, who was not completely devoid of all 
humanity and mercy, who would not have lamented to behold the fury of the fire 
had it raged upon their bodies. Signs of sorrow were everywhere. Some grieved to 
see their deaths, whose lives they held most dear. Some simply pitied them as 
persons, for they thought their souls had no need of their pity. Ridley’s brother 
touched the hearts of many men, as they saw him in his misery compelled to such 
infelicity that he thought to do Ridley a good turn in hastening his death. Some 
cried out (who most dearly loved him, and sought his release) because of his 
misfortune, seeing his endeavors turned to his greater vexation and increase of 
pain. But those who revered their past advancements in office, the places of honor 
that they occupied for a time in this commonwealth, the favor they had with their 
princes, and the opinion of learning they had in the university where they studied, 
could not help but shed tears of sorrow, seeing a man of so great dignity, honor, 
esteem, and so many godly virtues, with many years of study, of such excellent 
  92
learning, to be put into the fire and consumed in one moment. Well! Dead they 
are, and the reward of this world they have already. What reward remaineth for 
them in heaven, the day of the Lord’s glory, when he cometh with his saints, shall 
shortly, I trust, declare. 
What is noticeable about this lengthy description of the surrounding spectators is not only 
their uniform reaction, but how it is a reaction that they cannot help having: “They could 
not help but shed tears of sorrow.”  The execution elicits emotions that are different from 
the violent ravishment of senses, and operate as signs of their “humanity and mercy.”  
Foxe is not guarded about detailing the suffering bodies of the martyrs because “there 
was no one person, who was not completely devoid of all humanity and mercy, who 
would not have lamented to behold the fury of the fire had it raged upon their bodies.”   
 Because the martyrs’ bodies are indisputable signs of imitatio Christi for Foxe, 
they are images that are devoid of idolatry and elicit right emotions.  In this way, the 
traditional competition between image and word—ritual and sermon—becomes defused 
of danger.  As I argue later, this middle ground afforded by the “lively” images of the 
human body becomes significant when considering the mimetic power of the stage—
much of which was described in terms of idolatry by antitheatricalists.  The pathos and 
ethos of Foxean martyrs become significant when considering the anxieties attributed to 
the stage, and the signifying bodies of players.  The powerful performances of the 
martyrs are compelling without the danger of slipping into possible idolatry.  Foxe 
describes John Bradford, for example, in this way: “He made such a prayer of the 
wedding-garment, that some of those that were present were in such great admiration, 
that their eyes were as thoroughly occupied in looking on him, as their ears gave place to 
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hear his prayer (7.147).  The kind of visual exchange—in the performing bodies of the 
martyrs and the eyes of the spectators—is portrayed without the stigma of idolatry in 
Foxe’s work.  Unlike the perceived false religious signs such as the Catholic mass, the 
sacrifice of the martyrs is seen as authentic and thus appropriate images to which God’s 
people can view and respond.    
CONCLUSION 
Even as the martyred bodies legitimize the validity of the Reformed faith Foxe’s 
work, they also underscore the tricky matter of persecution.  Since both the heretical and 
the orthodox share the same strategy of legitimization, truth becomes problematic if 
persecution and embodied suffering become trustworthy signs by which one can 
recognize the members of the true church.
18
  As the later persecutions of the Jesuits in 
England would attest, the body’s resistance to pain held an emotional appeal to the 
spectators that would vex the Protestant establishment. The execution of Edmund 
Campion in 1581 on charges of high treason, for example, provides an apt demonstration 
of this principle.  Like a martyr out of the pages of Foxe’s work, Campion’s display of 
fortitude wins many of the spectators’ sympathy and admiration—a fact that disturbs 
Protestant writers such as Anthony Munday.  Accusing Campion of sophistry and 
hypocrisy, Munday laments the effects of Campion’s deception “whereby he peruerted 
many, deceyued more, and was thought suche a Champion, as the Pope neuer had the 
like.”
19
  Because Campion’s heresy proved too much to be like heroism, Munday 
endeavored to make clear that what really lay at the center of the Jesuit’s performance 
was not truth, but hypocrisy. 
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Munday employs a similar rhetoric of wrath when writing about another type of 
hypocrites in the 1580s and beyond: the professional players.  The spectacle of the body, 
as well as the emphasis on audience reception in Acts and Monuments, all provide a 
bridge into the realm of drama in the period.  Although Patrick Collinson writes in The 
Birthpangs of Protestant England that the Reformation essentially emancipated the 
English theater by completing its secularization in the 1580s, and finds an “absolute and 
irretrievable divorce” between Protestantism and the stage, a closer examination reveals a 
more complicated, interdependent relationship between the stage and the Reformation 
(112).  Indeed, the suffering body, anxieties about knowable interiority, the mimetic 
element of imitatio—these factors all evoke the space and atmosphere of the public 
theaters.  The pathos and ethos of Foxean martyrs become significant when considering 
the anxieties attributed to the stage, and the signifying bodies of players.  The next two 
chapters move into the realm of the popular stage, a place where the power of the 
theatrical exchange was defined by its ability to wield an imitative power.  Whereas Foxe 
would trust his audience to be moved to positive emulative imitation, the theater 
attendants were not so trusted, because the unsettling effects of the theatrical spectacle 
were perceived to affect the whole person.  
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CHAPTER THREE: HAMLET AND POSITIVE IMITATION 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter once more turns the polysemous term imitate in order to inspect the 
ramifications of its less positive aspects—to counterfeit, to mimic—in relationship to the 
well-established early modern sentiment labeled “antitheatricalism.”  At a fundamental 
level, imitation lies at the heart of the critique against the popular stage.  In his 
transhistorical survey of antitheatrical prejudice in Western history and culture, for 
example, Jonas Barish articulates the particular enmity against the theater during the 
sixteenth century in this way: 
The true meaning of the prejudice is elusive, but it would seem to have to do with 
the lifelike immediacy of the theater, which puts it in unwelcome competition 
with the everyday realm and with the doctrines espoused in schools and 
churches... By the closeness of the imitative process, in which it mimes the actual 
unfolding of events in time, it has an unsettling way of being received by its 
audiences, at least for the moment and with whatever necessary mental reserves, 
as reality pure and simple. (79)   
The proximity between theatrical imitation and real life was felt to be too dangerous for 
the average spectator to handle, a volatile counterfeit of reality that affected the viewer in 
an ethically harmful manner.   
I begin this chapter by examining “the true meaning of the prejudice” more 
closely, and use my findings in order to position myself for a reading of Shakespeare’s 
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Hamlet.  Whichever way the theater was perceived, its particular power to engage and 
move the audience was firmly entrenched in the minds of its detractors and endorsers.  
Arguing that the prejudice ultimately arises from a suspicion against the theater’s ability 
to enact transformative imitation, this chapter examines how the power of the stage was 
understood as affecting the whole person during the early modern period.  The holistic 
effect of the stage—indeed, to strike at the core of a being in which only the church was 
believed to be able to do, and move people’s affections—gained greater potency during a 
period in which the mind and body had not yet been divorced, and helps to explain the 
threat of the theatrical exchange.  Yet, as various religious writers make clear, what is 
deemed suspicious is desirable in the devotional realm, and articulates a fundamental 
Reformist desire: that the individual subject should not only be affected, but also be 
galvanized into devotional imitation. 
A lingering incarnational aesthetic, the embodiment of emotions—all of these 
elements suggest a greater complexity toward how images, especially figures of devotion, 
were considered.  Examining such complex attitude towards images helps us to better 
understand the matter of Hamlet's subjectivity.  Hamlet’s earlier iconoclastic outlook that 
denies any legitimacy to shapes and forms undergoes a significant shift; from the prince’s 
decision to use performance as a way to “catch the conscience of the king” and to his 
own resolution to become “Hamlet the Dane,” the play complicates Hamlet’s initial 
disdain for “playing,” and points towards an understanding of performance as authentic 
activity.  Although antitheatricalists decried the stage as a place of hypocrisy and 
lewdness, I see performance and piety intersect in meaningful ways in Hamlet.  Indeed, 
the (devotional) fantasy of perfect correlation between intention and action, without any 
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“shuffling” of hypocrisy, become captured in an explicit moment of theatrical direction in 
the play: “Suit the action to the word, the word to the action” (3.2.18).
1
  Concepts of 
“lively” images, habits of devotion, and holistic worship are relevant not just in 
contemporary devotional literature that interrogated the nature of “true” worship, but also 
in the court of Elsinore.  If the threat of the stage is its transformative imitation, it also 
carries with it a promising possibility of performance as reality, particularly through the 
bodying forth of “lively” images.  Contemporary devotional literature’s concerns with 
distinguishing between dead and lively faith resonate with crucial scenes of repentance 
and recognition in the play, and provide insight into how the external habits of the body 
can trigger and enact authentic devotion.  Hamlet’s initial iconoclastic denial of the body 
destabilizes, and I argue that tracing such a change in attitude yields one way to 
understand how Hamlet becomes “Hamlet the Dane.” 
RELIGION AND THEATER 
Although Barish voices the traditional view that the stage and religion in the late 
sixteenth century were at irreparable odds with one another, critics have questioned this 
outlook on literary history.  New Historicist critics in particular have initiated a 
productive critique of the separation between religion and the stage; Louis Montrose and 
Stephen Greenblatt connect the power of the stage, for example, to anxieties and desires 
of a population that is still profoundly affected by the lost tradition of Catholicism.
2
  In 
his recent work, Hamlet in Purgatory, Greenblatt provides a provocative reading of the 
tragedy as a play that makes use of energies that had been gathering in strength for 
several decades of the Reformation, and asserts that Shakespeare’s genius lies in his 
ability to cannibalize upon existent discourses and anxieties regarding the place of 
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purgatory in the early modern imagination.
3
  Other critics sidestep the appropriation 
theory and inquire into a more deliberate connection between the stage and religion.
4
  
Jeffrey Knapp, for example, asks whether the players themselves had been aware of the 
substitutive potential of the stage for the pulpit, and proposes that they consciously 
fashioned their works as “godly enterprises.”   
While New Historicist scholars have revived interest in religion as a dominant 
cultural matrix against which the energies of early modern culture must be understood, 
the fruitful connections that they make between religion and the stage ultimately empties 
religion of any inherent energy of its own, since it is just another a duplication of the 
state’s power.  Like Knapp, my analysis assumes that religion held a cultural attraction in 
its own right, and that the concerns which preoccupied “professional” divines—
hypocrisy, authentic faith, prayer—were also issues that helped shape matters onstage.  In 
this way, my view of performance in the period moves beyond the paradigm of deceptive 
imitation, and sees overlaps between the stage and the pulpit resulting in more than an 
“emptying out” of religion’s power.  Contemporary concerns with idolatry and figures 
inciting idolatry filtered into antitheatricalist discourse; however, through scenes such as 
Claudius struggling to pray and a “senseless” Gertrude, Hamlet explores how the gap 
between intention and action may be mitigated through the figure of the imitating body. 
The difficulty of tracing “the Reformation” in England further contributes to how 
I see the stage and religion relating to one another.  Indeed, as Paul Whitfield White 
asserts in his work on theater and the Reformation, the conventional outlining of the 
relationship between the theater and Protestantism does not adequately acknowledge the 
fact the “the Reformation” itself was not such a straightforward affair in England.
5
  He 
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writes of the changing attitude that Protestants held towards the theater, which did not 
view the stage with enmity until the 1570s.  Like revisionist historians such as 
Christopher Haigh and Eamon Duffy, White rightly questions the neatness of the “break” 
from the medieval past.  Since the degree to how eagerly people embraced the new 
reformist culture is uncertain, it is difficult to assign a linear movement to the history of 
the Reformation in England.
 6
   
Such blurred boundaries become important in my discussion of the lingering 
effects of late medieval “incarnational” theater.  Indeed, the rich background of mystery 
and miracle plays from the prior century shows that the discomfort with which 
antitheatricalists regarded the powerful influence of the stage did not always exist.  While 
the partnership between the theater and the church is a well-known phenomenon in the 
medieval period, I draw attention to it because of the affective paradigm in which 
audience reception operated—a tactic employed by the Church in order to move the 
spectator to devotion and to arouse piety.
7
  In medieval theater, a stirring of affections 
was accomplished primarily through the image of Christ’s body.  Originating with the 
Franciscans and their desire to “keep always before their eyes an image of the crucified 
Christ in vivid versimilitude,” the incarnational aesthetic involved the central organizing 
metaphor in the period: Christ’s body.
8
  Critics of the late medieval period usefully 
capture the paradigmatic role of Christ’s body; Sara Beckwith notes regarding the 
organizing metaphor of Christ’s body in late medieval writings, for example, that it was 
impossible to imagine the self without incorporating the body of Christ.
9
  The body of 
Christ was “both exclusive—in Bakhtin’s terms a classical body—closed, hermetic, 
monumental, static, elevated, awesome, homogeneous, and simultaneously inclusive, 
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warm, material, welcoming, heterogeneous, the very existential stuff of birth and death, 
the very stuff too of mortality and bodily change, open to the world through its 
welcoming wounds” (44).  
Most significantly, the body of Christ was important because it emphasized 
Christ’s humanity and historicity.  The vulnerability of his body provided such rich 
material for meditation in mystic experiences, for example, because his incarnation 
provided an accessible bridge between the divine and the human.
10
  As Gail McMurray 
Gibson notes in her work on medieval theater: “In fifteenth century devotion, in the 
visual arts, in the religious drama, it is the Incarnate Son rather than the Godhead who is 
ever fixed before the eyes of the beholder.  Instead of God the Pantocrator with his book 
of mysteries, the relevant central image for the late Middle Ages is a suffering human 
body racked on a cross” (6).  Functioning as a sanctioned biblia pauperum, the body of 
Christ served a central role in connecting the individual to the collective “body” of the 
Church.  While the concept of imitatio Christi is not one that claimed equal emulation of 
Christ, it nonetheless stressed the attainability of piety.  
 In his work on iconoclasm and theater, Michael O’Connell explains the shutting 
down of the medieval play cycles (not occurring until the 1570s in England) as directly 
related to an aversion towards this late medieval incarnational aesthetic: “The seemingly 
disparate Reformation challenges … are themselves interconnected by their underlying 
target, the incarnational structure of late-medieval religion” (50).  Arguing that a 
fundamental cognitive shift occurred through Humanist endorsement of a logocentrism 
that could not accommodate the incarnational underpinnings of late-medieval religion 
and theater, O’Connell asserts that the rejection of images was the result of “a clash 
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between religious systems, one based on an incarnational structure… and the other… on 
the logocentric assumptions of Renaissance humanism empowered by print culture” (58).  
In tracing this shift, O’Connell points to how the body of Christ itself became gradually 
textualized during the sixteenth century, and that such textualization offers further 
evidence for Protestant iconoclasm.  
 If, as O’Connell suggests, Christ’s body became textualized in order to place 
greater emphasis on the Word, I see the opposite occurring with the bodies of the 
individual believer in devotional and dramatic contexts.  That is, the individual in 
Protestant devotional texts was made more “incarnational” (for search of a better term) in 
an effort to respond to the epistemological anxieties brought on by the questioning of 
signs in the Reformation.  How could one exhibit signs of “true” faith, when traditional 
signs were under intense scrutiny?  It is here that the individual’s body becomes both 
representative (body as vehicle) and experiential (body as agent).  Such notions of the 
body become especially important when considering the all-important act of prayer—a 
subject of much discussion in contemporary tracts, and performed directly in Hamlet by 
Claudius.  The Anglican Bishop Lancelot Andrewes’ writings on this matter are 
instructive; he writes in his directions for prayer, “We are to use an outward gesture, 
answerable to our inward devotion: We must manifest our Humility by a reverend posture 
of the body too.  God is as well Creator of the body (which is the souls temple) as of the 
soul: and therefore expecteth to be honoured by both.”
11
   
Like Calvin, Andrewes uses the sign of the body to accommodate the fact that 
though true worship is not tied to outward ceremonies, we are (to quote Calvin) 
“creatures of sense.”  The traditional understanding of man as composed of both body 
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and spirit, along with the New Covenant notion of the body as the temple of the Holy 
Spirit, allowed the body to be an important part of devotion rather than an obstacle to it.  
Andrewes writes of the valuable effects of the gestures of worship in the following way: 
Not that Gods worship is absolutely or universally tyed to these outward 
Ceremonies, but that they serve to stir up the inward intentions and affections, for 
while we kneel, and lift up our eyes and hands to Heaven, we shew our humility, 
and declare our ardent desire and confidence, that all our aid and help we expect 
from God, and none else. Therefore, the acts of humiliation, of casting dust on 
their heads, putting on sack-cloath, rending of garments, mentioned in holy Writ, 
are there set down to no other purpose, but to make their Humility that used them 
appear, and to be a pattern for us in after times. 
Here, Andrewes proposes a counter-intuitive relationship between imitation and 
purpose—namely, that through imitating actions, “they serve to stir up the inward 
intentions and affections.”  Rather than a rejection of the body, its ability to show patterns 
from “holy Writ” is prized in displaying (and stirring up) piety.  Such an understanding of 
the postures and gestures of devotion has interesting implications for someone like 
Hamlet.  If the central dilemma of the play (Hamlet’s inability to take action) is 
considered against a common religious dilemma (how one stirs oneself towards genuine 
worship) the solutions as well as the problems overlap.  In all of its gross corporeality and 
rankness, the human body is something that Hamlet at first adamantly rejects.  Yet in his 
struggle to respond to the Ghost’s commands, a significant shift in attitude occurs 
towards assuming a role that changes his initial contempt for the body.   
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TRANSFORMATIVE IMITATION AND EMBODIED SELFHOOD  
The early modern concept of the body mirrors the interdependent relationship 
outlined in certain devotional works, and I pause here in order to examine the 
implications of a worldview that had not yet subscribed to Cartesian dualism.  Implicit to 
the attacks against the stage is an understanding of interiority that does not draw upon a 
division between “inner” and “outer” realms of the individual.  This becomes apparent in 
the privileging of emotions; that is, alongside the eye and the ear, what also mattered 
deeply were the other faculties attributed to the individual subject—what early modern 
writers term the senses, affections, and passions.
12
  Although the images performed on 
stage were persecuted because of their invasion through the eye, performing bodies were 
also demonized because such lascivious images stirred up the affections of the vulnerable 
spectator.  The players in particular were attacked as performers of hypocritical actions, 
and were seen as becoming sinners as they depicted and mimicked sins (a 
counterintuitive procedure from “outward” to “inward” that is also evident in devotional 
texts).  As Anthony Munday asks, “As for those stagers, are they not commonlie such 
kind of men in their conversation, as they are in profession?  Are they not variable in 
hart, as they are in their parte?”
13
  In the minds of antitheatricalists, what the performers 
engage in is a powerful mode of transformative imitation that possesses dangerous 
implications, and ultimately imperils the integrity of the performer.   
The perils posed to the performer become magnified when applied to the 
susceptible theater attendants.  Unlike the spectators in Acts and Monuments who were 
moved to piety through their witnessing of the martyrdoms, these theater attendants could 
only be envisioned as vulnerable to the assault on their senses.  Their capacity to imitate 
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behavior that they see on stage is typically depicted as limitless, and since the 
performances were so powerful, of a kind that they could not control.  As Philip Stubbes 
admits in his preface to The Anatomie of Abuses, “Such is our gross and dull nature that 
what thing we see opposite before our eyes do pierce further and print deeper in our 
hearts and minds than that thing which is heard only with the ears.”
14
  The particular 
dangers of attending a performance were connected to the potency of visual gestures, and 
the idolatry of the stage to its visual medium.  If the pulpit and the stage were indeed 
rivals, the latter held a significant edge over the former in its use of gestures and other 
visible forms; to borrow Claudius’ words, the audience is “the distracted multitude, / 
Who like not in their judgment, but their eyes” (4.3.4-5). 
 What concerned the antitheatricalists was what they imagined happening after the 
stage imagery entered through the spectators’ eyes—a corruption that seemed to have no 
limits and affected the whole person.  Indeed, this may be the reason behind the 
antitheatricalists’ vehement cry against the public theaters.  The anxiety that William 
Prynne displays when he write that the theater would “devirginate” women and make 
men “degenerate” into women attests to a notion of the theater’s effects that penetrated 
beyond the surface.
15
  Such notions of subjectivity arise from a pre-Cartesian, embodied 
understanding of selfhood, which did not divorce the mind from the body.  In the early 
modern period in which the relationship between the body and mind was perceived to be 
sliding rather than stable, the effects of theater were not limited to the cognitive level, but 
affected the entire being of the spectator.  As Cynthia Marshall notes in her essay, 
“Bodies in the Audience”: 
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In the early modern era, when intellect and will were seen as subject to the 
dangerously unraveling effects of emotion (or, as they were called, the passions), 
and when humoral psychology defined the passions themselves as physical, the 
excitement of theatergoing were not limited to the cognitive level.  With 
psychology and physiology compounded within the humoral regime, theater’s 
emotional effects were felt by bodies in the audience—metonymically, not 
metaphorically. (52)   
In a period in which “the excitement of theatergoing were not limited to the cognitive 
level,” the transformative effects of theater were perceived to affect the whole person—a 
kind of fundamental change that seemed both threatening and promising. 
POSITIVE IMITATION 
Although the theater’s ability to “body forth” its fiction is a source of worry for 
antitheatricalists, proponents of the stage saw it as a way to defend the theater as well.  
Despite the fact that Renaissance antitheatrical writings decried the stage as a place 
where hypocrisy abounded, the theater was also a potential place where performance and 
ethics could intersect, and where a stirring performance could literally induce positive 
imitation.  Thus argues Thomas Heywood in An Apology for Actors (1612).  Although 
Heywood’s argument is not new to the existent “apology for the arts” discourse in the 
period, his defense makes clear the high stakes involved in attending a show: it literally 
has the power to reform the spectator.  According to Heywood, performance is unique in 
the arts in that it surpasses all other mediums in its ability to deliver an immediate, 
inspiring image: 
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Why should not the liues of these worthyes, presented in these our dayes, effect 
the like wonders in the Princes of our times, which can no way bee so exquisitly 
demonstrated, nor so liuely portrayed as by action: Oratory is a kind of a speaking 
picture, therefore may some say, is it not sufficient to discourse to the eares of 
princes the fame of these conquerors: Painting likewise, is a dumbe oratory, 
therefore may we not as well by some curious Pigmalion, drawe their conquests 
to worke the like loue in Princes towards these Worthyes by shewing them their 
pictures drawne to the life, as it wrought on the poore painter to bee inamored of 
his owne shadow.
16
  
Performance trumps the inefficacy of aural and visual mediums (oratory and painting).  
Heywood praises the art of theater because it enacts the history of past heroic glory and 
inspires the present heroes to become present “Alexanders.”  He states that “so 
bewitching a thing is liuely and well spirited action, that it hath the power to new mold 
the harts of the spectators and fashion them to the shape of any noble and notable 
attempt.”  Hamlet’s confidence in the player’s performance to “catch the conscience of 
the king” is grounded in such optimism about the effects of playing (2.2.634).  
It is significant that Heywood uses the term “lively” to describe the power of 
performance in his Apology for Actors, and I pause on this word to argue that like the 
notion of holistic effect, the term “lively” captures the particular power (and worry) 
connected to the stage.  In this way, the word also illustrates the common denominator 
existing between the seemingly disparate realms of the stage and the pulpit.  For example, 
whereas William Prynne denounces the stage for its “lively pictures” of vice in his 
massive “scourge” against players, Histrio-mastix  (1633), William Perkins uses the same 
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term to describe the desired conditions of faith and knowledge in his Commentary on 
Galatians (1604).  The overlapping term “lively” is interesting because, while it is a 
commonly used adjective in the period, it nonetheless points to the particular concern for 
the immanent and incarnational aspects contained in the word.  Antitheatricalists 
persecute the stage performances because they are too lively—life-like without sincerity, 
and a model for hypocrisy.  Religious writers, on the other hand, admonish the believers 
because their faith is not lively enough.  As Perkins explains regarding how the scriptural 
word should be received, “it must be powerfull and liuely in operation, and as it were 
crucifying Christ within vs, and causing vs to feele the vertue of his passion.  The word 
preached must pearce into the heart, like a two-edged sword.”
17
  The term also serves as 
distinguishing characteristic for preachers such as Edmund Bunny.  He writes regarding 
how to distinguish between true and dead faiths: “There are two kinds of faith recounted 
in scripture (the one a dead faith without good works, that is which, beleeveth al you say 
of Christ, but yet observeth not his commandements; the other, a lively, a justifieng faith, 
which beleeveth not only, but also worketh by charitie, as Saint Pauls words are.”
18
   
In his work on the “reformation of worship” that occurred in the sixteenth 
century, Carlos Eire summarizes the difference between Catholic and Reformed faiths as 
essentially the difference between a religion of immanence and a religion of 
transcendence: one operates by the material and visual, and the other abides solely in 
rejecting the grossness of materiality.
19
  Yet, as demonstrated through the word “lively,” 
it is clear that the attitude towards images was tempered by the recognition of its potency, 
especially when the image was the believer’s body. If the body of Christ has become 
textualized, works by writers such as Perkins and Bunny make clear that the body of the 
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believer is de-textualized in order to emphasize the authentic work of salvation.  The 
“lively” working of God’s Word and faith are reflected in the bodies of charitable 
believers and, in this way, the performing body becomes a positive and “real” sign in 
Protestant discourses.
20
  
THE PROBLEM OF WORDS 
More than any of Shakespeare’s other plays, Hamlet struggles with the problem 
of manifesting interiority—a predicament that resonates with the dilemma of showing’s 
one’s “true” devotion during a religiously turbulent age.
21
  Although most critics agree 
that Hamlet exhibits an interiority that seems “modern,” the validity of Hamlet’s 
inwardness has been challenged as anachronistic to the Renaissance or a product of 
wishful thinking on the reader’s part.
22
  As Katherine Maus asserts, however, inwardness 
is neither an anachronism nor an illusion in the Renaissance, since it had already been 
articulated through a long history of Western philosophy.
23
  Like Maus, I do not question 
whether inwardness existed or not in the period, but seek to locate the why behind its 
insistent presence—an answer that seems tied to the play’s preoccupation with the body.   
Critics have recently focused on the material body as a way to understand 
Hamlet’s subjectivity, and complicate Hamlet’s relationship to the body in order to do so.  
Citing how the notion that important truths lie hidden within the body were reasonable in 
the early modern period, David Hillman writes, “What had begun, for Hamlet, as an 
insistence on the insufficiency of the external, has turned by the end of the play into an 
understanding of the insufficiency of the internal.  What is inside is neither more nor less 
revealing than what lies on the surface” (93).  John Hunt identifies a similar struggle with 
the body in Hamlet: “Fearing that physical actions may never adequately embody 
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virtuous intentions, he makes the doubt self-fulfilling by shielding his high sense of 
himself within an overwhelming contempt for the body—a contempt that sabotages 
meaningful action” (34).  Like these critics, I examine Hamlet’s initial sense of anathema 
towards the body, but situate my reading in the context of contemporary devotional 
literature which worries over the inadequacies in worship that lead to hypocrisy. 
In the beginning scenes at Elsinore, Hamlet appears first as a determined 
iconoclast in his rejection of visible signs.  His attitude becomes clear in his first 
extended speech: 
“Seems,” madam?  Nay, it is.  I know not “seems.” 
‘Tis not alone my inky cloak, good mother, 
Nor customary suits of solemn black, 
Nor windy suspiration of forced breath, 
No, nor the fruitful river in the eye, 
Nor the dejected havior of the visage, 
Together with all forms, moods, shapes of grief, 
That can denote me truly.  These indeed “seem,” 
 
For they are actions that a man might play; 
But I have that within which passes show, 
These but the trappings and the suits of woe. (1.2.79-89) 
By articulating a gap between what seems and what is, Hamlet’s semiotics point to a 
severance between sign and reality, between outward action and inward “truth”.  Indeed, 
though his funeral attire is strikingly somber amidst the gay colors of the rest of the court, 
Hamlet denies any reliability in “forms, moods, shapes of grief.”  This unreliability takes 
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the particular form of bodily functions and performance; the “forced breath” of grief and 
the “fruitful river in the eye” of tears are purposefully painted as seeming “actions that a 
man might play.”  In this way, Hamlet’s disdain for hypocrisy anchors itself on the 
visible performative functions of the body, making the site of the body a focus of his 
frustrations about the inadequacies of representation. 
Yet, if Hamlet distrusts images, it is paired with his distrust of words as well.  
Indeed, part of the problem in the play seems to be one of reliable signs: there is no 
satisfactory sign available to the brooding prince.  Although Hamlet takes advantage of 
the semantic richness of words, he also associates them with a kind of prostitution and 
wastefulness of nobler intentions: “This is most brave, / That I... Must like a whore 
unpack my heart with words, / And fall a-cursing like a very drab” (2.2.539-44).  Rather 
than acting as a reliable conduit of one’s inmost desires (revenge, in Hamlet’s case), 
words create a frustrating paralysis for Hamlet.
 24
  The unreliability of vows, which 
Hamlet attributes to others, also rebound upon himself, since others around him 
characterize him as a speaker of untrustworthy words.  Although he condemns the queen 
harshly for her wavering faithfulness, Hamlet is likened to his mother in that his words 
and promises are perceived as temporary and fickle.  As Laertes warns Ophelia regarding 
the prince, “Then, if he says he loves you, / It fits your wisdom so far to believe it / As he 
in his particular act and place / May give his saying deed, which is no further / Than the 
main voice of Denmark goes withal” (1.3.27-32). While it must be acknowledged that 
Laertes fulfills a conventional role of the protective older brother to younger sister at this 
moment, his advice to Ophelia nonetheless points to a truth about Hamlet’s situation: the 
efficacy of his word is limited by the political position he occupies in the state of 
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Denmark.  Laertes reasons that Hamlet’s agency is hampered by the voice of the state 
and, as a result, his promises of love toward Ophelia cannot be taken seriously. Likewise, 
Polonius also severs Hamlet’s word from his deeds as he tells his daughter: “Do not 
believe his vows, for they are brokers, / Not of that dye which their investments show, / 
But mere implorators of unholy suits, / Breathing like sanctified and pious bawds / The 
better to beguile” (1.3.136-40).  By mixing the language of economy with sincerity, 
Polonius underscores what he deems to be the prince’s “unholy” suit.  In the process, 
Hamlet’s vows are “brokers” that breach rather than ratify their promises, and are colored 
with the language of religious hypocrisy. 
Interestingly, though there are diverse accusations of verbal hypocrisy in the play, 
they revolve principally around Claudius and Hamlet.  In his first aside in the play, 
Claudius himself admits to the particularly verbal nature of his villainy.  Claudius’ aside 
is triggered by Polonius’ advice to Ophelia to pretend to “read on this book” since “with 
devotion’s visage / And pious action we do sugar o’er / the devil himself” (3.1.52).  Upon 
hearing Polonius, the king cries: 
O’ tis too true! 
How smart a lash that speech doth give my conscience. 
The harlot’s cheek beautied with plast’ring art 
Is not more ugly to the thing that helps it 
Than is my deed to my most painted word. 
O heavy burden! (3.1.54-59) 
It is interesting to note that before Hamlet can sound out the conscience of the king, any 
doubt about Claudius’ guilt is removed for the audience through this impassioned aside.  
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Again, this moment not only makes a connection between wantonness and words, but 
also evokes the idea of religious hypocrisy through the phrase “painted word.”  Placed 
close to common terms by which the Catholic Church was denounced (“harlot’s cheek 
and “plast’ring art”), the phrase “painted word” merges a popular adjective with which to 
defame Catholicism with the central object of Reformist worship, the word.
25
  The idea 
that words can become painted like idols brings about disturbing notions about how 
reliable (or vulnerable) words are as stable signifiers of truth—a theme that continues to 
haunt Hamlet throughout the play.  As the player king states to the player queen, “I do 
believe you think what now you speak, / But what we do determine oft we break. / 
Purpose is but the slave to memory.” (3.2.211-13) 
If words are polluted vows that promise much but are ultimately false in the play, 
one has to question what sort of a narrative becomes believable for Hamlet.  That is, how 
does he take anyone at his word?  Such practices seem to be a part of the nostalgic past in 
Elsinore, when King Hamlet had been alive.  I suggest that Hamlet does eventually learn 
to break out of his semiotic impasse, and that he is enabled partly through “lively” images 
of performance.  Accomplished through explicitly theatrical terms, these images 
complicate Hamlet’s initial iconoclasm and, specifically, his rejection of “playing” and 
its disconnection to an authentic self.  Emerging first in the form of his father’s ghost, and 
then through the pivotal moment with the players, a series of performative moments in 
the play portray the limits of language and an embodiment of interiority that sets up the 
body as a reliable image and trigger for action.  Although Hamlet begins by subscribing 
to a theory of playing that sees it as duplicitous, the play itself sets up moving 
performances that point to the efficacy of playing.   
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LIVELY PORTRAITS 
The erosion of Hamlet’s subscription to iconoclasm begins with his encounter 
with the Ghost in Act I.  As the “apparition” and “thing” that appears with terrifying 
solemnity, the Ghost occupies a threshold space between heaven and hell.  He seems to 
be his father, but, as Hamlet notes later on, the Ghost may also be a devil in disguise.  
The “questionable shape” of the Ghost has served as an entry point through which the 
play can be understood.
26
  I examine the ramifications of the curious fact that while the 
Ghost is a thing of performance, it is a strangely self-corporealized image as well.  This 
become apparent through the narrative he provides of what truly happened: 
... Sleeping within my orchard, 
My custom always of the afternoon, 
Upon my secure hour thy uncle stole, 
With juice of curséd hebona in a vial, 
And in the porches of my ears did pour 
The leprous distilment, whose effect 
Holds such an enmity with blood of man 
That swift as quicksilver it courses through 
The natural gates and alleys of the body. 
And with a sudden vigor it doth posset 
And curd, like eager droppings into milk, 
The thin and wholesome blood.  So did it mine. 
And a most instant tetter barked about, 
Most lazar-like, with vile and loathsome crust 
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All my smooth body. (1.5.66-80) 
The lengthy, detailed description of what happens once the poison enters the “porches” of 
the king’s body belies the image of the poison being “swift as quicksilver.”  Indeed, the 
slow-motion effect of the description underscores the “wholesome” and “smooth” body 
of the king, which is besieged and visibly affected by the leprous effects of the poison.  
 It is interesting that in both memory and in its present state, the Ghost should 
insist on his materiality.  Although the Ghost is now theoretically bodiless, the quality of 
its memory is not, and such details of the poison’s effects on his body help Hamlet to 
believe in the Ghost’s alternate narrative of what really happened to his father.  In this 
way, remembering becomes a re-membering of the king’s body.  The poison that courses 
through the king’s body provides a map of the king’s bodily interiority; the terms 
“porches, gates, and alleys” evoke an image of the body that is full of barriers, yet whose 
fences allow for mixing and commingling as well.  In comparison to the lingering details 
with which he describes his poisoned body, the Ghost’s much shorter description of what 
happened to his soul—“dispatched... even in the blossoms of my sin, / Unhouseled, 
disappointed, unaneled”—is jarringly curt.  By literally giving more space to the 
physiological effects of the poison, the mystery of death takes on a material dimension in 
the Ghost’s narration, and Hamlet believes in the narrative that makes use of corporeal 
reality.  The Ghost legitimizes his story through his description grounded in the body, and 
he is the first of “lively” portraits that come to disturb Hamlet’s epistemological 
prejudices.  
Perhaps appropriately, Hamlet’s reaction to the Ghost’s narrative is physical as 
well: “Hold, hold, my heart, / And you, my sinews, grow not instant old, / But bear me 
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stiffly up” (1.5.100-102).  Like the theater attendants accused of “ravishment,” we find 
Hamlet reacting with his body to the Ghost’s performance.  His exhortation to himself is 
a call for a hardening of his body, whose limp reaction to the Ghost’s story is a sign of 
cowardice that must be remedied.  In addition, vow-taking takes on an embodied aspect 
in this scene and again points to the inadequacy of logos alone.  Since it is an unverifiable 
act, the command to “Remember me” is, in fact, as or more difficult to fulfill than the 
command to “Revenge me.”  As if to remind us of this reality, this inward action takes on 
an embodied aspect through the exchange between Hamlet, Horatio, and Marcellus.  Not 
satisfied with their words alone, Hamlet makes them swear once more on his sword that 
they will not tell of what they have seen.  In this way, Hamlet’s vow that “thy 
commandment all alone shall live / Within the book and volume of my brain, / Unmixed 
with baser matter” becomes obliquely insufficient, because it is based on words alone 
(1.5.110).  He in effect needs the “baser matter” that he had rejected in his first soliloquy, 
or else this commandment will forever reside isolated and un-acted upon in his brain.  
The important link between remembrance and action cannot merely be forged through 
words, but requires a kind of embodied remembrance.   
 Although the Ghost succeeds in moving Hamlet to conviction, Hamlet is soon 
beset with the question that the ghost may instead be a devil that leads him to murder, and 
consequently seeks to have “grounds / More relative than this.”  The arrival of the players 
in Elsinore provides a pivotal piece to solving this problem for the prince.  In a place 
where decay and corruption seem to dominate, the players awaken an untainted piece of a 
pastoral past, which juxtaposes with the childhood but false friends, Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern.  Moreover, the players stirring performance begins to an important shift in 
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paradigm for Hamlet, where seeming can lead to being, and where outward signs become 
more than mere trappings.  Left alone after the players and others exit, Hamlet launches 
into a lengthy soliloquy that reveals much about his changing semiotics.  Interestingly, it 
begins as a direct response to the Player’s performance:   
O, what a rogue and peasant slave am I! 
Is it not monstrous that this player here,  
But in a fiction, in a dream of passion, 
Could force his soul so to his whole conceit 
That from her working all his visage waned, 
Tears in his eyes, distraction in’s aspect, 
A broken voice, and his whole function suiting 
With forms to his conceit?  (2.2.506-13) 
As a son that must enact revenge for his murdered father, the requested performance of 
Pyrrhus’s murder of Priam is a reminder of Hamlet’s similar designs upon his uncle, and 
as such, the first line of self-loathing makes sense.  Things begin to make less sense, 
however, with the ensuing lines.  Whereas it would seem logical for Hamlet to envy the 
decisive action of Pyrrhus, it is the player and not the Trojan warrior that Hamlet desires 
to imitate: “Is it not monstrous that this player here, / But in a fiction, in a dream of 
passion, / Could force his soul so to his own conceit?”  The player’s ability to “force his 
soul so to his own conceit” demonstrates a capacity to align one’s intentions and actions, 
and it is this clarity in signs that Hamlet envies.  Although the player is explicitly 
performing, it is a performance that Hamlet does not designate as hypocrisy, and thus 
does not worry about the gap between “seems” and “is.”  Significantly, the breaching of 
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the gap seems to occur not through the medium of words, but through the outward visage 
of the Player—“tears in his eyes, distraction in’s aspect, / A broken voice” (2.2.583-4).  
Curiously, Hamlet’s earlier semiotics where he vows his distrust of appearances is not at 
work here, and he attributes greater substance to the player’s “fiction” and “dream of 
passion.”   
Despite his declaration of disdain for outward signs, then, Hamlet exhibits an 
acceptance of performative, “lively portraits”—an acceptance that becomes explicitly 
manifest in his decision to make use of performance to “catch the conscience of the 
king.”  Again, this realization is paired with a recognition of the futility of words.  
Although Hamlet attempts to verbally work himself up through a string of reproaches 
against Claudius—“Bloody, bawdy villain! / Remorseless, treacherous, lecherous, 
kindless / villain!” (2.2.607-09)—the emptiness of his ranting causes him to pause for the 
second time in his soliloquy: 
Why, what an ass am I!  This is most brave, 
That I, the son of a dear father murdered, 
Prompted to my revenge by heaven and hell, 
Must like a whore unpack my heart with words, 
And fall a-cursing like a very drab, 
A scullion!  Fie upon’t! foh! 
About, my brains.  Hum—I have heard  
That guilty creatures sitting at a play, 
Have by the very cunning of the scene 
Been struck to the soul that presently 
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They have proclaimed their malefactions.  
The turn towards action only comes when Hamlet finally ceases to unpack his heart with 
words, as he breaks mid-line to recall the effects of performance upon “guilty creatures.”  
Perhaps appropriately, this picture of persons being “struck so to the soul” reflects 
Hamlet’s own position at this moment, since he is obviously moved by the player’s 
performance; indeed, by occupying the position of a spectator for even this brief span of 
time, Hamlet experiences the kind of transformative effects of theater, and is moved to 
take action.   
PERFORMANCE AND PRAYER 
Despite Hamlet’s confidence in the efficacy of performance to “catch the 
conscience” of Claudius, the neatness of this theory soon becomes complicated by the 
ensuing scenes.  The problem lies in the fact that though in Hamlet’s mind, “The 
Mousetrap” has the desired effects upon Claudius, the “proof” is limited to himself and 
Horatio.  As Roland Frye notes, the play-within-the-play does not so much implicate 
Claudius as it does Hamlet as a potential villain in the minds of Elsinoreans.
27
  The 
prayer scene that follows the play-within-the-play reflects the dubious success of “The 
Mousetrap” in that the effects of the devotional moment are also left unclear.  Should it 
be counted as successful since it convinces Hamlet of his uncle’s authentic prayer?  Or 
should it be counted as a failure since Claudius concludes, “My words fly up, my 
thoughts remain below. / Words without thoughts never to heaven go”?   
Examining this rarely dwelt-upon scene allows us to better understand the central 
issue of being moved; this time, it is in a specifically devotional context.  When Claudius 
declares, “Pray can I not, / Though inclination be as sharp as will,” he echoes a common 
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dilemma found in early modern prayer manuals: the believer’s inability to move oneself 
to genuine prayer.  These manuals acknowledge that a believer is not always inclined to 
pray, and point to the danger of false prayer, which is characterized by “mere” speech 
that lacks efficacy.  In his tract on practical prayer, for example, George Downame states, 
“As for that prayer which is onely the outward speech of the mouth without the inward of 
the heart, it is not a prayer in truth, but a meer lip-labour.”
28
 Although Claudius 
unwittingly convinces Hamlet that he is, in fact, praying, the king acknowledges that 
what he is doing is “meer lip-labour” since his “words without thoughts never to heaven 
go” (3.3.98). Like Hamlet, he cannot execute his intention: “like a man to double 
business bound, / I stand in pause where I shall first begin, / And both neglect” (3.3.41-
43).   
Hamlet’s credulity complicates the “failure” of this devotional moment, however, 
since his raised sword never alls upon the kneeling king.  Why does Hamlet believe in the 
king’s devotional sincerity at this moment?  Why doesn’t he chalk it up to the hypocrisy 
of one who “may smile and smile and be a villain” (1.5.115)?  In her essay on 
performance and prayer, Ramie Targoff points to the prevalent logic of habit used in 
devotional circles in order to answer the question of Hamlet’s credulity; that is, one’s 
participation in piety leads to the creation of a pious self.
29
  Targoff reads Claudius’ 
prayer as a result of “a combination of theatrical spectatorship and devotional practice” 
that allowed the body and its language to be “unmanipulable signifiers of the worshiper’s 
internal state” (62, 58).  Although I agree with the general tenor of Targoff’s argument, I 
also suggest that it is because Hamlet sees rather than hears Claudius at prayer that 
allows this moment to be believable for the prince.  The image of his uncle makes a 
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strong impression upon Hamlet, and he is led to trust in this “lively portrait” as an 
uninterrupted reflection of his genuine piety.  Hamlet is moved through a series of lively 
images—and at this moment, when he only sees rather than hears his uncle at prayer, the 
image of Claudius’ bent form is a sign of devotional sincerity that Hamlet is able to trust.   
Since we never hear the actual words of Claudius’ prayer, it is important to note 
that what is often referred to as the prayer scene is actually a “preparation to pray” scene.  
The manner in which Claudius prepares to pray deserves scrutiny, especially in light of 
the fact that as a figure of “words, words, words” in the play, Claudius is a character who 
seems most likely to slip into false prayer.  Since Claudius appears to genuinely struggle 
with feelings of guilt in his moment of solitude, the king’s soliloquy seems to confirm the 
effectiveness of Hamlet’s plan to “catch the conscience of the king”: 
O, my offense is rank, it smells to heaven; 
It hath the primal eldest curse upon’t, 
A brother’s murder.  Pray can I not, 
Though inclination be as sharp as will. 
My stronger guilt defeats my strong intent, 
And like a man to double business bound, 
I stand in pause where I first begin, 
And both neglect. (3.3.36-43) 
Aligning himself with the biblical character Cain, Claudius again exhibits his role as a 
“double” for Hamlet in that he confesses his inability to move himself to action—namely, 
the action of prayer.  The fact that Claudius distinguishes between false and true prayer in 
this soliloquy indicates that he understands the complex nature of the activity: “But, O, 
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what form of prayer / Can serve my turn?”  Recognizing that he cannot simply ask for 
forgiveness when he still possesses the effects of murder—“My crown, mine own 
ambition, and my queen”—Claudius ruminates upon the difficulty of his situation.   
Because Claudius acknowledges the difficulty of engaging in genuine prayer, it is 
in some ways, difficult to label this moment with the stamp of hypocrisy; it is nonetheless 
a moment of devotional failure.  I propose that though Claudius struggles to pray in this 
moment, he does not succeed because he fails in the important department of the 
passions—that is, he fails to stir up the proper passions necessary for genuine prayer.  
Numerous devotional tracts emphasize the importance of the affections and passions as 
necessary elements for prayer.  As Lancelot Andrewes states in Institutiones Piae, “…it 
is not a chill and cold Perseverance, or expectation, that will serve our turnes, to prevaile 
with God, but a fervent Spirit to pursue the same... it is the affection, and zealous desires 
of the devout, mixed with sighes, teares, and grones, not to be uttered, which moove, and 
prevaile with him.”
30
  Protestant divines pointed to one’s emotions as an acceptable gauge 
for one’s knowledge of God, which in turn are closely aligned to the body.  Although he 
tries to move himself to genuine prayer by taking a penitent posture, Claudius fails to 
rally the interdependent element crucial to true devotion: passion.   
The lack of passion in Claudius is most clearly evident in his use of language, 
which, from the beginning of the play, is measured “in equal scale.”  As Inga-Stina 
Ewbank notes in her assessment of the power of words in Hamlet, Claudius’ range of 
language is limited to his public voice.
31
  Referencing this scene as an example, Ewbank 
remarks how even his private speech sounds like his public voice: “The most trenchant 
self-analysis is as cleverly antithetical as anything he has to say before the assembled 
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court in I, ii” (67).  The measured nature of Claudius’ words attests to his calculating 
nature, which will not let him be moved.  Moreover, the solipsistic characteristic of 
soliloquy seems particularly out of place in a speech that is supposed to be in 
conversation with God.  There is no acknowledgment of the divine other as Claudius 
talks to himself.  Although he labors to pray and, in this way lends authenticity to the 
activity of prayer, the activity fails because his emotions remains unstirred. 
GERTRUDE’S SENSES 
The encounter with the Ghost, the player, and Claudius at prayer all work to 
disturb Hamlet’s initial rejection of the body.  Specifically, the lively image and language 
of the body—corporeal and physiological—becomes more substantial than mere words 
with the progression of the play.  In his essay on Shakespeare and knowledge, David 
Hillman has observed that there is frequent conflation between visceral and interior 
knowledge in the bard’s works: 
Several of Shakespeare’s characters seem to imagine that penetrating the other’s 
body would somehow solve the riddle of knowing the other; several of 
Shakespeare’s plays question and problematize this notion, while at the same time 
allocating to the body’s interior a decisive place in the comprehension of 
subjectivity. (82) 
Such conflation between the body and interiority seems to be at work in the scene 
between Hamlet and Gertrude, especially when talking of penetrable selves and “inmost 
parts.”  Since the allegorical mirror of reality offered through “The Mousetrap” had no 
effect on the queen, Hamlet offers another kind of a mirror to his mother when he meets 
her in her chamber: “Come, come, and sit you down; you shall not budge. / You go not 
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till I set you up a glass / Where you may see the inmost part of you” (3.4.23-25). 
Gertrude’s frightened response to her son’s promise is a fascinating moment of 
interpretative confusion; her understanding of how her son will devise for her to see “the 
inmost part” of her is strangely corporeal, for she asks Hamlet with real terror: “Thou wilt 
not murder me?” (3.4.20)  The metaphorical mirror that Hamlet offers to set up before his 
mother is understood in a visceral, anatomical manner, and echoes the kind of inwardness 
referenced in Hamlet’s earlier promise to “tent” his uncle.  The conflation between 
figurative and literal “inmost part” also resonates in intriguing ways with contemporary 
Eucharistic controversy, for in her terror, Gertrude commits the same kind of 
interpretative error for which Protestants blame Catholics: mistaking the figurative for the 
literal, the metaphor for the flesh. 
 Hamlet’s primary concern in this hectic scene, at least in regards to his mother, 
seems related to a similar impulse; that is, he also grants a sliding meaning between 
Gertrude’s visceral and figurative “self,” specifically through his use of the word “sense.”  
It begins with Hamlet’s promise that he will “wring” Gertrude’s heart “if it be made of 
penetrable stuff, / If damned custom have not brazed it so / That it be proof and bulwark 
against sense” (3.4.36-9).  Used four times in the next speech by Hamlet, Gertrude’s 
“sense” (or lack thereof) forms the nexus around which Hamlet builds his case against his 
mother.  Linked in the early sixteenth century to the sensorial organs but used in a 
divergence of meanings by Shakespeare’s time, the earliest use of the word correlates to 
the traditional five senses of the body.  Although Hamlet makes use of a corporeal sense 
and an intuitive sense—definitions which co-existed in Shakespeare’s time—to make his 
attack against Gertrude, the sliding registers between the “lower” and “higher” senses 
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ultimately come to rest upon corporeal sense of the word.  He achieves this through his 
insistence on his mother’s physical degeneracy.  Hamlet’s emphasis on Gertrude’s senses 
draws attention to a counterintuitive movement from “inward” to “outer” senses; that is, 
the corruption of Gertrude’s physical senses lead to an inward corruption of the higher 
senses.   
 As he stands before two portraits of his father and uncle in Gertrude’s closet, 
Hamlet seems determined to “show” the queen her mistakes and to probe her inmost part 
by highlighting the differences between her first and second husbands.  He points to the 
stark contrast between them, and focuses especially on her bodily senses in order to 
articulate his critique.  Beginning with her eyes, Hamlet asks sarcastically: “Have you 
eyes? / Could you on this fair mountain leave to feed, / And batten on this moor? Ha, 
have you eyes?”  He goes on to place Gertrude’s humanity/sanity into question, since her 
judgment is so skewed:  
… Sense sure you have, 
Else could you not have motion, but sure that sense 
Is apoplexed, for madness would not err 
Nor sense to ecstasy was ne’er so thrilled 
But it reserved some quantity of choice 
To serve in such a difference. (3.4.72-77) 
Hamlet draws upon multiple definitions of “sense” in order to make his attack work.  He 
is sure that Gertrude has some bodily sense, “else could [she] not have motion,” but he is 
certain that her reasoning sense is misaligned since she has chosen to be with Claudius.  
Such harping upon Gertrude’s senses leads to further ridicule: 
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… What devil was’t 
That thus hath cozened you at hoodman-blind? 
Eyes without feeling, feeling without sight, 
Ears without hands or eyes, smelling sans all, 
Or but a sickly part of one true sense  
Could not so mope. (3.4.77-82) 
With his language of disconnected body parts, Hamlet seems to indeed speak “daggers” 
to Gertrude as he creates an anti-blazon of his mother.   
The mismatch of body parts to corresponding senses—“eyes without feeling”—is 
listed as proof of Gertrude’s perverted senses.  Interestingly, this moment resonates with 
biblical language that condemns idolatry, and frames Hamlet’s anger within a rich matrix 
of ideas associated with idolatry.  The prophet Isaiah describes the Israelites’ idolatry as a 
blindness and malfunctioning of their proper senses: “They that make a grauen image are 
all of them vanitie, and their delectable things shall not profit, and they are their own 
witnesses, they see not, nor know; that they may be ashamed” (Isaiah 44:9, KJV).  The 
prophet Isaiah attributes blindness to those who practice idolatry, and mocks the 
absurdity involved in idol worship, since one takes a part of a tree to make a fire, and 
takes another part in order to make a graven image.  Idolatry, in short, is depicted as a 
failure of one’s senses:  
They haue not knowen, nor vnderstood: for he hath shut their eyes, that they 
cannot see; and their hearts, that they cannot vnderstand. And none considerth in 
his heart, neither is there knowledge nor vnderstanding to say; I haue burnt part of 
it in the fire, yea also I haue baked bread vpon the coales thereof: I haue rosted 
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flesh and eaten it; and shall I make the residue thereof an abomination? Shall I fall 
downe to the stocke of a tree? (Isaiah 44:8-9, KJV) 
The sin of idolatry is linked directly to a failure in common sense and reasoning: Shall I 
worship the very thing that I cut down and part of which I used for fuel?  Yet because this 
is precisely what is committed, the idolatrous Israelites are, like Gertrude, portrayed as 
people whose eyes are blind and whose senses are shut to obvious discrepancies in 
“sensible” logic.   
 Considered in this way, Gertrude unnamable act becomes not only one of 
degenerate sexuality, but also a perversion of senses that results in idolatry.  This notion 
becomes especially poignant in light of the fact that mother and son are staged to stand 
before two “counterfeit presentment of two brothers” (3.4.55).  Although both images are 
similar in that they are portraits, one is far superior to the other.  The scriptural language 
that compares the “dead” wooden idols to “the living God” matches the wrath behind 
Hamlet’s words, and anticipates his later declaration that he “must be their scourge and 
minister” (3.4.179).  The fact that Gertrude should prefer Claudius to old Hamlet enrages 
Hamlet with the kind of scorn that matches that of the Old Testament prophets, and his 
speech attains a violence that leaves Gertrude begging him to stop. 
 In light of the way in which this scene resonates with the scriptural condemnation 
of “dead” images that have no life, the entrance of the Ghost becomes even more striking.  
The Ghost is a literally “live” image that counters the dead image of Claudius in the 
room, and moves Hamlet to take action.  With the Ghost’s entrance, the target of 
interrogation shifts from Gertrude to Hamlet.  Indeed, though Hamlet sets up the scene as 
one of censure in which Gertrude’s perverted senses would re-form, the Ghost of his 
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father complicates this setup.  Any conversion that occurs in this scene seems to happen 
with Hamlet, as he cries: 
… Look you how pale he glares. 
His form and cause conjoined, preaching to stones, 
Would make them capable.—Do not look upon me, 
Lest with this piteous action you convert 
My stern effects.  Then what I have to do 
Will want true color—tears perchance for blood. (3.4.126-132) 
The appearance of the Ghost and Hamlet’s description of him—“His form and cause 
conjoined”—echoes the earlier statement regarding the player’s ability to “force his soul 
so to his own conceit.”  Appearing for the second and last time in the play, the Ghost 
continues to operate as a “lively image” that once more moves Hamlet to action.  Hamlet 
deems his image to be so effective that he uses hyperbolic language of stones being 
moved, and characterizes the Ghost’s personal threat as one of converting his “stern 
effects.”   
Although Hamlet resists the converting effects of the Ghost, he is nonetheless 
moved to action—specifically, ethical action.  The cryptic statement—“Then what I have 
to do / Will want true color—tears perchance for blood”—begins to make sense when 
considering Hamlet’s changed attitude towards his mother, which switches from speaking 
“daggers” to something more gracious in this scene.  His tone softens to take on the voice 
of a minister, and he advises his mother: 
O, throw away the worser part of it, 
And live the purer with the other half. 
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Good night—but go not to my uncle’s bed. 
Assume a virtue if you have it not. 
That monster, custom, who all sense doth eat, 
Of habits devil, is angel yet in this, 
That to the use of actions fair and good 
He likewise gives a frock or livery 
That aptly is put on.  Refrain tonight, 
And that shall lend a kind of easiness 
To the next abstinence, the next more easy (3.4.181-89) 
Echoing the biblical logic of “cutting off” the sinning member, Hamlet tells Gertrude to 
“throw away the worser part” of her heart.  Whereas the traditional symbol of interiority 
is the focus of attention at the beginning of his response, Hamlet abruptly changes the 
focus of his attention after having seemed to end his conversation with his mother.  
Indeed, the commands that follow the parting word, “Goodnight” are fascinating, because 
they move the focus of change from the heart to the body: “Assume a virtue if you have it 
not.”   
This change in focus, though subtle, seems crucial.  Here, Hamlet endows the 
verb “assume” with the meaning “to put on.”  And though the subsequent lines citing 
frock or livery infuse the verb with the meaning of putting on vestments (which recalls 
his earlier line “customary suits of solemn black”), there is no anxiety about potential 
hypocrisy.  Indeed, we see the prince abandon his language of interiority in order to focus 
on the doings of the body.  The solution “assume a virtue” contrasts sharply with 
Hamlet’s prior attitude to habits, and points to another way in which the prince’s earlier 
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iconoclastic semiotics no longer function.  Earlier on in the play, Hamlet had exhibited a 
disdain towards “damnéd custom” and habit.  He feared the corrosive nature of “some 
habit that too much o’erleavens / The form of plausive manners,” which, as he had 
explained regarding the custom of the Danish king’s drinking to Horatio, “is a custom / 
More honored in the breach than the observance.”  According to Hamlet, a single bad 
habit can potentially pollute the virtues of the rest of a man (or a nation).   
 Ranging from Augustinian to Aristotelian, critics have connected Hamlet’s 
preoccupation with habit to a variety of traditions.
32
  What is notable about Hamlet’s 
understanding of habit in the private scenes with Claudius and Gertrude in Act III, 
however, is the reliance on “outward” form to mold inward inclinations: “For use almost 
can change the stamp of nature, / And either curb the devil, or throw him out / With 
wondrous potency” (3.4.172-4).  Like the devotional gestures that stir one’s affections, 
the habit of assuming a virtue can lead to change—in short, a transformation through 
imitation.  In this way, the danger of hypocrisy inherent in words such as assume, imitate, 
play becomes defused. 
HAMLET THE DANE  
 Hamlet’s changing semiotics has fascinating implications for how performance can 
be understood in the play as a whole.  In her article, “What was Performance?” Crane 
examines the early modern understanding of performance and argues that in contrast to 
the assumptions behind the subversion/containment debate, definitions of early modern 
performance “embraced a wider range of possibilities than we usually now associate with 
the term and that some of those possibilities involve a different kind of relationship 
between the performed and the real than the paradoxical one assumed by many critics 
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today” (172).  Crane usefully suggests an understanding of performance (itself an 
anachronistic term in the period) as an act that emphasizes action rather than deception.  
Such an understanding of performance seems to be at work in this crucial moment in 
Hamlet, a kind of reiteration and repetitions of words and gestures that can lead to a 
shaping of reality and true transformation.  It is, as aforementioned, a kind of logic that 
appears in devotional manuals, and explains the positive space given to the performing 
body in stirring up devotion.  Although the word “assume” brings us back to the 
unsettling imitative effects of deceptive playing, the disdain behind Hamlet’s earlier 
statement—“These indeed seem, / For they are actions that a man might play”—alters to 
become something quite different: a viable solution for transformation.  The theater’s 
ability to effect transformative imitation is offered as a possible means for not only 
Gertrude’s “redemption,” but also as a means for Hamlet to “assume” the identity of 
“Hamlet the Dane.”   
 The rest of this chapter focuses on Hamlet’s determination to “assume” the role of 
the revenging son, a change in attitude that ultimately notes an important shift in his 
attitude towards playing.  Rather than an act that is always already devoid of genuine 
feeling, Hamlet’s understanding of performance is one that goes beyond the paradigm of 
deception.  Triggered by examples “gross as earth” and culminating in his encounter with 
Laertes, Hamlet’s actions seem indicative of a new attitude towards the efficacy of 
performance—that is, he is not loathe to play the part, but accepts his role as an avenging 
son.  In her cognitive analysis of the play, Crane has pointed to Hamlet’s self in this way: 
“Although he is preoccupied with locating [an inner] self for most of the play, in the end 
he comes to accept his own implication in the plot and to act in accordance with his 
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existence as a relatively conventional dramatic character shaped performatively through 
his words and actions.”
33
  Although I draw upon a different framework for this notion, I 
see in Hamlet’s reliance upon the body as an important turning point in his changing 
attitude to playing.  In ways that echo the logic behind his advice of “assume a virtue if 
you have it not,” Hamlet changes through assuming and imitating action from a series of 
characters with whom he identifies.   
  Although we never see Hamlet and Fortinbras meet face-to-face, the “strong arm” 
of Norway serves as one of the many “doubles” for Hamlet in the play.  After hearing 
about the plans of Fortinbras’ army, Hamlet enters into his last soliloquy in Act IV.  It is 
a speech that echoes many of his earlier thoughts about the nature of man and contains 
familiar elements of self-loathing: 
 … Now, whether it be 
 Bestial oblivion, or some craven scruple 
 Of thinking too precisely on th’ event— 
 A thought which, quartered, hath but one part wisdom 
 And ever three parts coward—I do not know 
 Why yet I live to say ‘This thing’s to do’,  
 Sith I have cause, and will, and strength, and means, 
 To do’t. (4.4.39-46) 
The problem of inaction becomes explicitly expressed here, and it is in terms of 
overthinking: “Of thinking too precisely on th’ event.”  Hamlet self-defines his problem 
as one of mere mental knowledge rather than one of experience.  His envy of Fortinbras 
echoes his earlier envy of the player, and it is again, an envy that centers upon action: 
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“How stand I then, / That have a father killed, a mother stained, / Excitements of my 
reason and my blood, / And let all sleep” (4.4.56-59).  Citing “examples gross as earth” 
as exhorting him to take action, Hamlet is determined to not let his purpose be blunted: 
“O, from this time forth, / My thoughts be bloody, or be nothing worth!” (4.4.65-66) 
 Despite his rallying cry, Hamlet’s last soliloquy leaves room for doubt because his 
focus is still on thoughts rather than actions.  It is as if merely hearing about Fortinbras’ 
feats and not witnessing them himself fails to trigger the necessary passions in Hamlet.  
Perhaps appropriately, it is not until he sees Laertes and reacts to his moving example 
that Hamlet is enabled to become “Hamlet the Dane” later in the play.  Coming out of his 
hiding at Ophelia’s burial site, Hamlet declares himself: “This is I, / Hamlet the Dane” 
(5.1.226-7). The moment of self-declaration comes, as he later confesses to Horatio, 
because he sees the correlation between himself and Laertes: “For by the image of my 
cause I see / The portraiture of his.  I’ll court his favors. / But sure the bravery of his grief 
did put me / Into a tow’ring passion” (5.2.77-79).  Stirred emotionally by the lively image 
of Laertes’ example, Hamlet leaves his place of hiding and finally seems to show himself 
“in deed” his father’s son “more than words” (4.7.124-5).  His earlier sense that he was a 
“tardy” son “that lapsed in time and passion lets go by / Th’ important acting” seems to 
no longer be operative here. 
 The fast pace of events from Hamlet’s last soliloquy and the death-filled ending 
move Hamlet inexorably to his role of the revenging son.  There are no more soliloquies 
through which Hamlet unpacks his heart with words.  The closest Hamlet comes to 
confession is when he tells Horatio, “But thou wouldst not think how ill all’s here about 
my heart.  But it is no matter” (5.2.187-8).  In a way, we see Hamlet becoming what 
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Laertes had warned Ophelia about earlier: more than his particular emotions, Hamlet’s 
identity is one formed through his role within the state of Denmark.  As Hamlet dismisses 
the importance of his feelings, the impossibility of the Ghost’s initial command—“But 
howsomever thou pursues this act, / Taint not thy mind”—seems to be proven here 
(1.5.84-5).  The cost of taking action, of suiting action to the word, becomes one of 
subsuming the individual emotions towards a greater end.  Perhaps appropriately, 
Hamlet’s last words are directed at the audience and combines explicit references to the 
theater and his submission to a greater story: “You that look pale and tremble at this 
chance, / That are but mutes or audience to this act, / Had I but time, as this fell sergeant 
Death / Is strict in his arrest, O, I could tell you— / But let it be” (5.2.313-17).  Here, in 
this final moment of sudden death and last words, Hamlet declines to insist upon his 
interiority—“O, I could tell you— / But let it be.” 
CONCLUSION 
 Although Hamlet is not a devotional work, its preoccupations with authentic 
prayer and memory, and how people are moved to take action, all point to the relevance 
of religious texts and controversies when reading the play.  My next chapter continues to 
think about lively figures that stir the audience by turning to Shakespeare’s late romance, 
The Winter’s Tale.  My decision to move from Shakespearean tragedy to romance is 
motivated not only by the prominence of lively figures, but the ways in which Catholic 
and Protestant belief systems seem to be so complexly interrelated in both of these works.  
Antitheatricalists’ denouncement of the stage as a breeding ground for idolatry seem to 
gain particular force in a play that concludes with a figure (the statue of Hermione) that 
invokes worship.  Like other works examined in this dissertation, The Winter’s Tale 
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struggles with epistemological uncertainties; arguing that they resonate with 
contemporary religious discourse surrounding the complex nature of idolatry, I explore 
the construction of “lawful” imitations in Shakespeare’s work.
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CHAPTER FOUR: IDOLATRY AND LAWFULNESS IN  
THE WINTER’S TALE 
INTRODUCTION 
This fourth and final chapter in this study centers upon Shakespeare’s late 
romance, The Winter’s Tale.  While the play evokes some recurrent ideas from this 
dissertation, The Winter’s Tale points to new direction within this study’s treatment of 
imitatio.  Through explicit references to art and religion, the celebrated ending blends 
artistic and devotional modes of imitatio in the “raising” of the dead queen.  The 
centerpiece of the scene—Hermione’s body—also points to an embodiment of 
redemption that brings my prior discussions of penitent and suffering bodies together.  
The seemingly endless nature of Leontes’ repentance is resolved in this stone-to-flesh 
moment, as the oft-invoked dead queen is re-membered before his (and the audience’s) 
eyes.  Pleading with Paulina not to draw the curtain upon the image of his wife, Leontes’ 
reaction to Hermione’s statue emphasizes a conscious conflation between art and life: 
“What fine chisel / Could ever yet cut breath?”
1
 As Leontes’ wonder-filled comments 
attest, he is visibly moved and stirred by the “lively” image before him, and embraces the 
possibility of being “mocked with art.”  The hyper-aestheticized image is nonetheless 
real, however, and perhaps the ending of the play is so remarkable because it is a 
mimesis that not just imitates reality, but is reality.  In this way, the unnamed lords’ 
comment in Act V that the work (Hermione’s statue) is “newly performed” seems 
particularly appropriate, for the word “perform” holds a sense of performance enacting 
reality.   
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As aforementioned in the previous chapter, the dangerous imitation of reality and 
its stirring impact upon the hapless viewer were common reasons for denouncing the 
public stage, and this chapter continues to consider the imitative link between idolatry 
and iconoclasm.  The three-dimensionality of actors’ bodies made the theater a place 
where reality was mimicked (and idolatry hazarded), and the connection between idolatry 
and the stage fueled the vociferous attacks against the theater.  Through the statue scene 
of The Winter’s Tale, Shakespeare defuses the danger attributed to the stage by animating 
a potentially idolatrous image with life; in ways that were only hinted at in Hamlet, The 
Winter’s Tale makes use of the lively bodies onstage to suggest that the presumed 
connection between idolatry and the imitative stage is an unwarranted one, and “to see… 
life as lively mocked” can help to perform redemption (5.3.19).  The breathing warmth of 
Hermione’s presence is key to understanding the methodology of redemption in the play, 
particularly in light of how in devotional works idols were condemned as false images of 
“dead stocks and stones”.
2
  Her lively, flesh-and-blood presence abolishes any 
connections to “dead” images of idols, and instead, becomes an embodiment of “lawful” 
divine grace. 
Although deconstructionist readings of the play foreground the struggle for 
meaning and recognition, the play’s concern with epistemological uncertainties finds 
greater resonance with early modern discourse surrounding idolatry.
3
  Divergent attitudes 
towards images provide insight into the redemptive nature of the statue scene.  In her 
work, England’s Iconoclasts, Margaret Aston presents a thorough catalogue of the 
complex nuances with which the problem of images was treated in early modern 
England.  Noting that the Reformists’ iconoclastic tendencies were motivated by a 
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recognition of “the possibilities of controlling minds through imagery or the destruction 
of imagery, loading or unloading mental processes with visual effects,” she aligns the 
Reformists’ iconoclastic zeal to a kind of “revolution” (5).  This helps to enhance our 
understanding of how, in The Winter’s Tale, the question of images becomes an 
“aesthetic inquiry.”
 4
  Aston proposes, for instance, that in Declaration of the ten holy 
commandments (1548), John Hooper takes a “critical step forward” in the investigation 
into the origins of idolatry when he asks whether idolatry begins with the image or the 
mind of the beholder (436).  For Hooper and subsequent reformers after him, the danger 
of idolatry lay within the operations of the sinful mind: 
The mind of man, when it is not illuminated with the Spirit of God, nor governed 
by the scripture, it imagineth and feigneth God to be like unto the imagination and 
conceit of his mind, and not as the scripture teacheth.  When this vanity or fond 
imagination is conceived in the mind, there followeth a further success of the ill.  
He purposeth to express by some figure of image God in the same form and 
similitude that his imagination hath first printed in his mind; so that the mind 
conceiveth the idol, and afterward the hand worketh and representeth the same 
unto the senses. (Qtd Aston 436-7) 
Leontes’ jealousy would seem to be idolatrous then because it involves the error 
described in Hooper’s Declaration: it privileges the imagination rather than the 
(scriptural) truth.  As Calvin writes in the Institution of Christian Religion, idolatry is so 
dangerous because it does not originate with God, but is born from the sinful human 
mind: “Thus the minde begetteth the idol, & the hand bringeth it foorth” (21).   
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In a play fixated on matters of birth and issue, it is important to consider how the 
conception of idols begins to “birth” itself in Leontes’ mind, and notions about how idols 
are conceived provide an important context for such an investigation.  Indeed, Leontes’ 
faith in what his “minde begetteth” rather than his faith in the lively image of his wife 
helps to explain the nature of his jealousy.
5
  Reminiscent of a “senseless” Gertrude who 
cannot distinguish between an idol and a lively image, Leontes’ jealousy is guided by an 
inability to distinguish between groundless fantasy and Hermione’s real self.  His idolatry 
is evident in the fact that he cannot exercise common sense but, instead, clings to a 
viewpoint guided by his subjective affections.  The living body in this last scene is so 
crucial to Leontes’ redemption, then, because the nature of Leontes’ jealousy is one that 
requires an incarnational type of redemption that has the power to expel his nightmarish 
fantasies.  The faith that is awakened in the final scene is ultimately “lawful” because it is 
based on a material, embodied reality (“O, she’s warm!”) rather than on one’s vain 
imaginings (“Too hot, too hot!”).  Perhaps it is only fitting that Paulina deems it “physic” 
for the king to look upon the lively image of his newborn daughter, since she is the 
imitative “copy of the father” (2.3.99).  Leontes’ refusal to recognize the similarities 
between the newborn Perdita and himself is yet another manifestation of his idolatrous 
and twisted vision; in choosing to believe in the fruit of his imagination, he literally 
cannot see the flesh-and-blood truth set before his eyes.  The disconnection of the 
sanctioned imitative link between parent and child—a connection that seems to barely 
survive inspection in Mamillius’s case—becomes yet another sign of Leotes’s twisted 
outlook in the stony world of the first three acts. 
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Liveliness as the trademark of real faith is, as I’ve already shown, an important 
distinction that made the believer’s body exempt from the Protestant rejection of 
idolatrous images.  The fact that Paulina’s character seems to be an explicit nod towards 
the New Testament apostle further supports the notion that an embodied aesthetic plays 
an important role in the realization of redemption in the play. Although Paulina’s role in 
Shakespeare’s romance has been examined in light of the doctrine of works and 
justification, there has been little interest in the dominant image in Pauline thought: the 
body.  Yet the human body plays a central role in Pauline doctrine; it supplies the 
language of metaphor (the Church as the body) while simultaneously signifying the 
individual’s physical connection to the incarnate God.  For Paul, the suffering body (his 
and that of other believers) forms a crucial imitative connection between Christ and his 
followers.  The marks of faith borne on the members of Foxe’s martyrs gain authority 
through verses such as Romans 12:1: “I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercies 
of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is 
your reasonable service” (KJV).  In this way, the denigration of the flesh and the 
important role the body plays in the performance of devotion are not conflicting models, 
if the body (as subordinate to Christ) can help achieve perfection.
6
   
Whereas Pauline theology privileges the body as a “temple” of God even as it 
rejects the carnality of the flesh, Leontes refuses to see his wife objectively—that is, her 
identity becomes merely one of flesh.  Threatened by his wife’s fertile body, Leontes can 
see her (and, by extension, the entire female sex) only as diseased: “No barricado for a 
belly” (1.2.202). This practice becomes especially evident in his preoccupation with the 
female body— a “playing” body that, in turn, resonates interestingly with contemporary 
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antitheatrical sentiments and accusations of idolatry.  The sanctity of Hermione’s body 
becomes evident, however, through the fact that her selfhood is marked by suffering 
rather than sexuality.  Moreover, the close connection shared between mother and a son 
who “physics the subject, makes old hearts fresh” further establishes a way to sanctify the 
female body in the play.  Although I am not suggesting that Hermione is a Christ-figure, 
it is interesting that the only safe site in Sicilia seems to be Hermione’s womb. 
Hermione’s redemptive body also provides a new way to think about the carry-over of a 
medieval incarnational aesthetic.  As Caroline Walker Bynum has shown, while concepts 
of the female body were indisputably negative and deemed dangerous, there was also a 
medieval tradition of aligning the female body with Christ’s humanity.
7
  Such tactile 
connections to the divine also make Hermione a fitting emissary of grace in the play.   
Whereas idolatry provides an especially helpful category for understanding the 
workings of Leontes’ jealousy in Acts I-III, the movement away from tragedy into 
comedy is better understood by way of a complementary category.  Iconoclasm, the 
obverse of idolatry, provides important ways to think about Paulina’s “poor image” in her 
chapel (5.3.58).  If English reformers operated by the principle, “the greater the realism 
the greater the hazard of idolatry,” then is this masterful work of Giulio Romano who 
“would beguile nature of her custom” (and whose name bears the mark of Rome) a type 
of an idol in its imitative excellence?  To explore this possibility, we need to take into 
account pertinent early modern thinking about iconoclasm and, in addition, we need to 
reckon with the difficulty with which transgressive images were identified in 
Reformation England.  Because of the importance of sculpture in The Winter’s Tale, 
contemporary anxieties about how to distinguish between an idolatrous image and an 
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acceptable image are pertinent to not just the general antitheatrical debates, but to the 
central workings of this play. In his essay on “living sculptures,” Leonard Barkan 
contends that sculpture is key to understanding a hierarchy of the arts implicit in this 
ending scene of The Winter’s Tale, since sculpture (and, by extension, drama) was 
considered to be superior to the other arts: “So the name of Giulio Romano means, I 
think, the multiplicity of the arts, the rivalry among them, and the paragone of art and 
nature” (657).  Although my reading is different from Barkan’s in that I focus on the 
scriptural more than the classical traditions, I also see the sculptural component being 
important to realizing the power of the artistic image.
8
  Understandably, the Elizabethan 
iconoclasts privileged the human statue more than any other art form by fretting over it 
the most, and attributing the greatest danger to it.  The fact that Hermione is a hyper-
aestheticized sculpture and a living being, however, makes this imitative moment 
complicated; because the awakening of faith requires a kind of repenting and 
remembering that centers upon a three-dimensional body, whose art is closer to the 
brazen reality than a poetic “golden” in its wrinkled status, the redemption that occurs is 
ultimately grounded in the “real presence” of Hermione’s lively body.   
IDOLATROUS VISION IN SICILIA 
While psychoanalytic readings of Leontes as a man who fears the maternal body 
have yielded valuable perspectives from which to understand the sudden onset of his 
jealousy, it is helpful to attend to some ways in which Shakespeare’s dramatic 
representation of the dynamics of jealousy engages with discourses contemporary with 
his play, in particular, the language of introspection.
9
  Julia Reinhard Lupton notes in her 
chapter on The Winter’s Tale that the Decalogue provides a powerful “matrix of 
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transgressions” for the production of Leontes’ jealous fantasy through its laws against 
idolatry, adultery, and covetousness (186).  The prohibition against graven images 
follows immediately after God’s declaration about himself: “I am the Lord thy God, who 
brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage.  Thou shalt have no 
other gods before Me.” (Exodus 20:2-3).  Idolatry is defined as worshiping something 
false as something real, mistaking the counterfeit imitation (idol) for reality (Jehovah).  In 
a fundamental sense, the sin that Leontes thinks his wife commits is closely related to 
such idolatrous impulses.
 10
  In his first face-to-face confrontation with Hermione in Act 
II, for example, Leontes’ charge to her is one of failing to distinguish between two men: 
“You have mistook, my lady, / Polixenes for Leontes” (2.1.82-3).  What he observes 
between Hermione and Polixenes is a type of misdirected tribute that he rightly deserves 
from her: “How she holds up the neb, the bill to him! / And arms her with the boldness of 
a wife / To her allowing husband” (1.2.181-183).   
Not only does the play’s general concern with likenesses resonate with the sin of 
idolatry, but the network of ideas associated with idolatry forms an intriguing starting 
point for a discussion of Leontes’ seemingly senseless jealousy.  In particular, the origins 
of idolatry—whether it is from within or without—seem to provide a relevant context for 
discussing a text saturated with the language of “diseased opinion,” for the question on 
everyone’s minds is captured in an exchange between Polixenes and Camillo: “How 
should this grow?” (1.2.426).  Although Camillo answers Polixenes that “’tis safer to / 
Avoid what’s grown than question how ‘tis born,” early modern contemplators of the 
meaning of idolatry did not stop there.  From whence does idolatry, the first and principle 
sin, arise?  In particular, is it triggered by what one sees or what one imagines?  In his A 
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Warning Against Idolatry (1616), William Perkins considers “all manner of idols” and 
the various ways in which idolatry can be manifest in one’s life.  Perkins’ tract is 
interesting because he writes not just of the visible forms of idols, but of a “most secret 
and spiritual idolatry.”  Elucidating upon kinds of idols that can be erected in men’s 
minds, Perkins states: 
Yea the multitude in all places set up unto themselves, a god that is all mercy, and 
no justice: because they content themselves with the light of blind nature, and 
frame God according to their own desires and affections. And by this means they 
erect unto themselves idols within their own hearts, and commit a most secret and 
spiritual Idolatry, which the world cannot discern. 
Here again, the perennial issue of self-deception that can hide itself in worship arises, for 
any false understanding of God becomes a form of idolatry; indeed, one’s 
misinterpretation of God becomes an act of idolatry.  Concluding that “A false opinion, is 
an idol of falsehood,” Perkins warns his readers of the idols conceived by man’s mind: 
“God is to be conceived as he reveals himself unto us, and no otherwise: if otherwise, 
God is not conceived, but a fiction or idol of the brain” (674).   
Perkins’ concern with “a fiction or idol of the brain” seems relevant when 
considering Leontes’ jealousy, especially since the baseless quality of the king’s jealousy 
is evident both to the people around him and to the watching spectators.  Going back to 
the question of “How should this grow,” then, I want to keep this notion of an “idol in the 
brain” and examine some key moments that lead up to and exemplify Leontes’ jealousy.  
Polixenes’ idyllic description of his and Leontes’ childhoods provides a good starting 
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point for such an investigation.  Responding to Hermione’s teasing question about his and 
Leontes’ childhoods together, Polixenes states: 
We were as twinn'd lambs that did frisk i' the sun, 
And bleat the one at the other: what we changed 
Was innocence for innocence; we knew not 
The doctrine of ill-doing, nor dream'd 
That any did. Had we pursued that life, 
And our weak spirits ne'er been higher rear'd 
With stronger blood, we should have answer'd heaven 
Boldly 'not guilty;' the imposition clear'd 
Hereditary ours… 
Temptations have since then been born to’s, for 
In those unfledged days was my wife a girl; 
Your precious self had then not crossed the eyes 
Of my young playfellow. (1.2.66-78) 
This moment of explicit mirroring in the language of this speech has elicited much 
psychoanalytic explanation.
11
  While there is much about this speech that is fascinating, I 
want to focus on what is unspoken.  That is, the Bohemian king’s depiction of their 
childhood is interesting not so much for what it says, but what he so insistently avows as 
absence: “the doctrine of ill-doing.”  Not only is it not a possibility in their horizon of 
knowledge, such a doctrine lies beyond their ability to even “dream” up.   
If we take Polixenes’ description as a window into Leontes’ mind as well, then 
this short exchange about childhood, ill-doing, and who comes to sabotage paradise 
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yields interesting results for how to understand the king’s jealousy.  According to 
Polixenes’ idyllic description, what was missing from their idyllic experience together in 
youth was any consciousness of sin.  He expresses this in terms that suggest the 
impossibility of an inner idolatry, that is, one that is formed within.  As Polixenes’ 
answer attests, the deep innocence of the boys who could not even “dream” that there 
could be ill-doing was forever changed by what “crossed the eyes / Of [his] young 
playfellow.”  It is a fall that begins with the eye and then develops through the workings 
of imaginings within.  Demonic agency is projected upon the seductive figure, whose 
presence is assigned responsibility for infecting and corrupting the innocent (if hapless) 
viewer.  Indeed, Hermione’s playful response to Polixenes’ description—“Of this make 
no conclusion, lest you say / Your queen and I are devils” (1.2.80-1)—takes on ominous 
reality through Leontes’ later accusations.  Likewise, the playful disavowal of any 
knowledge of a “doctrine of ill-doing” enables Leontes’ later burst of jealousy by 
attributing all causation to the (adulterous) image before his eyes.  Whereas others would 
counsel the king that what he sees is nothing, Leontes insists that there is indeed 
something.  As he tells a disbelieving Camillo, if there is “nothing” between his wife and 
Polixenes, “Why then the world and all that’s in’t is nothing, / The covering sky is 
nothing, Bohemia nothing, / My wife is nothing, nor nothing have these nothings / If this 
be nothing” (1.2.289-93).   
The remarkable sort of faith that Leontes has in his perceptions and affections—a 
kind of faith that “make possible things not so held” (1.2.138)—becomes possible in a 
person who sees “ill-doing” as motivated by externals rather than an “inner idolatry” that 
Reformists fretted over.  Indeed, although there existed plenty of advice against avoiding 
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what would cause one to “trip,” contemporary devotional texts also frequently placed the 
burden of idolatry on one’s inner eye—a practice that echoed biblical injunctions towards 
self-knowledge.  Without such an understanding of inner idolatry, the “doctrine of ill-
doing” and utter depravity could not make sense.  The emphasis on inward depravity 
built upon Christ’s definitive policy on such matters: “For from within, euen out of the 
heart of men, proceede euill thoughtes, adulteries, fornications, murthers, thefts, 
couetousnes, wickedness, deceite, vncleanness, a wicked eye, backbiting, pride, 
foolishnesse. All these euill things come from within, and defile a man” (Mark 7:21-23 
Geneva).  In light of Christ’s logic about what truly defiles a man, Leontes’ frenzied 
expression of revulsion gains a kind of heightened irony, since his accusations point to 
his own depraved mind than any kind of reality.  It is, in Perkins’ words, a “most secret 
and spiritual idolatry” that engages in self-deception.  Such definitions of idolatry 
question any easy correlations between outside and inside; if idolatry is an issue of things 
internal (the mind and the heart), Polixenes’s depiction of man’s fall from innocence is 
ultimately an inaccurate one, since the blame lies so squarely on the intruder.  
Such belief in the boys’ innocent passivity before their eyes have been “crossed” 
has interesting ramifications for how The Winter’s Tale counters antitheatrical 
sentiments.  The theater had become conflated with idolatry because its detractors 
deemed the stage’s imitation of reality to be morally dangerous.  The reasoning behind 
this necessitated that the viewer be constructed in a certain way—that is, as a defenseless 
recipient of sensorial attacks that pollute the mind.  For example, Gosson asks in his 
second attack against the stage: “If we be carefull that no pollution of idoles enter by the 
mouth into our bodies, how diligent, how circumspect, how wary ought we to be, that no 
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corruption of idols, enter by the passage of our eyes & eares into the soule?” (Qtd 
O’Connell 14).  Avoidance of idolatry through the stage became a regulation of the self 
that must monitor and censor what comes into the eyes and ears, and it was frequently 
described in the language of pollution and infection.  Although Leontes is, in many ways, 
an iconoclastic character, his embracing of outward infection aligns him with 
antitheatrical portrayals of the hapless viewer as well.  The question of “how should this 
grow” is answered by placing the blame on the demonic idol—in his case, his wife.  The 
king’s wounded sense of victimization smacks of the antitheatricalists’ construction of 
the audience member, whose senses are assaulted by what they see on the idolatrous 
stage.  It perhaps makes sense, then, that the play’s meta-theatrical moments, which are 
so wondrously displayed in the last redemptive scene, are sources of dark speculation and 
imaginings in the stony world of the first acts: “Go play, boy, play—thy mother plays, / 
and I / Play too, but so disgraced a part, whose issue / Will hiss me to my grave” 
(1.2.184-86).  While I will expand on the antitheatrical strain later on in this chapter, it is 
interesting to note here how often derivations of the word perform occur in the play 
(eleven times), and that the word is frequently used to describe Leontes’ will: “The king’s 
will be performed!” (2.1.114).  The fact, then, that the living body of Hermione breaks 
the nightmare and endless cycle of Leontes’ inefficacious repentance is significant; only 
in his wife’s presence does the king fully perform a redemptive repentance.  By doing so, 
the final scene points to how performance itself undergoes redemption from the 
beginning to the end of the play. 
Leontes’ idolatrous vision serves to explain the objectifying language that flows 
with astonishing variety from his lips.  Hermione is by turns a thing, a hobby-horse, a 
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bed-swerver, because Leontes subscribes to his own private perspective which cannot 
even “dream” that it might be faulty.  As a result, Hermione must remain objectified so 
that she can serve as a creation of his imagination, and such beliefs seem to drive a 
refusal to recognize Hermione as an individual (if she is false, all women are false).  
Leontes’ objectification of his wife also becomes evident through the distancing language 
with which he describes Hermione.  After charging into the female space of the nursery, 
for example, Leontes declares to his lords: 
Look on her, mark her well; be but about 
To say that she is a goodly lady, and  
The justice of your hearts will thereto add 
‘Tis pity she’s not honest. Honourable; 
Praise her but for this her without-door form, 
Which on my faith deserves high speech, and straight 
The shrug, the hum or ha, these petty brands 
That calumny doth use—O, I am out!  
That mercy does, for calumny will sear 
Virtue itself; these shrugs, these hums and has, 
When you have said she’s goodly, come between, 
Ere you can say she’s honest. But be’t known,  
From him that has most cause to grieve it should be, 
She’s an adulteress! (2.1.63-78) 
Commanding his lords to “look on her,” Leontes relates to his wife as a critic who sees 
beyond the surface of the aesthetic object: she may seem “honourable” in her “without-
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door form,” but he knows better.  Yet, as this scene and others make clear, in order for his 
vision to “work,” Leontes cannot see Hermione as she is; the image/idol of the mind 
becomes more real than the breathing form before him.  Again and again, then, Leontes 
distances himself from the reality of his wife by insisting on her deviant sexuality.  Even 
as he accuses Hermione of failing to distinguish between her true husband and a false 
one, Leontes’ vision is one that can see his wife only as flesh and the rest of the world as 
“a bawdy planet” (1.2.199). In a perverse way, Leontes’ certain knowledge of 
Hermione’s true status as an adulteress seems to replace a husband’s “knowledge” of his 
wife. 
Perhaps the greatest indication of Leontes’ inner idolatry is his reliance upon a 
key term in the play: affection.  Even before the infamous “Affection! Thy intention stabs 
the centre” speech, affection provides the groundwork for Leontes’ identity.  The opening 
scene’s conversation between Camillo and Archidamus makes clear the fact that affection 
is the bond between Polonius and Leontes.  Camillo assures Archidamus that “…there 
rooted betwixt them then such an affection which cannot choose but branch now” 
(1.1.22-23).  Affection, of course, also means more than kindly feelings; the dominant 
early modern sense of the word was grounded in the body as we have noted, and it was 
closely aligned to the term “senses.”  David Ward’s investigation into contemporary 
meaning of the word offers insight into the usages of the word, and his emphasis on the 
fact that affection can play “a dominant and coercive role in the non-physical world” 
seems accurate.
12
  However, whereas Ward emphasizes the medical and psychological 
senses behind the term “affection,” I look to the coercive role given to affections in 
religious discourse.  One’s affections provided the counterpart to reason, and often served 
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a synonymous function for the heart and the imagination.  Although one’s affections 
needed to be stirred up in order to engage in authentic devotion, they could also become a 
source of idolatry because they composed such an integral part of how one understood 
selfhood.  Moreover, since self-originating images were considered idolatrous, affections 
also played an important role in defining idolatry by becoming an idol itself.  Thus, 
affection provides the means for what Perkins labels “secret” idolatry: when men “frame 
God according to their own desires and affections.”   
Such subtleties involved in idolatry were concerns in devotional tracts.  John 
Bradford, for example, notes the correlation between worshipping an outward idol and an 
inward image when he writes, “For as in times past, when I did not know this [second] 
commandment, I was an image-worshipper of stocks, stones &c, yea, bread and wine; so 
now I am a worshipper of mine affections, offering to them the service due unto thee” 
(Qtd Aston 459).  Bradford realizes that the privileged status given to “mine affections” 
is as much an act of idolatry as the externalized idolatry practiced in “times past.” 
Lancelot Andrewes pairs an unhealthy devotion to one’s affections with “prophaness,” 
and writes: “When a man will be carried by his affections in every thing, and do that 
which seemeth good in his own eyes, when he will be under no yoke or bands but breake 
them, giving credit to nothing but what his own God (corrupt reason) him to, doing 
nothing but by his own direction and what his own will stands affected to.”
13
  The 
idolatry of one’s affections leads one to a kind of solipsistic circle in which no other 
perspective exists except “that which seemeth good in his own eyes.”   
In light of how affections themselves can become a kind of idol, Leontes’ bizarre 
paean to “Affection” in Act I becomes less illegible.  Critics have dealt with this 
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confusing monologue in various ways.  Stephen Orgel notes that the speech is a testament 
to the “linguistic opacity” that is built into the play; David Ward reads it as an effort on 
Leontes’ part to make a self-diagnosis of his madness.
14
  Beginning with an address to 
Mamillius but ending in an apostrophe to “affection,” these lines serve as a crucial (and 
confusing) moment in the first act: 
---. Come, sir page, 
Look on me with your welkin eye. Sweet villain, 
Most dear’st, my collop—can thy dam, may’t be 
Affection!—thy intention stabs the centre. 
Thou dost make possible things not so held, 
Communicat’st with dreams—how can this be? 
With what’s unreal thou coactive art, 
And fellow’st nothing. Then ‘tis very credent 
Thou mayst co-join with something, and thou dost, 
And that beyond commission, and I find it, 
And that to the infection of my brains 
And hard’ning of my brows. (1.2.136-44) 
By using key terms within the play such as “dreams” and “nothing,” these lines teasingly 
point to the importance of affections.  Without trying to flatten out the richness of these 
verses, I suggest that one way to understand these lines is by reading the term affections 
as a sign of reliance upon one’s internal eye.  For  Leontes, affections are so powerful 
because “Thou dost make possible things not so held, / Communicat’st with dreams”—a 
strange perversion of the definition of faith.    
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The king’s insistence on the rightness of his perceptions can be seen, in effect, as 
an insistence on the rightness (and superiority) of his affection and senses.  Leontes’ 
confidence in his affections comes out clearly when he chides his officials with the 
rebuke, “You smell this business with a sense as cold / As is a dead man’s nose; but I do 
see’t and feel’t / As you feel doing thus” (2.1.151-3).  Unlike the lords whose senses are 
deadened, he is not fooled by Hermione’s falsely innocent image, because in his mind, 
his senses and affections are vibrantly alive.  Similarly, Leontes engages in self-
congratulation (albeit bitter) when he cries, “How blest am I / In my just censure, in my 
true opinion!” after finding out that Camillo had absconded with Polixenes.  The moment 
in which he chastises the lords is interesting because it seems emblematic of the kind of 
interpretative “infection” from which Leontes suffers: he cannot subscribe to the reality 
of things around him. The epistemology that drives Leontes assumptions about reality is 
made visible in this moment of comparison between affection (see’t and feel’t) and the 
reality of “thus.”  Indeed, the last line “thus,” which calls for some kind of stage business 
to follow, is subordinate to Leontes’ subjective reality of seeing and feeling.  That is, his 
comparison between a concrete “thus” and his ability to “see’t and feel’t” is one that 
overrides the authenticity offered through the tangible, embodied reality of touch.   
Leontes’ commitment to his own senses reaches tragic heights during the trial 
scene.  As many critics have noted, the message from Apollo is unusually clear in its 
staccato declaration of facts: “Hermione is chaste, Polixenes blameless, Camillo a true 
subject, Leontes a jealous tyrant, his innocent babe truly forgotten, and the King shall live 
without an heir if that which is lost be not found.”  Despite the clarity of the message, 
however, the king dismisses the pronouncement in favor of his own opinion.  It is only 
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through a second message—the death of his son—that Leontes surrenders his adherence 
to what he can construct in his mind’s eye.  The fact that Leontes is brought to his right 
senses through Mamillius’ death seems to resonate with the competition between 
subjective “see’t and feel’t” and the real matter of “thus”; that is, the fallen body of a son 
finally awakens the father from his dreams.  Recognition comes too late, however, and 
part of the redemption that occurs in the final scene of the play, then, is the reversal and 
restoration of Leontes’ senses. 
The confidence that Leontes places upon his affections contrasts sharply with the 
common antitheatrical rhetoric that also emphasized affections.  Performing bodies were 
demonized because they were judged to be idolatrous images that stirred up the affections 
of the vulnerable spectator, whose humoral psychology made them especially susceptible 
to the emotional effects of the theater.  While my previous chapter on Hamlet emphasized 
the role of affections in eliciting positive imitation, The Winter’s Tale provides a more 
complex portrayal of how affections operate in relationship to the stage.  Although lines 
such as “Go, play, boy, play: thy mother plays” assigns Hermione as a lascivious playing 
body, Leontes’ reliance upon his affections show him to be stirred by his imagination 
rather than the lively image of his wife.   
In light of how committed Leontes is to his blind vision, it is perhaps appropriate 
that Paulina assumes the roles of both physician and director in the play.  The roles are 
more deeply connected than one initially thinks, because of the nature of Leontes’ 
disease: his failure in vision.  In this way, like and unlike Cavell, I also understand the 
last crucial scene as a moment of recognition.
15
  The tragedy of the first three acts—the 
failure to see Hermione as she really is—becomes recovered in the explicitly meta-
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thetarical moments of the statue scene.  There, the spell of Leontes’ idolatrous vision can 
be finally broken in a moment that depicts stone turning into flesh.   
Leontes’ problematic vision also serves to explain the failure of Paulina’s method 
of “physic” in the first three acts.  Although Paulina draws attention to the lively image of 
his newborn babe by pointing out the visible match between father and daughter, it also 
becomes clear that Leontes’ role as a parent as well as a husband has been compromised 
by his idolatrous vision.  As critics have pointed out, Leontes’ sudden descent into 
jealousy seems connected to an anxiety about his true connection to his son.  Leontes 
ends the “Too hot, too hot!” speech with a sudden turn to Mamillius and asks, “Art thou 
my boy?” (1.2.118)  The question of Hermione’s fidelity places his firstborn into a 
questionable state as well, yet Mamillius is able to “pass” the test because he, in effect, 
can offer ocular proof of his sonship.  As Leontes himself states, “Yet they say we are / 
Almost as like as eggs” (1.2.128-9); the son looks exactly like the father, and thus 
escapes the wrath of Leontes’ jealousy.  Paulina seems to depend on a similar logic of 
visible proof to work in her favor when she decides to “physic” the king by showing him 
his newborn babe; however, her tactic fails to bring about the desired result, and Perdita 
is condemned to be abandoned in the wilderness.  
Reasoning that “We do not know / How he may soften at the sight o’th’ child” 
(2.2.41), Paulina presents Perdita before Leontes and his lords:   
---. Behold, my lords, 
Although the print be little, the whole matter 
And copy of the father—eye, nose, lip, 
The trick of’s frown, his forehead, nay, the valley, 
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The pretty dimples of his chin and cheek, his smiles, 
The very mould and frame of hand, nail, finger. (2.3.97-102) 
In a moment reminiscent of Leontes’ earlier speech to the lords to “look upon” 
Hermione, Paulina commands the all to look upon the babe.  Unlike Leontes, however, 
what Paulina draws attention to is not her conjectures about the babe, but the lively image 
of Perdita and what is plain to the sight of all who are there: the babe is the “copy of the 
father” and thus his legitimate issue.  Here, the threatening notion of counterfeits, false 
likenesses, and bastards seem to be defused through the clarity drawn from common 
sense: the imitative resemblance between father and daughter. By drawing attention to 
the physical attributes of the babe, Paulina’s solution is one that would “physic” the king 
with flesh-and-blood evidence.  So why does Leontes reject this evidence of exact copy, 
if he accepted the visible link with his son?   
 In order to answer this question, it is helpful to turn our attention to a speech 
uttered by an earlier Leontes.  Attributing his distraction to his thoughts about Mamillius, 
Leontes answers a questioning Hermione with this explanation:  
 …Looking on the lines 
 Of my boy’s face, methoughts I did recoil 
 Twenty-three years, and saw myself unbreeched 
 In my green velvet coat, my dagger muzzled 
 Lest it should bite its master, and so prove, 
 As ornaments oft do’s, too dangerous. 
 How like, methought, I then was to this kernel, 
 This squash, this gentleman. Mine honest friend, 
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Will you take eggs for money? (1.2.152-9) 
The lineaments of his boy’s face transport Leontes to an earlier time of “unbreeched,” 
androgynous childhood.  It is evident from his words that Leontes’ method of gazing 
remains idolatrous, however: he sees yet does not see Mamillius; his boy actually serves 
as a mirror for the father.  This insistent demand on self is also a form of idolatry 
(remember Luther’s succinct definition of the carnal self, curvatus in se).  When Leontes 
is asked to look upon his identical issue in Perdita, then, he cannot find a similar mirror 
unto himself—most prominently, I suggest, in the fact that there is no phallic sign of the 
“dagger muzzeled.”  Indeed, Paulina’s commentary on the visible connections between 
father and daughter are unwelcomingly female, especially in context of Leontes’ 
misogynous language against Paulina.  The feminine traits of the daughter also threaten 
the masculinity of the father, for among the matter that proves the babe to be the “copy of 
the father” are: “The pretty dimples of his chin and cheek, his smiles / The very mould 
and frame of hand, nail, finger” (2.3.101-2).  Paulina’s strategy of offering visible proof 
fails because, amongst other things, Leontes’ self-centered gaze cannot accommodate the 
sexual difference (or similarities) that exists between himself and his daughter.   
HERMIONE’S SUFFERING BODY 
 The competition between a vision of inner idolatry and real presence finds its 
focal point through the figure of Hermione.  Although Leontes insists upon representing 
her as an adulteress, Hermione resists such villifying gestures.  Indeed, though she is a 
figure of courtly social grace and verbal wit, Hermione shows herself to be a character 
predominantly aligned with suffering—a fact that is made clear through Antigonus’ 
recitation of his dream encounter with her in Act III.  He states, “To me comes a creature, 
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/ Sometimes her head on one side, some another; / I never saw a vessel of like sorrow / 
So filled, and so becoming” (3.3.18-21).  Here, the sexual incontinence of which Leontes 
accuses her (and, by connection, all womankind) becomes one of watery sorrow: “her 
eyes / Became two spouts.”  Like the Ghost in Hamlet, Hermione is a lively image with 
much power.  Although recent criticism has employed feminist perspectives to treat 
Hermione as a character, a perspective that considers the qualities of her martyrdom 
bettern enables us to explore the key term grace and to put Hermione’s character into 
focus.  Rather than sexual transgressions, Hermione’s body bears the marks of a martyr 
and is ultimately a suffering body rather than a “slippery” one.   
The trial scene in Act III not only highlights Hermione’s verbal eloquence, but the 
real presence of her body and its present state.  Hermione’s language of corporeality—
specifically, her suffering body—effectively dispels the dreams and threats of her 
husband.  She states: 
 Sir, spare your threats. 
The bug which you would fright me with I seek. 
To me can life be no commodity; 
The crown and comfort of my life, your favour, 
I do give lost, for I do feel it gone, 
But know not how it went. My second joy, 
And first fruits of my body, from his presence 
I am barred like one infectious. My third comfort, 
Starred most unluckily, is from my breast, 
The innocent milk in its most innocent mouth, 
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Haled out to murder; myself on every post 
Proclaimed a strumpet; with immodest hatred 
The childbed privilege denied, which ‘longs 
To women of all fashion; lastly, hurried 
Here, to this place, i’th’ open air, before 
I have got strength of limit. (3.2.89-104) 
Hermione dismisses the “bug” with which he threatens her, and turns his (and our) 
attention to her present condition.  She does not fear the punishment of death, since all of 
her joys have been taken from her.  The performative elements of this scene focus upon 
the visible proof of her losses: her now unpregnant body.  Hermione’s speech is visibly 
underscored by her literally deflated figure, which serves as a startling contrast to her 
fertile form in the last act.  Her diction, too, is full of female body parts (body, breast, 
milk), and she seems to purposely point out her frail body which has been “hurried / 
Here, to this place, i’th’ open air.”  As Gail Kern Paster points out, Hermione’s trial 
“displaces the churching ceremony, which even for queens, was the proper form of public 
reincorporation into the social body because it represented an affirmation of the bodily 
recovery and purgation that traversed all gradients of rank” (272).  Her suffering is 
compounded by the fact that she has been denied the privilege of bedrest “which ‘longs / 
To women of all fashion.”  By fleshing out her experiences and identifying herself as a 
suffering body, Hermione resists the label of adulterous flesh that Leontes would foist 
upon her.    
 While critics such as Patricia Gourlay have noted that Shakespeare “already used 
‘femaleness’ to imply the limitations of a masculine world” by the time he writes The 
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Winter’s Tale, he writes for Hermione a self-defense which draws upon a tradition of 
female suffering that circulated with the depictions of martyrs.  Indeed, the circumstances 
of her imprisonment and, in particular, the fact that she gives birth to Perdita while 
imprisoned resonate interestingly with examples of female martyrs found in works like 
Foxe’s Acts and Monuments.  As my work on Foxe points out, the suffering body 
radically reduces the potential for counterfeit performance and shrinks the space between 
sign and thing.  When Hermione invokes her father, the Emperor of Russia, and wishes 
that “he were alive, and here beholding / His daughter’s trial!” she seems to invoke the 
watching eyes of the spectators as well, and guaranteeing that they see “with eyes / Of 
pity” (3.2.118-121).   
Hermione emphasizes her weak and vulnerable state by drawing attention to her 
bereft status.  The bodying forth of her sufferings resonates with the late medieval 
tradition of aligning the female with the humanity of Christ.  As Bynum notes, “The 
symbolic association of humanity with the female thus derived strength both from the 
association of humanity with physicality (and woman was the symbol of flesh) and from 
the association of Christ’s humanity with his mother” (269).  Hermione’s suffering body 
reinterprets the carnal transgressions with which Leontes accuses her; in this way, though 
the nightmarish interpretation of Leontes’ vision insists on asserting itself, it is 
encouraged to change from imagination to reality.   
PROBLEMS AND PROMISES OF REDEMPTION IN BOHEMIA 
 The structure of The Winter’s Tale as a tragidomedy becomes evident in Act IV, 
and I want to examine how the pastoral interlude in Bohemia prepares us for the final 
statue scene.   Overflowing with symbolic elements of spring and new life, the new 
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generation signified through Perdita and Florizel promises to overcome the mistakes of 
the former generation. Even as the elements of the first three acts’ elite tragedy seem to 
be recast, however, the shadow of Leontes’ warped vision also threatens the bond 
between Perdita and Florizel.  The promises of redemption in Bohemia seem to be beset 
by potential problems and dangers; specifically, the devotion that Perdita naturally 
inspires from the men around her threatens to make her into an object of idolatry, and 
Florizel’s reliance upon his affections resonate dangerously with Leontes’ earlier 
idolatrous gaze.  Moreover, the protean figure of Autolycus, through his enervating 
effects upon his “spectators,” underscores the antitheatricalists’ worst fears about theater.  
Assessing the problems and promises for redemption in Act IV allows us to be in a better 
position to examine the performance of redemption in the last act. 
Various critics have pointed out how the pastoral interlude is not free from the 
earlier theme of misogyny: it is apparent through Polixenes’ harsh language against 
Perdita.  Rather than misogyny, I examine the traces of idolatry that are apparent in this 
act, and the ways in which Perdita becomes a problematic object of idolatry who must 
negotiate its dangers.
16
  The idyllic rural scene is one in which, we’re told again and 
again, Perdita is a “queen.”  The lavish compliments that her lover piles upon her are met 
with uneasy self-deprecation by the lowly shepherdess, however, who spurns being 
“pranked up” like a goddess.  The prestige of being “goddess-like” is a false kind of 
imitation that worries Perdita, and there is an iconoclastic tendency about her uneasiness 
that comes out in her rejection of any false images and falsifying exteriors.  Perdita 
herself is featured pictorially by the men around her, however, and such language of 
representation makes clear the fact that there is a persistent desire to view her as an 
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aesthetic object.  It is Camillo rather than her suitor who most clearly articulates this 
idolatrous urge, however, when he tells Perdita, “I should leave grazing, were I of your 
flock, / And only live by gazing” (4.4.109-110).  The perpetual quality implicit in this 
remark threatens to freeze Perdita into a kind of goddess-statue, or an idol.   
 The threatening stilling implicit in Camillo’s compliment to Perdita is a 
noticeable theme in Florizel’s praise of his beloved as well.  Indeed, his loving desire for 
her to keep on doing what she does holds troubling implications.  Responding to Perdita’s 
self-critiquing statement that she “plays” as those who play in “Whisun pastorals” and 
that her disposition is changing through her changed weeds, Florizel states: 
What you do 
Still betters what is done. When you speak, sweet. 
I'd have you do it ever: when you sing, 
I'd have you buy and sell so, so give alms, 
Pray so; and, for the ordering your affairs, 
To sing them too: when you do dance, I wish you 
A wave o' the sea, that you might ever do 
Nothing but that; move still, still so, 
And own no other function: each your doing, 
So singular in each particular, 
Crowns what you are doing in the present deed, 
That all your acts are queens. 
The adoring words of a lover to his beloved betray a desire for stillness, and a perpetuity 
that allows for masculine control over the female subject.  While Florizel points out the 
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redemptive “bettering” that all of Perdita’s actions bring, his praise is also a command for 
her to be frozen in what she does: “I’d have you do it ever.”  The desire that she should 
“ever do / Nothing but that” is dangerously close to a desire that she stop doing anything 
altogether.  The speech’s conflicted urgings for both action and stillness become evident 
in lines such as “move still, still so, / And own no other function.”  At the end of his 
adoring speech, Florizel’s devotion threatens to become a deadening one, in which 
Perdita’s liveliness threatens to transform into the “dead stocks and stones” of idols. 
Part of what Perdita must negotiate, then, are the ways in which the men around 
her try to represent her.  She proves to be more than a match for anyone who would turn 
her into a senseless idol; indeed, her response to Camillo’s remark that he should “only 
live by gazing” is reminiscent of her mother’s playful wit: “Out, alas! / You’d be so lean, 
that blasts of January / Would blow you through and through.”  Perdita is also quick to 
deflect attention from herself and directs Camillo’s (and our) gaze to the lively figures 
surrounding her.  Turning to Florizel and then to the Shepherdesses, and invoking the 
sexual fertility of those “That wear upon your virgin branches yet / Your maidenheads 
growing,” she shatters Camillo’s deadening idolatry that would “only live by gazing” by 
turning our attention to these figures of springtime and fertility.  Perdita is equally self-
deprecating in response to Florizel’s “too large” praise in the same scene, yet less playful.  
Instead of employing witty playfulness when referring to Florizel’s hyperbolic (and 
potentially false) praise, she is all seriousness as she evaluates the verity of her lover’s 
purpose towards her.  Interestingly, Perdita sheds any possibility for suspicious thoughts 
by turning to a questionable proof of the prince’s virtue: his blood.  She states, “But that 
your youth / And the true blood which peeps fairly through’t / Do plainly give you out an 
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unstained shepherd, / With wisdom I might fear, my Doricles, / You wooed me the false 
way” (4.4.147-51).   
In a play that has much to do with verification, Perdita’s invocation of and 
reliance upon “true blood” is intriguing.  The reference to blood holds multiple senses; it 
not only points to the fact of Florizel’s noble heritage, but also to a fundamental humoral 
disposition on his part, which Perdita trusts is virtuous and makes him “an unstain’d 
shepherd.”  Although in obvious disguise, his playing remains unquestioned due to his 
true blood.  Like the dangerous motif of stoniness, however, the reference to one’s 
humoral workings resonates threateningly with the wintry world of the first three tragic 
acts: Leontes’ tyrannical passion.  Indeed, as Paulina’s description of what ails the king in 
Act III shows, Leontes’ problem is one of unbalanced humors, which she tries to cure 
through her words: “I / Do come with words as medicinal as true, / Honest as either, to 
purge him of that humour / That presses him from sleep.”  In this way, Perdita’s reliance 
upon Florizel’s “true blood” is ambiguously coded in the play: on one hand, it could 
indicate a virtuous nature that will remain unchanged; on the other hand, it could signify 
a disturbing resemblance to Leontes that would perpetuate the sins of the prior 
generation.   
Perdita’s reliance upon Florizel’s “true blood” becomes potentially more 
problematic when looking at Florizel’s own allegiance to his passions and humors.  After 
all the disguises are off and the young lovers find themselves facing separation, Florizel 
declares to a distraught Perdita:  
 It cannot fail but by 
 The violation of my faith; and then 
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 Let nature crush the sides o’the earth together 
 And mar the seeds within! Lift up thy looks: 
 From my succession wipe me, father; I 
 Am heir to my affection. (Italics mine) 
Declaring fealty to his affections rather than to his father, the young prince names himself 
as “heir to [his] affection.”  In light of Leontes’ earlier dependence on his affections, 
however, the term does not operate innocently at this point in the play.  Is the prince 
declaring fealty to his passions or to his own perspective?  And how trustworthy is his 
gaze that would have Perdita froze in perpetual action “still”? 
Despite the comic elements in this act, some of the shadows from the stony world 
of Sicilia hang over the festivity in Bohemia.  The wonder and devotion that Perdita’s 
beauty elicits in those around her mark her as a potential figure of idolatry, and her self-
effacement seems undergirded by a subconscious understanding of this dangerous 
potential even as she attempts to dispel it.  Her lover’s subscription to reality seems to be 
compromised by his allegiance to affections as well as a desire for her to be still.  Perhaps 
appropriately, then, Polixenes’ threat that he would “have thy beauty scratched with 
briers and made / More homely than thy state” resembles the iconoclastic zeal that fueled 
defacement of church images, since Perdita is a figure that invites devotion.  Perdita’s 
iconoclastic tendencies seem to motivate her rejection of gillyvores as well, which she 
refers to as “nature’s bastards” later on in the scene.  She fears that theirs is an idolatrous 
counterfeiting of nature: “For I have heard it said / There is an art which in their piedness 
shares / With great creating nature.”  Polixenes is quick to correct her rigid stance, and 
suggests that nature and art do not have to be at odds: “This is an art / Which does mend 
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nature—change it rather—but / The art itself is nature.”  Polixenes’ description of such 
an art has been interpreted as a gesture towards the art of theater.  While the general tenor 
of this interpretation is right-headed, it is important to note that the potential promise of 
theater is deliberately sabotaged in this fourth act.  Even as it gestures towards an ideal 
fusion between art and nature, the pastoral interlude merely promises rather than delivers 
redemption—something that becomes evident through the wily figure of theater in the 
play, Autolycus.    
After all the disguises come off and Polixenes has stormed off in anger, the play 
offers a series of meta-theatrical allusions.  Camillo’s solution for the young lovers have 
him take on the role of a playwright, as he assures Florizel that he does not need to fear 
any lack in financial resources: “It shall be so my care / To have you royally appointed, 
as if / The scene you play were mine” (4.4.588-90).  Florizel and Perdita become actors 
and Camillo’s care for them that of a playwright for his characters.  The notion of playing 
and staging is immediately picked up by the entrance of Autolycus, who comes on to the 
scene cackling with glee over how he has been able to con the gullible attendants of the 
sheepshearing.  Autolycus’ entrance is interesting because he not only continues the 
meta-theatrical elements initiated by Camillo, but also points to the incompleteness of 
performative redemption in Bohemia.  Indeed, though Autolycus is a figure of art and 
theater, he is also a figure who, in his trickeries, fulfills the antitheatricalists’ worst 
nightmare.  This becomes apparent in the description of those who come to buy from 
Autolycus.  So enthralled are they by the love songs he peddles, the purchasers are 
described as “senseless.”  Autolycus boasts, “No hearing, no feeling, but my sir’s song, 
and admiring the nothing of it.  So that in this time of lethargy I picked and cut most of 
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their festival purses” (4.4.608-611). It is picked up again by Autolycus’ later description 
of the way in which the shepherds eagerly come in order to buy his merchandise: “They 
throng who should buy first, as if my trinkets had been hallowed and brought a 
benediction to the buyer.”  The description of Autolycus’ customers matches the ways in 
which antitheatricalists depict the vulnerable spectator, whose senses are assaulted and 
debilitated by the images on the stage, and who are greedy for hollow scenes of gratuity.  
This description also resonates with the kind of senselessness attributed to Gertrude in the 
closet scene as well, and seems to point to a correlation between the participants and 
objects of idolatry: “no hearing, no feeling.”  Such lethargic effects upon the audience are 
in sharp contrast to the descriptions of marvel and wonder that are so prominent in the 
statue scenes.  
 The inadequacy of Autolycus’ theater is apparent not only by the enervating 
effects his products have on his audience, but in the description of the things he peddles.  
Again, though the figure and circumstances of Autolycus are clearly marked by humor 
and comedy, it is interesting to note how a tinge of religious language undergirds the 
description of the trickster’s trinkets and ribbons.  Autolycus’ entrance into the festival is 
announced by a servant in this way: “He hath ribbons of all the colours I’th’rainbow; 
points, more than all the lawyers in Bohemia can learnedly handle… inkles, caddisses, 
cambrics, lawns—why, he sings ‘em over as they were gods or goddesses.  You would 
think a smock were a she-angel, he so chants to the sleeve-hand and the work about the 
square on’t” (4.4.202-207).  While the wry tone of the servant’s description of Autolycus’ 
enthusiasm for his wares allows him to be a figure of comic relief, the description also 
overlaps with the language of relic worship and iconophilia.
17
  While I do not read this 
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moment as one in which Shakespeare secretly flexes his polemical muscles, I do see 
Autolycus as a figure through whom antitheatrical sentiments can be performed and 
critiqued.  Along with the development in plot and the promise of reunion anticipated in 
the last act, the Bohemian interlude also sets up an anticipation of theatrical wonder 
through a negative enactment of it.  While several elements in the act gesture toward the 
redemption of the final scene, Act IV is nonetheless marked by promise rather than 
fulfillment.  Even as the play makes use of “lower” elements to paint another picture of 
fertility, Act IV also highlights the play’s anxieties about improper mixing and presents 
the stage as a problematic site for such mingling.  Indeed, it is worthwhile to note that 
figures of “low” theater are missing from the final redemption scene, and there seems to 
be a distinction between types of theater that present counterfeit marvel and real wonder.  
Perhaps appropriately, then, Florizel’s response to Camillo’s plan to help him is a 
qualified one: “How, Camillo, / May this, almost a miracle, be done?” (4.4.530-1, italics 
mine).  It is not until the wonder of the final statue scene that the past is completely 
redeemed. 
STATUE SCENE 
 Marked by a husband’s repentance that seems to have no end in sight, and a 
kingdom without a viable heir to the throne, Act V opens upon a bleak note.  In lines such 
as those uttered by Cleomenes, the language of religious works and justification pervades 
the scene, and becomes strangely conflated with theater and imitation: “Sir, you have 
done enough, and have performed / A saint-like sorrow. No fault could you make / 
Which you have not redeemed; indeed, paid down / More penitence than done trespass” 
(5.1.4). The problem seems to lie in the notion of inadequate imitation, which is captured 
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in the phrase “saint-like.”  Though Cleomenes would comfort Leontes with the assurance 
that his performance of sorrow is sufficient, the king’s restlessness speaks otherwise.  
The impasse implicit in penitence—the question of when one’s sorrows can be 
considered enough—hangs heavily upon the scene, in which the theological meaning of 
grace (so frequently invoked in the play) is still missing.  The same idea of inadequacy 
pervades the conversation that follows, in which Paulina denies the possibility of 
replacing Hermione with another wife for the king.  Sicilia’s dynastic troubles do not 
compare to the fact that there is none who can parallel the original virtues of the dead 
queen; moreover, the Oracle’s pronunciation must be met in that Leontes cannot have an 
heir until what is lost is found.  This notion fuels Paulina’s brokering of promises from 
Leontes, for she demands the following requirement for the replacement of the dead 
queen: “Unless another / As like Hermione as is her picture / Affront his eye” (5.1.74-5).  
If there is to be a replacement queen, she must be a perfect imitation and copy of the old 
one. 
The last scene that takes place in Paulina’s chapel sets up explicit references to 
theater and imitation, and fulfills Paulina’s requirement that one “as like Hermione as is 
her picture” replace the queen.  Of course, what ultimately occurs is that no such 
replacement occurs, since Hermione never died, and she poses as a statue with her living 
body.  Frequently (if not quite accurately) dubbed as the “statue scene,” this last scene 
has been the subject of much critical interpretation that focuses on the nature of the 
wonder at work.  Drawing upon Levinasian ethics, James A. Knapp interprets the scene 
as a commentary on faith by “prioritizing of the ethical over the visual” and states that 
“the statue scene emphasizes the overcoming of both language and vision in favor of an 
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‘otherwise’—something beyond both the stasis of the visual image and the self-affirming 
word” (276).  That “something beyond” the image and the word resonates squarely with 
contemporary religious debates—specifically, with questions about how one’s idolatrous 
vision can be remedied. 
Critics such as Julia Reinhard Lupton, Michael O’Connell, and Huston Diehl have 
connected this scene to sectarian aesthetics.  With Diehl, we can see the final scene as 
recuperating the stage from charges of idolatry.  Yet, given the perspective that we have 
been developing here, it would seem that the redemptive process lies in the lively figure 
of Hermione, who acts as the agent redemption, rather in than Paulina’s rebuking 
qualities.  Although Paulina’s rebuke is a necessary antecedent to the success of the last 
scene, there is a decisive break rather than a continuity between her earlier role as 
rebuking physician and her later role as an extension of theater.  Diehl rightly notes that 
the play acknowledges “the essential impurity of the stage” and sees in the figure of 
apostle Paul an appropriate figure of hybridity; the stage is recuperated, however, through 
a different, but no less important, Pauline notion: the body as a legitimate vehicle for 
devotion.  The “physic” that Paulina was unable to perform in the earlier acts, she can 
now enact in her role as director and magician.  In doing so, she points out the “lawful” 
nature of what she does by directing the focus of the audience upon the lively image of 
Hermione’s body.  More than the aural components of the scene, it is Hermione’s flesh 
and blood presence that dispels anxieties about unlawful magic.  Despite the call to 
awaken our faith, the fact is that the statue has been the real Hermione all along.  Rather 
than offering tribute to an inanimate imitation, the characters (and we) find out to our 
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delight that Hermione is alive; rather than being an aesthetically distant object, Hermione 
is immanent and human in her wrinkled state.   
This scene engages with antitheatrical rhetoric in complex ways.  It has been 
commonly noted that the scene is rife with the conventional accoutrements of “popish 
idolatry”: an idol and people who feel compelled to kneel before and ask blessings of a 
stone statue.  It is important to note another way, however, in which the statue scene 
connects to the dangers of the stage: its competition with the pulpit.  As the most 
effective “physic” that Paulina has in her arsenal, and in its effectiveness in eliciting 
repentance and self-knowledge from Leontes, the statue plays a role conventionally 
attributed to sermons.  The fact that this figure of potential idolatry is staged as worthy 
“physic,” then, has interesting ramifications for how the scene may be engaging in 
dialogue with antitheatrical diatribes.  Leontes’ response to the statue is especially 
notable: 
As now she might have done, 
So much to my good comfort as it is 
Now piercing to my soul.  O, thus she stood, 
Even with such life of majesty—warm life 
As now it coldly stands—when first I wooed her. 
I am ashamed.  Does not the stone rebuke me 
For being more stone than it?  O royal piece! 
There’s magic in thy majesty, which has  
My evils conjured to remembrance, and 
From thy admiring daughter took the spirits, 
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Standing like stone with thee. (5.3.33-42) 
The “piercing” effects of the statue resemble the attributes usually allocated to 
logocentric means: “For the word of God is quick, and powerful, and sharper than any 
twoedged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints 
and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart” (Hebrews 4:12, 
KJV).  In possessing such piercing powers, Paulina’s statue enacts the “physic” 
traditionally ascribed to effective sermons.  In this way, the fear that theater could 
potentially replace sermons—that they be “as good as sermons”—seems to be reflected 
and simultaneously deflected in this moment.  Indeed, the reference to his stoniness is 
interesting in light of Gosson’s antitheatrical comment about what happens to spectators: 
they “so looke, so gaze, so gape upon plaies, that as men that stare on the head of 
Maedusa and are turned to stone, wee freze unto ease in our own follies.”
18
  The 
potentially idolatrous image, in a sense, has a Medusa-like effect in that it reminds 
Leontes of his shame and rebukes him.  The crucial difference is, however, the fact that 
Leontes is able to acknowledge his stoniness and, paradoxically, embark upon the process 
of his softening.  
Why is this last scene so insistently visual and why does it venture so boldly into 
the dangerous realm of idolatry?  What does it mean for Paulina’s role to change from a 
verbal advocate to a stage director?  If we consider the precise nature of Leontes’ 
illness—his diseased affection and vision—then the elaborate operation of Paulina’s last 
and most effective “physic” begins to make sense.  Part of the lesson that Leontes must 
learn in this final chapel scene has much to do with doctrine of ill-doing, to which he had 
owned up before and yet could not break out of.  I argue that Leontes learns to accept 
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grace here by surrendering his epistemological certainty—that is, his earlier confidence in 
his senses and affections.  The king’s willingness to do away with his autonomous senses 
become most apparent in his pleading response to Paulina: 
O sweet Paulina, 
Make me think so twenty years together! 
No settled senses of the world can match  
The pleasure of that madness. Let’s alone. (5.3.70-74) 
Recalling his previous attachment to affections, we now see Leontes preferring the 
“madness” of fantasy to an state of reasonable and settled senses.  Rather than privileging 
his idolatrous inner eye, however, Leontes now asks for Paulina’s “physic” that will 
reform his senses.  By using the term “madness,” Leontes evokes the destructive nature 
of his earlier jealous delusions; however, it is now a tamed desire to live in the fantasy of 
wistful make-believe—a fantasy that wondrously comes to life before his (and the 
audience’s) eyes in the next few moments.  Interestingly, Leontes’ words also recall 
almost verbatim Florizel’s earlier words regarding his reckless action in Bohemia: “If 
not, my senses, better pleased with madness, / Do bid it welcome” (4.4.463-64).  The 
promise of comedic transaction seems to lie in these words as well as anywhere else, 
since they point to Leontes’ loosening grip on his idolatrous senses.  Because the statue in 
its marvelous mimetic qualities has the promises of transporting Leontes beyond what his 
reasoning leads him to believe, the king willingly surrenders his affections.     
In this way, the common complaint about the stage—its assault upon one’s 
senses—becomes redeemed as a piercing assault that performs “physic.”  Unlike the kind 
of theater that Autolycus practices, Paulina’s theater is one that galvanizes the audience 
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members toward remembrance and repentance.  As Leontes assures Paulina, “this 
affliction has a taste as sweet / As any cordial comfort” (5.3.76-77).  If one of 
antitheatricalists’ common fears was the theater’s ability to transform the spectator, then 
the fact that Leontes is so visibly moved has interesting countering effects to this charge.  
Paulina states, “I’ll draw the curtain. / My lord’s so far transported that / He’ll think anon 
it lives” (5.3.66-69).  Instead of being transported by his jealous rage, he is now 
transported by the image before him.  A key component of Leontes’ redemption seems to 
involve being too stirred, and the open state of his senses allows him to see with clear 
eyes.  And what is it that he sees?  This is a nagging question that underlies the first three 
acts, for though Leontes insists that he has seen the “spider” in his cup, it is also clear that 
his senses cannot be trusted.  It is perhaps appropriate, then, that this last scene is such a 
visually rich one, and that this visual quality is built through careful description of the 
figure standing before them.  The description of the statue belies any connection to the 
erotic language of the adoring blazon.  Although the statue strikes all with marvel and 
awe, it is a kind of awe that nonetheless notes the defects as well as the perfections: “But 
yet, Paulina, / Hermione was not so much wrinkled, nothing / So aged as this seems” 
(5.3.27-29).  The details that the men notice about the statue are clinically detached rather 
than aesthetically imaginative: “See, my lord, / Would you not deem it breathed, and that 
those veins / Did verily bear blood?” (5.3.63-64) 
It is clear now that what Leontes sees is objectively real, and is a vision directed 
away from idolatrous impulses that only look for oneself.  Instead of placing confidence 
in his affections and senses, Leontes now sees Hermione as she is.  This is perhaps why 
there is very little trace of Hermione as a sexual being here, since Leontes’ earlier 
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idolatrous vision insisted upon seeing his wife as just flesh.
19
  The “Too hot, too hot!” 
response to the clasping of hands between Hermione and Polixenes in the beginning acts 
of the play is now transformed into an “O, she’s warm!”  The faith that is awakened in 
this final scene is ultimately lawful because it is not the kind that is “coactive” with 
“what’s unreal.”  The king’s perverted faith in his affections and senses—a sign of one’s 
reliance upon one’s imagination rather than what’s real—is dispelled through the 
potentially idolatrous image of Hermione’s statue.  Although the sculpture, an art form 
close to drama, was closely linked to “graven images” forbidden in injunctions about 
idolatry, the promise of an art which “itself is nature” finds fulfillment through this 
potentially idolatrous figure.   
As Diehl notes, Paulina’s command for an awakening of faith recalls the very 
words used to mock idols.  For example, John Vernon writes: “Wo unto hym, that sayeth 
unto the woode, awake; and unto the dumme stone: ryse uppe.  Shoulde the same teach: 
Beeholde, it is layed over with golde and silver, and there is no breathe in it” (Qtd Diehl, 
78).  The idols that were so gleefully ridiculed, however, were easy targets precisely 
because they were “dumme stone” without any breath.  Hermione’s breathing warmth 
and the lively presence of her body engage the senses rather than dispose of them; that is, 
the “senselessness” attributed to both the “dumme stone” and the idolater are effectively 
dispelled through the liveliness of the transporting image.  The faith that Paulina 
commands the spectators to awaken, then, is not a quenching of one’s senses, but a faith 
that depends on true senses.  And Shakespeare seems to suggest that the public stage, 
when carefully managed, is a salutary place for the training of the audience’s senses. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In certain ways, this study has investigated the kind of epistemology uttered by 
Milton’s blind hero when he states, “The way to know were but to see and taste.”  
Although Reformation anxieties regarding reliable signs made the concept of “real 
presence” problematic, religious texts also privileged the stamp of authenticity by a fierce 
rejection of hypocrisy—a hypocrisy made up of a compartmentalized knowledge of the 
divine.  Within the domain of religion, the instability of language implicit in humanist 
hermeneutics made right imitatio one that privileged the signs of the body; “the way to 
know” elicited an embodied response that encompassed one’s affections and bodily 
members as well as the mind.  This study argues that such discourses surrounding “true” 
devotion allow for a greater understanding of how epistemological complexities operate 
in early modern texts.   
The painstaking way in which idolatrous images are jettisoned out of the 
Reformed church does not touch a fundamental Reformist desire for the tangibility of 
faith, a materialistic devotion that utilizes the human body as a reliable sign of 
authenticity.  The anxieties of textual imitatio instigated a deep distrust of language itself; 
the fierce onset of iconoclasm made certain that traditional religious images were 
destroyed.  Such anxieties play themselves out in the proliferation of emblematic works 
which, like Egyptian hieroglyphs, provide language without the fallen mediation of 
words in the seventeenth century.  Although due to limitations of space and time, I have 
not ventured into seventeenth century religious lyric poetry, I see the kind of embodied 
aesthetic take place in works of poetry that explore the inadequacy of language even as 
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they acknowledge its beauty.  Indeed, the “something understood” of George Herbert’s 
poem on prayer is a communication that is perfectly understood and yet surpasses 
description.  
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